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ABSTRACT
In the following dissertation, I consider how the legal challenges faced by LGBTI
refugees might compel reflection on and revision to traditional conceptions of citizenship in the
United States. Specifically, I explore the question of how queer refugees and asylum seekers
might alter – or queer – the meaning of “citizenship” in the United States. This project
contributes to the conversation about citizenship in the field of rhetoric in multiple ways: (1) It
highlights tensions between the cultural construction of citizenship and its legal parameters, (2) It
expands rhetorical citizenship scholarship through attention to the intersection of identification,
marginalization, and the political imaginary, and (3) It reveals tensions between norms of civic
and sexual identity. It does this by tracing rhetorical precedent through a case study of sexual
orientation and gender identity asylum in the United States.

I argue that LGBTI refugees and asylees can shape a queered discourse of citizenship,
but that the discourse produced is limited based on narrow definitions of sexual orientation and
identity categories. To make this argument, I analyze the precedent-setting case involving Fidel
Armando Toboso-Alfonso, in which I address how the establishment of that case as precedent set
in place norms of sexual identity that persist in the adjudication of LGBTI asylum cases today.
Next, I look to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration training module for handling LGBTI
asylum claims in order to make sense of the ways the norms set forth in the precedent-setting
case have become codified and interrogated in current efforts to adjudicate LGBTI asylum
claims. Finally, I compare visual representations of LGBTI asylum seekers to other refugees in
order to understand how photographs of LGBTI asylum seekers fit within or rupture the genre of
refugee photography. Taken together, these case studies provide insight into how citizenship is
discursively imagined when access to citizen status is predicated on simultaneous normative and
non-normative performances of sexual identity.
INDEX WORDS: Rhetoric, Citizenship, Asylum, Immigration Policy, Queer Theory,
LGBT
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INTRODUCTION: QUEERING CITIZENSHIP IN THE PUBLIC IMAGINARY

At its core, citizenship is an official membership within a community. In the United
States, citizenship status has determined who can vote, work, buy housing, receive employment
or spousal benefits, and travel freely within and beyond the nation’s borders. A history of various
disenfranchisements has shown that this legal status is subject to change according to the
collective socio-cultural conceptions of citizenship. These conceptions, which I refer to as
cultural citizenship, are normative, disciplining, and dynamic forces that determine not only who
belongs within a nation, but also whose life is legally protected as part of their citizenship status.
Our understanding of citizenship is therefore shaped not only by laws, regulations, and rights,
but also by the social imaginary—the normative ideals and actual practices of society that define
what it means to be a citizen.1 Legal status as a citizen can impact one’s cultural citizen standing,
but a shift in one’s cultural citizenship may also impact legal regulations of who gets citizenship
and who does not.
The relationship between legal and cultural citizenship is especially pronounced where
issues of sexuality are concerned. Although the United States has made progress toward sexual
orientation and gender identity equality, targeted hate crimes persist,2 and many states are still
engaged in efforts to restrict certain privileges and benefits to only those people who are

1

Cornelius Castoriadis is credited with first using the term “social imaginaries” in French publications in
the 1950s under a pseudonym. Dilip Gaonkar situates most contemporary discussions of social
imaginaries (like those undertaken by Charles Taylor and Michael Warner) as different than
Castoriadis’s ontological orientation to the concept: Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “Toward New
2
“FBI Releases New Hate Crimes Report Ahead of First-Ever Congressional Forum on Anti-Trans
Violence,” Human Rights Watch, November 16, 2015 http://www.hrc.org/press/fbi-releases-new-hatecrimes-report-ahead-of-first-ever-congressional-forum; Patrick Saunders, “Atlanta Police Release
Details on 12 Most Recent Anti-Gay Hate Crimes,” GA Voice, December 10, 2014
http://thegavoice.com/atlanta-police-release-details-12-recent-anti-gay-hate-crimes.
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cisgender and not openly gay.3 Not only has immigration been restricted on the basis of sexual
orientation until the recent past, but sexual orientation and citizenship have likewise shared a
complicated relationship within our nation’s borders. From legislating private sexual behavior to
upholding laws that make being out as LGBTI in public a near impossibility, there has long been
an investment by the U.S. government in upholding national heterosexuality. Citizenship in the
United States has traditionally been imagined in a decidedly heteronormative way. This
heteronormativity is manifested in recent state efforts to institutionalize discrimination under the
guise of “civil liberty” and to regulate public restroom use by biological gender.4 Here, we see
how legal and cultural forms intertwine to define and promulgate notions of citizenship and
complicate boundaries of public and private civic and sexual identity.
In 2011, the Obama Administration officially declared U.S. support for refugees and
asylees fleeing their home countries because of sexual orientation-based persecution.5 Not only
would the U.S. allow entry to people fleeing this type of persecution; it would welcome them.
The declaration stated that it would “improve protection for LGBT refugees and asylum seekers”
and that the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security would ensure “appropriate

3

An MSNBC article states, “LGBT people in these states risk being fired, evicted, or denied service on
the basis of their identity.” See: Adam Talbot, “The State of LGBT Equality in America,” MSNBC,
January 18, 2015, para. 5, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-state-lgbt-equality-america; Matthew
Clark, “In 2016, An Influx of Anti-LGBT State Laws,” Spectrum, 11 February 2016
http://spectrum.suntimes.com/news/10/155/10982/2016-anti-lgbt-bills-legislatures.
4
Eithne Luibhéid argues that migrants are disciplined into performances that are in line with U.S. gender,
sex, race, and class standards. For LGBTI refugees, this pressure to perform citizenship in a certain way
complicates these standards while still operating within them. See: Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied:
Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), xxvii.
See also: Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman, “Queer Nationality,” in Fear of a Queer Planet:
Queer Politics and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 1993); Carol Johnson, “Heteronormative Citizenship and the Politics of Passing,” Sexualities, 5
(2002): 317-338.
5
Barack Obama, “Presidential Memorandum – International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons,” White House Official Home Page December 6
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-internationalinitiatives-advance-human-rights-l.
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training is in place” so that government personnel can work together to protect LGBTI refugees
and asylum seekers.6 In this declaration, the LGBTI asylum seeker is declared equal to other
asylum seekers, but not the same.7 Like other refugees, they seek protection from oppressive
regimes.8 Unlike those refugees, their oppression is not based on their religion or politics, but
instead on their sexual orientation or gender identity. As made clear by the statement regarding
the need for “appropriate training,” their situation is different than that of prima facie refugees,9
and this difference demands changes to the asylum process. For those fleeing sexual orientation
or gender identity persecution, the asylum process includes interviews and exams designed to
establish their identity as a sexual minority and to prove that their identification as such caused
them to experience unlivable conditions in their home nation.10 Paradoxically, if the refugee
succeeds in proving their membership in a persecuted sexual minority, they overcome an
important barrier to achieving legal citizenship in the United States. However, this success

6

Obama, “Presidential Memorandum,” section 2.
A note on terminology: In Obama’s 2011 declaration, he used the initialism “LGBT” to describe this
population of refugees and asylum seekers. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations division currently uses the initialism “LGBTI” – with
the addition of the “I” to represent intersex people – in all of its training materials. Because of this, I use
the “LGBTI” initialism throughout this dissertation. A more thorough discussion of this initialism
appears in Chapter 3.
8
The legal distinction of “refugee” differs slightly from the legal distinction of “asylee” in the U.S., as
those seeking refugee status must secure legal refuge in the U.S. before they leave their home nation.
An asylum seeker is someone who meets the threshold of persecution required of those receiving
refugee status, but does not obtain that status before entering the U.S. These slight differences mean the
terms are not wholly interchangeable, but their similarities allow the term refugee to generally represent
the same meanings as asylee or asylum seeker.
9
In order to respond to large-scale refugee migrations, the U.S. can designate certain groups as prima
facie refugees who will be granted refugee status upon their arrival in a new country. See Bonaventure
Rutinwa, “Prima facie status and refugee protection,” UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,
October 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/3db9636c4.pdf
10
The term “sexual orientation asylum seeker” or “sexual minority” is frequently used to represent people
seeking asylum from persecution targeting them for their sexual orientation or gender identity. I
recognize that the term “sexual orientation” does not account for or incorporate transgender or intersex
asylum seekers, and that the term “sexual minorities” runs the risk of reinforcing a minoritizing
perspective of LGBTI people. Identities and orientations can be difficult to categorize, and at times it is
necessary to deploy an imperfect phrasing or terminology to help make sense of these issues.
7
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creates a barrier to achieving cultural citizenship, which is determined in large measure
according to normative images of civic identity.
Asylum granted on the basis of sexual orientation persecution is paradoxical because its
attainment requires proof of sexual minority identity, but it then places asylees into a culture that
does not offer full rights to sexual minorities. This paradox is significant for what it reveals about
the relationship between citizenship as a legal status that can be attained through the
naturalization process and citizenship as a social status that is shaped through processes of
cultural imagination. Given the heteronormative dimensions of cultural citizenship, the move to
recognize sexual orientation or gender identity as a basis for asylum puts LGBTI refugees in a
double bind: The path to citizenship begins with their adoption of an identity that is at odds with
the prevailing image of cultural citizenship.
My dissertation takes this paradox as the starting point for an examination of how the
legal challenges faced by LGBTI refugees might compel reflection on and revision of traditional
conceptions of citizenship in the United States. Specifically, I explore the question of how
LGBTI asylees might alter – or queer – the meaning of “citizenship” in the United States.
Asylum granted on the basis of sexual orientation persecution abroad forces an official and
public conversation in the United States about the relationship between sexuality and citizenship
– a conversation that queers current, heteronormative definitions of the term “citizenship.”
Specifically, those seeking and obtaining refuge in the U.S. through the sexual orientation
asylum clause hold the potential to upset traditionally heteronormative ideas about citizenship
because their access is based on their ability to prove their homosexuality as necessary for
membership.11 I argue that the system through which the U.S. offers asylum to some LGBTI
11

For the most comprehensive study of the ways border control and immigration regulation in the U.S.
have functioned as a regulation of sexual orientation, see Luibhéid, Entry Denied.
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asylum seekers may rupture the traditional heteronormativity of citizenship but ultimately
contributes to a system of homonationalism in which only certain LGBTI asylees are fully
incorporated into citizenry. This homonationalism functions to improve slightly the cultural and
legal citizenship of certain LGBTI individuals while concomitantly establishing new restrictions
on the legal citizenship of others. While LGBTI asylum cases might not “queer” citizenship in
the United States, an analysis of its precedent, regulation, and representation does provide
insights about the relationship between citizenship, sexual orientation, and gender identity.
When extending asylum status to those who are fleeing sexual orientation-based
persecution, the United States extends the rights to citizenship for people who are explicitly not
heterosexual. This creates tension with the traditional (heteronormative) imaginary of cultural
citizenship, which forces us to reimagine the implicit or traditional norms of citizenship.
Moreover, it seems as though it creates the potential for a queering of citizenship – for rejecting
the binaries of sexual expression and embracing fluidity and instability. Yet, while legal
citizenship may be somehow altered through the inclusion of queer bodies into the citizenry
through LGBTI asylum, legal citizenship itself can never truly be queer because it can only ever
exist within institutions and never actually rupture them.12 Nevertheless, I see potential for
cultural norms of citizenship to become queerer. Here, the phenomenon of queering does not
function in opposition to some norm or hierarchy. Instead, the queering of citizenship is athwart
– it moves across categories and across hierarchies to transform current understandings of what it
means to be a citizen.
This project contributes to the conversation about citizenship in the field of rhetoric in
multiple ways: (1) It highlights tensions between the cultural construction of citizenship and its
12

Amy Brandzel argues that “citizenship itself is necessarily exclusive, privileged, and normative,” and
that “‘queer’ and ‘citizen’ are antithetical concepts.” Amy Brandzel, “Queering Citizenship?: Same-Sex
Marriage and the State,” GLQ 11, no. 2 (2005): 173, 197.
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institutional parameters, (2) It contributes to rhetorical citizenship and civic identity scholarship
through attention to the intersection of identification, marginalization, and the political
imaginary, and (3) It complicates/solidifies the relationship between civic and sexual identity.
Although rhetorical studies has paid much attention to various performances of citizenship, this
dissertation offers the concept of “rhetorical precedent” as a way to trace the official constraints
on rhetorical performances of citizenship. Specifically, I look to rhetorical precedent established
in the first successful U.S. LGBTI asylum claim and trace its influence to the present. In so
doing, I offer a way to better understand institutional constraints not only on refugee
performances of citizen identity, but also on performances of all who seek to affirm or display
their citizenship. My findings assert that institutional discourses have the ability to set in place
rhetorical precedent that shapes future performances associated with that precedent –
performances of citizenship in particular – by shaping the collective understanding of citizenship
(and citizens) in the political imaginary. This insight contributes to studies of the political
imaginary as an account of the how that imaginary develops and how deeply it is connected to
rhetoric. Finally, this dissertation highlights the necessity of considering the inextricability of
sexual and civic identity in rhetorical studies. This is important because it forces us to consider
the intersectionality of all citizenship and the ways in which our distinct subject positions
become enmeshed within the institution of citizenship. Looking at cases of LGBTI asylum and
citizenship help us see how our own citizenship is not a stable, monolithic status, but is both the
product of a history of institutional discourses and a collective process of imagining.
In my dissertation I explore the discourses surrounding LGBTI asylum to uncover what
they tell us about conceptions of legal and cultural citizenship both in and beyond the field of
rhetoric. In its course, I tell the story of LGBTI asylum in the United States, tracing the social

7

imaginary of the LGBTI asylum seeker through the inception of this type of asylum in the U.S.,
through efforts to train immigration officers to process LGBTI asylum claims, and through the
visual representation of LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers in news media. I read institutional
and cultural discourses of LGBTI asylum to understand the tensions embodied in efforts to grant
asylum on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity persecution. This project is situated
between studies of public address and studies of critical/cultural communication through its
unification of queer theory, institutional rhetoric, and theories of citizenship. At the intersection
of these bodies of research lies a gap that I intend to fill with my dissertation. Here, I am not
looking to determine whether or not LGBTI asylum seekers themselves are deemed authentically
queer enough to receive asylum, but rather, how this population both reveals and ruptures norms
of citizen and sexual identity.
Given that the issue of legal citizenship is a life-or-death matter for many refugees, it may
seem strange to focus an entire dissertation on the tensions between this new avenue to legal
citizenship and the traditional, heteronormative imaginary of citizenship. It may seem as though I
am forsaking questions about human safety and material well-being for a more scholastic
discussion about identity. In response to this, I argue that identity is an essential component of
one’s material well-being. Yes, for many refugees, citizenship can eventually be attained through
a long legal process. Yet, even with the official distinction, citizens not born in the U.S. are
sometimes faced with circumstances that depict their citizenship as less valuable than the
citizenship of others. In my dissertation, I show that this multi-faceted othering that faces people
who are both refugees and sexual minorities has significant implications to ongoing discussions
about the relationship between legal and cultural citizenship and for the well-being of refugees
and asylum seekers in the United States. First, I will show that this tension between legal and

8

cultural citizenship can make assimilation and identification with a new nation difficult or even
impossible. Second, I will show that as this tension manifests in public discourses about
citizenship, it creates opportunities and obstacles for incorporating new identities and bodies into
the citizenry; although these discourses cannot queer the institutional dimensions of citizenship,
they do operate in a way that could lead to full equality among legal and cultural citizens.
In an effort to make sense of the interwoven but independent discourses surrounding
these issues, my project focuses primarily on the rhetorical representation of citizenship as it
develops through queer refugee and asylum cases. In order to frame this study, I begin this
introduction with a review of scholarship on citizenship. This review focuses on discussions of
citizenship as a normative identity perpetuated in and altered by social practices as well as the
relationship between this normative identity and legal or institutional definitions of and
requirements for citizenship. From there, I turn to the expanding body of rhetorical scholarship
that addresses the notion of imagined citizenship - paying special attention to work at the
intersection of citizenship and sexual identity. In the course of this discussion, I connect the
scholarship in rhetoric to complementary accounts from disciplines like law, sociology, gender
and sexuality studies.
Following my review of these bodies of literature, I explain precisely how my project
contributes to these conversations. As part of my explanation, I discuss the theories that inform
my approach, which include work in the social imaginary, rhetoric, and queer theory. Next,
introduce my methodology, which includes a variety of rhetorical approaches to analyzing the
imagination of citizenship in queer refugee cases. Following this, I introduce the texts selected
for this study. Finally, I conclude with a chapter outline that charts the course to my contribution.

9

1.1

Review of Literature
In order to parse a concept as vast as citizenship, I first address its history as a legal status

and set of rights and responsibilities that implicitly upholds social and cultural hierarchies. Next,
I turn to scholarship that is explicit in recognizing citizenship as more than just a collection of
rights and obligations under the law through its attention to citizenship as an identity that is
culturally constructed and enacted in social practices. Here, I address the concept of imagination
and imaginaries as they relate to and shape our perceptions of citizenship in the United States.
Next, I discuss recent scholarship that combines work in the cultural constructedness of
citizenship with work on the social and political imagination of citizenship. I follow this
discussion with a review of work in rhetoric on citizenship. In this section I look to three
rhetorical approaches to studies of citizenship – that of citizenship as a process of identification,
that of citizenship as an institution with the potential to marginalize and/or liberate, and that of
citizenship as a performative process. In the final paragraphs of this literature review, I focus on
the body of scholarship that addresses specific questions about queer refugees, asylum seeking,
and U.S. citizenship to show how my intervention both brings together and expands upon these
discussions.
From its inception, the legal status of citizenship and its cultural constructedness have
been inseparable. Long before the establishment of U.S. boundaries, questions of citizenship and
citizen identity circulated. Plato and the members of the Greek polis have been credited with
developing the conception of citizenship that is valued by Western societies today.13 For Plato,
citizenship was of both legal and ethical importance. In Laws, he describes the necessity of

13

Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Durham, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1994), 3-4.
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proper moral education for the development of virtuous citizens.14 Similarly, Aristotle wrote of
the connection between the common good and the duties of citizens.15 Rhetoric itself emerged as
an art of civic education, and for the Greeks, citizenship functioned both as a legal status and as a
social status defined by implicit norms (or doxa). For Isocrates, this came in the form of his
commitment to an education in logos politicos: “an education in speaking well for the purposes
of citizenship and statesmanship.”16 The abilities to speak on one’s own behalf, to make public
argument, and to commit to the good of the state were essential for citizens. This idea that
commitment to one’s city/state merited certain behaviors was carried well beyond the Greeks.
Cicero, for example, extolled the concept of the ideal citizen – someone who was wise, an
exemplary orator, and who valued the principle of equity.17 Quintilian’s “good man speaking
well”18 required a moral education in order to become a valued citizen-orator.19 From its earliest
acknowledgement, citizenship involved more than mere legal status, as there were standards and
expectations for how to best enact one’s citizenship.20 Of course, many individuals were
excluded from Greek and Roman citizen status altogether, but even among those granted

14

Plato, Laws, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
Susan Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
16
Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Use of doxa,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34, no. 1 (2001): 62.
17
Hans Baron, Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance (Manchester
University Press, 1938); Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkley: University of California
Berkley, 1969), 24; Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth 1929 (Whitefish: Kessinger
Publishing, LLC, 2004).
18
Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Lee Honeycutt, trans. John Selby Watson (Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 2006), XII.1.1.
19
Quintilian, On the Teaching of Speaking and Writing: Translations from Books One, two, and Ten of
the Institutio Oratoria, ed. James J. Murphy, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), xii.
20
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citizenship, certain hierarchies arose which constructed some subjects as better citizens than
others.
Although citizenship today excludes people in a different way from ancient societies,
today’s conceptions of citizenship have inherited much from classical political philosophy. For
the Greeks and Romans, democratic citizenship was first and foremost a legal status, but it was
also inextricably social – even though that distinction was not explicitly acknowledged.
Likewise, U.S. citizenship today is most obviously a political status; yet, the meaning of this
status is shaped by social and cultural factors. Citizenship in the United States is officially
granted to all people born within the nation’s borders, regardless of income, religion, race, or
moral standing. But although these legal protections might technically extend to all citizens, they
do not necessarily extend to all citizens in the same way. As noted by sociologist T.H. Marshall,
citizenship is not merely a legal or political status, but also, and just as importantly, a social
status. In his 1950 book of lectures, Citizenship and the Social Class, Marshall delineates three
types, or elements, of citizenship: the civil, the political, and the social.21 Most citizenship
research up until the time of his writing in the early 1900s had been primarily concerned with
political and civil notions of citizenship.22 Marshall’s introduction of social citizenship provided
a way to explicitly account for society’s unequal treatment of people with equal legal or political
status.
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Theorists in political science, sociology, and political philosophy have since extended
Marshall’s insight that citizenship involves more than a solely political or legal status. For many
of these theorists, citizenship is best understood as something one does, rather than as a status
one has – it requires active participation in a society and a conscious commitment to one’s
nation. For Eric Hobsbawm, understanding the relationship between a nation and its subjects can
help to account for the ways power becomes imbricated within citizenship. However, Hobsbawm
seeks to make clear that the existence of this relationship is not necessarily an indication of
equally shared identifications between citizens and their states. To account for this, he
encourages scholars to find ways to address the shifts in national identification over time or
across spaces.23 Charles Tilly argues that what makes citizenship unique among other similar
contracts is the way it “encases vital rights and obligations that impinge significantly on life
outside the world of constitutional affairs.”24 He further refers to citizenship as a necessary but
insufficient condition of democracy. What this means is that in order for the process of
democracy to function, people must deeply identify with their roles as citizens25—to imagine
themselves as having rights through their citizen status as well as obligations to an imagined
nation and an imagined citizenry.26 Isaac West characterizes this obligation as an adoption of a
politics of “wholeness,” or an emphasis of “the need to accept others on their own terms without
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demanding fealty to a belief in essential similarities” instead of a politics of “oneness” which
merely demands assimilation.27
One’s identification with their own citizenship can manifest itself in different ways – as
active engagement with one’s nation, through passive reflection upon one’s citizen status, or
both of these at once. Despite the varied possibilities for enactment of citizenship, members of
the citizenry must be able to imagine themselves either as equals among their fellow citizens or
as possessing the potential for equality among their nation’s inhabitants. For citizenship scholars
Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran, citizenship functions both passively and actively as a
“membership of individuals in a nation-state with universalistic rights and obligations at a
specified level of equality.”28 Their definition is helpful because it incorporates the tension
between equality and access to rights while accounting for the ways that not all citizen
participation is consciously active. The granting of citizenship to birthright or naturalized
citizens carries with it inalienable rights; yet, some people are more equal under the law than
others. This determination of citizen equality is enacted through a process of imagination.
The notion of imagined citizenship has roots in the work of Benedict Anderson, who
introduced the idea that nations and communities are themselves “imagined.”29 Anderson
observed that the people within a nation or community could never know or even encounter all
of the other members of their nation or community. Therefore one’s conception of a community
as large as a nation is necessarily based on its common representations – the images and
narratives about the community, which become circulated by community members and the
27
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media.30 Sociologist Charles Taylor extends this conception of imagination through his
introduction of “social imaginaries,” which he defines as “the way our contemporaries imagine
the societies they inhabit and sustain.”31 Taylor is particularly interested in how social relations
are “carried” in vernacular discourse comprised of shared “images, stories, and legends.”32
Although Taylor’s language is that of the social, his examples of how the social imaginary plays
out in contemporary western societies relies on concepts related closely to citizenship, like
voting and protesting. For this reason, a focus on the imaginary suggests a focus on the social
practices through which our shared conceptions about citizenship develop.
Although not always explicitly interested in the social processes of imagining,
scholarship in cultural citizenship similarly acknowledges the varied conceptions of citizenship
developed through social practices. This work often incorporates imaginaries and imagination
through its efforts to depict the instability of a citizen status that holds certain cultures to be
ideal. For anthropologist and transnational citizenship scholar Aihwa Ong, cultural citizenship is
a term that encapsulates “ways of belonging according to the dominant cultural criteria.”33 Other
scholars of cultural citizenship emphasize that not only is there a type of citizenship that exists in
addition to political and economic status, but also that more needs to be done to incorporate a
right to communication and cultural difference within civic life.34 One of the most widely cited
proponents of this type of attention to cultural citizenship is Renato Rosaldo. For Rosaldo,
cultural citizenship is a “deliberate oxymoron” because it accounts for differences while actively
seeking equality among and equal treatment of all people within a state; it “refers to the right to
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be different and to belong in a participatory democratic state.”35 Keith Faulks further argues for
greater attention to cultural difference in studies of citizenship in his book Citizenship: Key
Ideas. Faulks claims that conceptions of citizenship need to better account for the tension
between the sovereign individual and the collective needs of a society through a cosmopolitan
cultural citizenship. His emphasis on an egalitarian conception of citizenship allows him to
account for the ways societies and cultures exclude certain people from civic life.36 Further, in
his review of cultural citizenship scholarship, Toby Miller concludes that the field still needs to
find ways to reject neoliberalism and to vigilantly attend to those who are consistently excluded
from conversations about citizenship.37 The scholarship attending to questions of cultural
citizenship serve as a departure from some traditional citizenship scholarship through its critical
focus on who is excluded from citizen status and the cultural construction of citizenship.
Attention to cultural citizenship provides a way to both recognize and deal with the
marginalizations that certain notions of citizenship perpetuate. In the United States, circulating
discourses tend to reinforce heterosexual and masculine ideals of citizenship that subordinate
queer and feminine notions of citizenship.38 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner claim that in the
United States, “national heterosexuality” has become the dominant, unspoken space of “pure
citizenship” that allows systemic inequalities regarding sexuality to remain in the shadows.39
This renders unintelligible the relationship between sexuality and citizenship and makes
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heteronormativity the standard operation of the state.40 Citizenship is inherently embodied and
performative, and, as Lauren Berlant argues, it is also inherently paradoxical:
In the patriotically-permeated pseudopublic sphere of the present tense, national politics
does not involve starting with a view of the nation as a space of struggle violently
separated by racial, sexual, and economic inequalities that cut across every imaginable
kind of social location. Instead, the dominant idea marketed by patriotic traditionalists is
of a core nation whose survival depends on personal acts and identities performed in the
intimate domains of the quotidian.41
For Berlant, citizenship is paradoxical because it requires of its citizens certain publicly
performed private identities. The nation is both public and inherently intimate, and private acts
like sex are forced to “bear the burden of defining proper citizenship.”42 Sexual orientation
becomes an integral part of the performance of citizenship, yet it is only recognized as such
when it deviates from heteronormative structures of citizen identity.
Recently, scholars have turned to a concept of “sexual citizenship” to help clarify this
relationship between minoritized sexual identities and the performance of citizenship.43 Attention
to sexual citizenship promises to account for the tethering of rights to sexual orientation and to
highlight the ways in which distinctions between public and private disenfranchise women and
sexual minorities whose private acts have long been subject to public legal regulation.44 Much of
this work, however, is focused on the experiences of heterosexual subjects as they undergo a
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process of “becoming and unbecoming” citizens.45 Barbara Cossman’s definition of sexual
citizenship is an example of this approach, and she makes the claim that merely by choosing to
engage or not engage in certain sexual behaviors, one can move fluidly between categories of
good and bad citizenship.
The notions of citizenship outlined above have been integrated into contemporary
scholarship on rhetoric in a number of ways. From the most traditional public address
scholarship to the most progressive critical/cultural work there exists an investment in how
citizenship is framed by political figures, how citizenship is denied or restricted for marginalized
populations, and how the relationship between citizenship and democracy plays out in the public.
To do this, scholars tend to adopt one of the following distinct, though often overlapping, foci: 1)
civic identity and identification, 2) exclusions and marginalization, and 3) performance.
Rhetorical studies of citizenship often focus on the ways in which rhetors invite
audiences to accept and adhere to a preferred civic identity. This literature is generally interested
in the duties of people who have already obtained citizenship, and specifically how those in
positions of power attempt to shape citizen identities. Much of this scholarship occurs in the area
of presidential rhetoric, where scholars look to the successes and failures of presidents (or the
presidency) to constitute audiences or create certain identifications among their audiences. For
example, in Mary Stuckey’s Defining Americans, she claims that citizenship is a key theme of
presidential discourse and the presidency’s constitutive capacities are most evident in their role
in defining citizenship.46 Both Stuckey and Vanessa Beasley find that in U.S. presidents’ efforts
to shape the concept of citizenship, they must openly assert that it is a status open to all, while
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finding ways to implicitly exclude certain people from its definition.47 On this view, presidential
rhetoric is one of the main sites of citizenship’s definition in the United States, and these
collective definitions both constitute some as citizens while also excluding others entirely.
There is also a rich body of rhetoric literature that considers the relationship between
public sphere participation and citizenship.48 The relationship between the critical role of the
individual citizen and the rhetoric of the public sphere is echoed in Paul Stob’s claim that most
academic research of these discourses are ultimately interested in “identity, access, and power.”49
Stob ultimately finds the most fruitful entry points for discussion of rhetoric, citizenship, and the
public sphere to be located in the work of John Dewey and Kenneth Burke. For my project, and
many others that consider rhetorical citizenship, Burke’s concepts of identification and
consubstantiality provide a starting point for dealing with citizenship’s inclusions and
exclusions.50 Gregory Clark argues that Burke’s identification helps people to see the ways in
which rhetorical power functions outside of conventional realms and that the symbols shared
between people work rhetorically to shape a common identity – a rhetorical citizenship.51 For
Burke, “Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there
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would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.”52 Thus, we can approach
citizenship as state-sponsored identification, a sanctioned wholeness that defines a person as part
of one group and not another. In so doing, citizenship determines who matters within a nationstate and sets forth a hierarchy of common identities.
Where some rhetoric scholars look to the processes of state for insights into
identification, others look to the ways identification with one’s citizenship is enacted through
one’s civic participation. Alessandra Beasley Von Burg describes this as “philosophical
citizenship,” which she claims complicates the nationality-centered concept of citizenship, and
which comes to be only through a participatory, engaged process.53 Christian Kock and Lisa S.
Villadsen move Beasley Von Burg’s philosophical citizenship toward the concept of “rhetorical
citizenship,” a discursive phenomenon achieved by civic engagement and public deliberation.54
Rhetorical citizenship differs from philosophical citizenship through its emphasis on collective
engagement. Here, one identifies with their citizenship through their participation in political
activities. The identification of oneself or others as “good citizens” requires normative
definitions of citizenship, which tend to benefit certain individuals and groups at the expense of
others.
Sovereign power exploits divisions between members of society who enjoy the full rights
of citizenship and those who do not. As a result, any effort to gain citizenship threatens the
political order and is met with resistance. Despite the potential for a diverse group of people to
gain legal access to citizenship in the United States, a number of groups have faced a long
struggle to become recognized as having citizenship of equal cultural value, including (but
52
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certainly not limited to) women,55 the homeless,56 and migrants.57 Acceptance into the U.S.
citizenry matters because it unites those under its protection while excluding or foreclosing
outsiders. Immigrants generally, and refugees more specifically, disrupt the nation-state. Or, as
Giorgio Agamben explains, “by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between
nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty.”58
Immigrants and refugees alike have been viewed as threats to the (perceived) sovereignty and
purity of the United States. For Anne Demo, many of our justifications for keeping people from
citizenship are based on ideas about the importance of U.S. sovereignty.59 In her analysis of
immigration politics and sovereignty discourse, Demo finds a number of arguments wielded
within political discourse that serve to depict migrants as excessive, alternative, and dangerous.
As John Fletcher explains, citizenship can be dangerous because it inherently includes and
excludes while serving as “a major tool of neoliberal hegemony” because it is based on a model
that includes some and excludes others.60 The ways in which these inclusions and exclusions are
regulated is subject to change over time, and that instability perpetuates fear of immigrants and
refugees – inciting slippery slope arguments about the potential outcomes of amnesty or even
asylum. In addition to the multiple concerns facing sexual orientation refugees, one of the most
challenging to combat is the fear that people will be able to fake their sexual orientation and
55
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sneak into the U.S.61 This fear compounds the scrutiny faced by LGBTI refugees whose presence
not only might be seen to threaten U.S. sovereignty, but might even appear to do so
mendaciously.
For LGBTI refugees, sexual orientation and refugee status combine to create an
especially difficult path to citizenship – one that is wrought with multiple exclusions – as they do
not readily conform to legal or cultural definitions of U.S. citizenship. Their foreignness sets
them apart, and their refugee/asylee status serves to place them in a liminal position between
immigrant and citizen.62 Karma Chávez argues that, in the United States, immigrants (regardless
of sexual orientation) are inherently queer because “they are most other, abject, and in the minds
of many, they belong outside of the nation-state.”63 This means that LGBTI refugees are deemed
queer both because of their sexual orientation and through their position as migrants. For
Chávez, immigrant rights discourses and LGBTI rights discourses work to counter the metaphors
and narratives that subordinate them within the national social imaginary.64 This process, argues
Chávez, can result in efforts to belong within the nation that force identity performances that fit
within heteronormative citizen ideals, and which ultimately embrace domesticity and “normal”
sexual relations. As an alternative, Chávez offers “differential belonging” as a strategy of
cultural citizenship that can confront exclusionary conceptions of belonging. This differential
61
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belonging would require recognition of different identities while leaving space for all of those
different identities to coexist within a citizenry. An effort toward differential belonging would
help to encourage relationships across margins and differences in a way that expands the social
imaginary. Further, it may help to break individuals free from the restrictions of an imagined,
normative understanding of good citizenship.
Chávez’s work serves as a link between rhetoric’s attention to large-scale institutional
processes of inclusion/exclusion and the ways citizenship is performed and disciplined in subtler
ways.65 For immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, the transition into cultural citizenship
requires them to transcend the boundary that forecloses them by sufficiently performing citizenidentity. Though the idea of performance as related to civic engagement is a frequent theme in
rhetorical scholarship, what constitutes a performance sufficient to, or typical of civic
engagement varies significantly. For some, citizenship is inextricably tied to the act of voting,
which makes sense in the context of the suffrage movement or other efforts to gain voting
rights.66 Robert Asen goes so far as to call voting “the quintessential act of citizenship.”67
Although Asen acknowledges voting as a powerful mode of civic engagement, he recommends
that scholars turn their attentions to other forms of civic action to investigate questions of how
best to engage civically. David Zarefsky similarly advocates expanding the notion of active
citizenship to include argument and critical deliberation as modes of civic engagement,68 as do
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M. Lane Bruner, 69 and Brian Ott and Greg Dickinson when they posit everyday criticism as a
signature mode of critical performance.70 John Lucaites claims that performance of citizenship
requires one to be “both agent and spectator, enacting the demands of civic life for the benefit of
others to witness or observe—if not judge, while also viewing the world through the eyes of the
citizen.”71 And while Kenneth Rufo and R. Jarrod Atchison warn that such efforts to expand
what counts as civic engagement might subsume the private and fail to theoretically account for
everything outside of citizenship, their argument does not undermine the basic insight that
citizenship is something one does, and that its definition emerges through repeated, public
performance.72
To understand the relationship between imagined citizenship and performance, rhetoric
scholars have looked to the public discourses that shape and frame our ideas about citizenship.
For example, Darrell Wanzer-Serrano and J. David Cisneros consider how legal and cultural
non-citizens work to gain access to citizenship. Both find ways that these non-citizens appeal to
the civic imaginary and through this appeal performatively present the possibility of its
reformation. Specifically, Wanzer reads an embodied discourse that has the potential to shift the
social imaginary, which, drawing from Charles Taylor, he defines as “one way to talk about the
complex hegemonic structuration of ‘the social’ in manners that inform and are informed by
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political discourse and habitus.”73 Cisneros considers how non-citizens themselves are
“alienized” through a process he calls “discursive bordering” which ultimately maintains the
concept of citizenship in a particular way. He explains that the functioning of democracy
requires people to perform and identify with traits belonging to “good” citizens – traits like
rationality, eloquence, and the motivation to become informed participants in the democratic
process.74 Cisneros further explains that adherence to this “ideal” type of citizenship makes
possible the silencing of immigrants, the stateless, and other minorities who might lack the
ability to perform citizen identity in this desired way. What is important for Cisneros, however,
is that even non-citizens have the ability to embody and perform a citizen identity, and these
performances can “reborder the civic imaginary” – in essence, reshaping or challenging the
borders between citizen and non-citizen.75
Within rhetorical studies, there are some studies addressing queer performances of
citizenship,76 and some addressing the plight of LGBTI refugees and immigrants.77 However,
there is currently no rhetorical scholarship that looks specifically at how LGBTI refugees are
called to perform specific identities in order to be given access to citizenship or what may
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become of the discourses and assumptions that comprise cultural definitions of citizenship as a
result of this new policy.78 Refugees face discrimination similar to that of the broader population
of migrants in the U.S., but their identity is further scrutinized.79 Although the vast archive of
rhetorical scholarship on immigration and border politics informs my project, it is still important
to account for the specific demands placed on refugees. Refugees’ reasons for leaving their home
nations can be complicated and traumatic, and their needs are often perceived in ways that differ
from those of other immigrants. Moreover, queer refugees’ literal and metaphorical
subordination doubly others them and creates a paradox. If they are able to prove to their
immigration officer or judge that they immutably belong to an identity or orientation category
considered “sexual minority,” they foreclose their ability to be part of the group privileged in
heteronormative conceptions of cultural citizenship. Conversely, if they conform to
heteronormative conceptions of cultural citizenship they will be denied their claim to refugee
status, thus ending their journey to legal citizenship. This paradox creates situations in which
multiple actors in the public sphere negotiate definitions of citizenship. My project looks to these
negotiations for insights into how we imagine and reimagine citizenship.
LGBTI asylum cases provide a new way of considering the rhetorical construction of
78
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citizenship for a population that is excluded from cultural citizenship in multiple ways despite
their potential for legal citizenship status. This dissertation will expand rhetorical citizenship
scholarship through this new focus as well as through its attention to the interrelationship
between identification, exclusion, and performance in this set of citizenship discourses. In order
to account for the challenge of intersectionality as it relates to the LGBTI refugee I turn to the
concept of “rhetorical imagining” as a framework for analyzing the notion of citizenship that
emerges in the discourse surrounding LGBTI refugee cases.
1.2

Methodology
Most of the academic focus on sexual orientation refugees has been on the laws that

regulate them.80 This dissertation will take a rhetorical approach through a turn toward the
institutional discourses surrounding these asylum cases and an analysis of the ways citizenship is
discursively imagined for queer refugees. In order to assess the ways citizenship is imagined in
the discourse surrounding sexual orientation asylum cases, my methodology relies on Robert
Asen’s notion of public imagining as a “tool that may inform critical investigations of the ways
in which included and excluded people appear in public spheres.”81 Asen argues that inclusion
and exclusion in the public sphere occur not only through the vocalization and embodiment of a
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person or population, but also through the imagining of others.82 For Asen, such “representing is
not a disinterested process, but one that implicates social judgments and relations of power.”83
Following Asen, I will look to the tension between what is made present in the news articles and
official documents of support for queer refugees and what is left out – what is made positive and
what is made negative. Through political imagining, the images and documents that surround
queer asylum cases hold the potential to impact legislation, and they present an enduring legacy
that shapes cultural understanding of LGBTI migrants and refugees as they seek citizenship in
the United States.
Even when citizenship is granted, one is not guaranteed equal status among the citizenry.
Robert Asen finds that the process of imagining often reveals important information about who is
included or excluded within public spheres. By invoking “public sphere” here, I refer not to
actual publics, but to the shared idea of the public as discussed by scholars like Jürgen Habermas
and Michael Warner.84 Specifically, I turn to the concept of counterpublics as described by
Warner as “an indefinitely accessible world conscious of its subordinate relation.”85 Although
Warner addresses the need to create a literal space for queer counterpublics, the needs of LGBTI
refugees move beyond the desire for a literal space and instead work toward literal access to
citizen identity.
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In addition to Warner’s attention to counterpublics, his insight that imaginaries develop
and circulate through the sharing of texts further augments Asen’s concept of imagining. For
Warner, “the circulation of texts among strangers” enables a reflexive conception of identity;
addressed as a “social entity” within a network of circulating discourse, it allows readers to
imagine themselves a public of a particular sort.86 Warner’s emphasis on circulation is important
to my analysis because of the ways that individual news stories about refugees are printed, reprinted by other sources, or used as fodder for commentary on other web sites or as
representative anecdotes in NGO and U.S. government documents addressing asylum issues. The
movement of this discourse and its framing and re-framing over time contribute to a particular
image of citizenship in the United States. Tracing this helps account for what Asen refers to as
the “multimodality” and multidirectionality of political imaginaries.87
From these conceptions of a public imaginary informed by theories of counterpublics and
circulation, I work to understand how an act of public imagining can queer dominant notions of
citizenship. Because of this, I supplement Asen’s iteration of imagining with a perspective that
accounts for my cases’ embodiment (and legislation) of queer identities. Much of the queer
theory work being done in the rhetorical discipline relies on Warner and particularly on his
notion of queer counterpublics. However, Warner is only one piece of the queer rhetoric
puzzle.88 The term “queer” may seem to be interchangeable with other sexual-orientation terms
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like “gay” and “lesbian,” but it differs because it brings with it a new consciousness regarding
sexuality and gender norms. “Queer” serves an important role in the LGBT civil rights
movement. Terms like “gay” or “lesbian” function within (and/or are deployed within) dominant
institutions, and queer theorists argue that they function to uphold seemingly stable categories of
sexual orientation. Although their usage can help one to assimilate with the dominant social
force, it cannot help to complicate or problematize those forces. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
explains, queer is “transitive – multiply transitive.” 89 Sedgwick uses “transitive” to emphasize
the ways in which queer is not meant to exist only in opposition to something – it functions
across spectrums and boundaries, and it is meant to be a disruptive and integrating force. For
Sedgwick, and others following her path, queer provides a way to both rupture and maintain; it is
an embodied, material both/and. Addressing the capacity of LGBTI asylees and refugees to
queer citizenship means not merely to alter it, but to re-shape and re-imagine what it can be for
this population and all other people existing under its umbrella. I am interested in the ways
sexual orientation has traditionally precluded certain people from the material benefits of
citizenship and how the discourse surrounding and produced by LGBTI asylees and refugees
might complicate ideas of proper sexual and rhetorical citizenship.90 Attention to queer
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perspectives allows for a critical reading of texts that embraces and engages the relationship
between sexual orientation, gender identity, and the citizen status sought by LGBTI refugees.
The theories described above fit together in a way that will allow me to thoroughly and
conscientiously address my diverse and sensitive texts. Discursive identifications and divisions
are at play in the news stories about LGBTI refugees and the documents used to facilitate their
trials and resettlement. Theories of counterpublics and queer identity performance combine to
provide a framework for considering queer citizenship, refugee status, and the social imaginary.
For Asen, drawing here from Sarte, the imagining is a process of “connecting consciousness to
objects through mental images.”91 Visual and verbal representations of people or groups
contribute to the enduring understandings of these people or groups. That is, the discourse about
citizenship in these cases and the actual images that become part of that discourse function to
create a collective understanding of what citizenship itself means. The imagining of citizenship
in these cases takes place through a variety of means – both visual and verbal; therefore, I
analyze visual and verbal texts related to the process of sexual orientation asylum.
Although Asen’s concept of rhetorical imagining provides a rationale and framework for
analyzing the discourses that shape cultural, and ultimately legal definitions of citizenship, he
leaves it to subsequent scholars to establish a method for analysis. This is beneficial because it
allows others to read for imagining in a variety of texts. However, it can present a challenge
when attempting to fashion a methodology for investigating the process of public imagining.
Specifically, although Asen puts rhetorical representation at the center of the process of public
imagining, he does not explain how this process works, or provide a method for analyzing it.
Fortunately, rhetorical scholarship suggests a variety of methods for analyzing the processes of
rhetorical representation. In the chapter outline that follows, I explain how other theories that
91
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complement this approach to rhetorical representation will be used to uncover the ways
citizenship is imagined in each set of texts I analyze.
1.3

Outline of Dissertation Chapters
In order to understand the impact LGBTI asylum seekers have on the tensions between

legal and cultural citizenship, I turn to the process through which LGBTI asylum was embedded
into U.S. policy, the institutional efforts to incorporate or reject LGBTI asylum seekers from the
citizenry, and the cultural discourses through which this population is represented. The first
chapter reads the social controversy surrounding the precedent-setting LGBTI asylum case, The
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso and considers the ways in which its establishment as precedent helped
to set in place norms of LGBTI asylum. In order to understand the ways those norms of LGBTI
asylum became codified and disputed, the subsequent chapter looks to the U.S. office of
Citizenship and Immigration training module titled “Guidance for Adjudicating Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) Refugee and Asylum Claims.” In the final chapter
I consider how these norms impact ways of seeing LGBTI refugees/asylum seekers by reading
images of LGBTI refugees alongside the genre of refugee photography.
Throughout, I look to the ways LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees are discursively
imagined in a way that shapes legal and cultural notions of citizenship. The following chapters
are organized chronologically. I begin with the precedent-setting case, proceed to the current
training manual for immigration officials, and end with a consideration of visual representation
in the present and its potential to shape a queer future. Of course, rhetorical representation can
proceed in a variety of ways and is case specific. In what follows, I will discuss my texts, and the
characteristic modes of representation therein, to provide a more detailed explication of my
methodology and conclusions.
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In the second chapter, titled “Citizenship Controversy in The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,”
I establish the context through which LGBTI asylum cases have emerged, and discuss the history
of the relationship between sexual orientation and citizenship. The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was
a 1990 Bureau of Immigration Appeals case that first established LGBTI people as “members of
a particular social group” who could gain asylum in the United States upon proof of their
membership in that group and their “well-founded fear of persecution.” The particular
citizenship controversy in the Toboso-Alfonso case brought together issues of immigration and
sexual orientation – complicating notions of private and public, and calling into question the
necessity of exclusionary immigration policies. In making public what had been understood as
private, the case began to construct the LGBTI asylum seeker in the political imaginary. This
representation complicated prior representations of LGBTI migrants as ineligible for citizenship
by providing a path to citizenship for LGBTI migrants through their ability to prove that their
identity alone caused them to be persecuted. I argue that in making Toboso-Alfonso precedent for
similar cases, the U.S. ultimately set forth a standard of asylum that complicated LGBTI
citizenship. It removed the barrier to entry for LGBTI migrants but set in place norms that
continue to regulate LGBTI identity.
The third chapter, titled “Regulating Queer Asylum: Heteronormative Citizenship and
Homonationalist Politics,” looks to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services training
module for government officials who handle asylum cases involving sexual orientation or gender
identity persecution.92 Obtaining asylum in the U.S. following sexual orientation persecution
involves a lengthy process of migrating, navigating the immigration court system, and
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resettlement. This document provides 65 pages of training materials that cover the unique needs
and processes undertaken by LGBTI asylum seekers. This document is the official (governmentissued) guide for working with this group of refugees and asylees. The document contains
resources for authenticating these asylum claims as well as prompts for how to interview asylees
fleeing potentially abusive or violent situations.
The RAIO training module stands as an institutional effort to resolve the contradictions
between identity, orientation, persecution, and citizenship produced by LGBTI asylum cases. It
sits at the intersection of immigration law and the political sphere – speaking to an audience of
lawyers, judges, and most importantly, immigration officers in their efforts to parse the political
contradictions surrounding LGBTI asylum. I examine the module as an index of the social
imaginary. This examination is informed by work in critical rhetoric, which approaches texts as
sites of power relations. Through this reading, I argue that the training module strives for
inclusivity but ultimately engages in a practice of homonationalism, which draws boundaries that
exclude the potential for a queer understanding of sexual orientation and identity. This
institutionalized homonationalism defines certain bodies and identities as deserving of
citizenship and excludes those who cannot be identified as embodying the desired LGBTI
citizen. The training module is a response to heteronormativity in U.S. culture that, though
claiming itself to be progressive and accepting of difference, reifies the boundaries of queer
identity and produces the subject worthy of sexual orientation asylum. While efforts toward
inclusivity of different identities and orientation has seen significant progress over the past
twenty years, the institutional response ultimately upholds a version of national
heteronormativity through the projection of homonationalism.
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For the fourth chapter, titled “Depicting LGBTI Refugee Cases: Looking at Queer
Asylum,” I consider visual representations of LGBTI refugees within the context of the broader
genre of refugee photography. Reading photojournalistic images of large-scale refugee crises
alongside images of LGBTI asylum seekers, I ask how photographs of LGBTI refugees fit within
the larger genre of refugee photography, and how these photographs highlight challenges faced
by LGBTI asylum seekers as they seek to appear worthy of citizenship. I argue that images of
LGBTI asylum seekers both belong to the genre of refugee photography and concomitantly
rupture understanding of what is meant by “refugee photography” through their construction of a
different image of refugeeness. Images of LGBTI refugees have the potential to queer our
collective understanding of what it means to be a refugee because they complicate the
heteronormativity of typical refugee photographs. However, photographs of LGBTI asylum
seekers highlight the struggle of rhetorical representation because they do not depict or call to
mind suffering in the same way as prima facie refugee photographs.
Finally, I conclude by addressing the relationships between these cases and the
argumentative collective imaginary of citizenship produced through all these disparate texts. The
analysis will work to uncover patterns of discourse and disparities in what gets excluded and
included in narratives about LGBTI refugee cases and the efforts to streamline the asylum
process. By focusing on how queer refugees and citizenship itself gets imagined over a range of
discourses, I will be able to expand current understanding of the rhetoric of citizenship. Here I
consider the ways these cases might alter the heteronormativity of citizenship while codifying a
system of homonationalism. Through this codification, progress for some LGBTI people occurs
at the exclusion of others and results in the establishment of national enemies whose anti-gay
policies become fodder for our national superiority. In my conclusions I further consider the
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ways in which homonationalism might itself become eroded through or outside of LGBTI
asylum.
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2

CITIZENSHIP CONTROVERSY IN THE MATTER OF TOBOSO-ALFONSO

Until 1990, any person migrating the United States who identified as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or intersex would be denied entry under the regulations set forth in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Under the Refugee Act of 1980, however, any person
seeking refuge in the United States after fleeing persecution for their “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” would be eligible for asylum.93
This meant that it was possible to fall into conflicting categories of eligibility for entry –
someone could be both excludable because of their sexual orientation and eligible for asylum
because of their status as a refugee. The contradictions in refugee and immigration policies
resulted in a lack of clarity regarding how to handle LGBTI people seeking refugee status in the
United States. For the most part, the INA held sway over the 1980 Refugee Act. In the late 1980s
there existed conflicting opinions in the courts and among the general population about what
rights should be granted to whom. For example, while the 1986 Supreme Court case Bowers v.
Hardwick upheld the constitutionality of sodomy laws and the ability to prosecute people for
private sex acts, a majority of Americans in 1989 supported homosexual partners’ rights to
inherit one another’s property and receive medical and life insurance benefits from one another’s
policies.94 There existed discomfort over private acts but acceptance of public relationship status.
Opinions on LGBTI rights were undergoing an evolution but not one that occurred
linearly or steadily. Like most social change, the evolution of LGBTI rights progressed over
time, vacillating between progression and regression in different areas of LGBTI life. The late
1980s and early 1990s constituted a period of controversy that reflected uncertainty over the
93
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granting of rights. It was a moment of shifting ideas about and shifting regulations of public
sexual identity. This controversy not only concerned how these rights might look within the
United States, but also who would be allowed legal access to citizenship, and what kind of path,
if any, should be provided for LGBTI migrants arriving in the U.S. seeking citizen status. The
controversy over LGBTI rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped to shape cultural
understanding of what citizenship in the United States looked like and who would be included
within its boundaries.
The Toboso-Alfonso case took place within a broader social controversy in the United
States over who should be granted citizenship and under what circumstances.95 In 1990, the U.S.
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) granted a withholding of deportation to Fidel Armando
Toboso-Alfonso, a gay man forced to leave Cuba in 1980.96 The BIA determined that TobosoAlfonso was eligible for asylum and withholding of deportation because homosexuals
constituted a “particular social group” and Toboso-Alfonso showed a “clear probability” of
persecution in his home nation because of his membership in that group. The decision in this
case was groundbreaking for U.S. immigration policy because it explicitly contradicted the
regulations set forth in the INA, and because in 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno declared
Toboso-Alfonso precedent for any case involving “an individual who has been identified as a
homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone.”97
The particular citizenship controversy in the Toboso-Alfonso case brought together issues
of immigration and sexual orientation – complicating notions of private and public and calling
into question the necessity of exclusionary immigration policies. Because controversies engender
95
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oppositional arguments, cases like Toboso-Alfonso inspire images that become part of the
collective understanding of that controversy. In order to make sense of how Toboso-Alfonso
reflected and inflected images of citizenship, I look to the case as a moment of controversy in
which sexuality was established as a status, not an activity.
The Toboso-Alfonso case made public what had been understood as private, positioning
sexual orientation as a public status that could exist regardless of one’s private sexual activity
and determining that such an identity should not preclude someone from access to U.S.
citizenship. In making public what had been understood as private, the case provides a window
into the process of political imagining, where participants in a controversy draw on and develop
images of the stakes and stakeholders therein. In its course, Toboso-Alfonso became a
representative image of the LGBTI asylum seeker. At one level, this expanded the repertoire of
acceptable representation of citizenship within the social imaginary. At the same time, however,
it created a barrier for those unable or unwilling to conform to that representation. This barrier
resulted in norms that ultimately privilege cisgender, male asylum seekers whose sexual
orientation can be made most legible in immigration courts. This moment of advancement in
immigration policy is dampened by the fact that what looks like progress, and what allowed a
different group of migrants to seek asylum, resulted in narrowed definitions of identity and
orientation. Establishing more than just legal precedent, Toboso-Alfonso also set forth a
rhetorical precedent through which future LGBTI asylum cases would be measured – one that I
return to in the following chapters.
In order to make this argument, I first discuss the history of LGBTI migration and
asylum, tracing the different iterations of homosexuality delineated in U.S. immigration policy.
Following this, I outline the relationship between controversy and the political/social imaginary,
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placing in conversation Lauren Berlant’s concept of incipient citizens, G. Thomas Goodnight’s
discussion of controversy, and Robert Asen’s development of a citizen imaginary. Next, I tell the
story of Toboso-Alfonso, highlighting the impact Cuban-U.S. relations had on the process and
progress of his immigration hearings. I read the majority and dissenting opinions in the TobosoAlfonso case to make sense of the construction of the LGBTI asylum seeker in the citizen
imaginary. Finally, I turn to the establishment of The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent for
similar cases and address the ways it helped to set up norms of LGBTI asylum and citizenship
through its establishment of legal and rhetorical precedent.
2.1

History of LGBTI Asylum
Over the past hundred years, U.S. immigration policy has defined categories of sexual

and gender identity in myriad ways and has ranged from exclusion of this population to inclusion
under most circumstances. The effort to define LGBTI people within immigration policy and law
has taken a variety of turns over the course of U.S. history. Within U.S. law, there have been a
number of different approaches used to deny citizenship to people on the basis of sexual
orientation. Sodomy laws enforced the criminalization of certain types of sexual activity, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) classified homosexuality as a
sociopathic personality disturbance, and identification of oneself as a homosexual would bar
anyone from access to citizenship status when immigrating. While immigration restrictions in the
United States have excluded many different populations over the course of the nation’s history,
Congress has used a variety of descriptions and tactics to exclude LGBTI people.
In 1790, the United States passed the first legislation restricting citizenship and
immigration, and it excluded most everyone who was not a white man with certain financial
means. While several subsequent acts restricted who could enter the U.S. and how those entering
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could become citizens, the 1917 Immigration and Nationality Act was the first to ban people on
the basis of their actual or imputed sexual orientation. In this Act, homosexuals were barred from
entry not on moral grounds, but on pseudoscientific ones.98 Homosexuality was considered to be
a “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” but was not explicitly defined as a violation of any
moral or ethical guidelines. The connection between psychopathy and homosexuality in the 1917
INA came 35 years before the American Psychiatric Association added homosexuality to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1952.99 Perhaps related to this
characterization of homosexuality, the 1952 INA, often referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act,
expanded the grounds upon which homosexuals could be barred from entry. It listed “Aliens
coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act” as a population “ineligible to
receive visas and excluded from admission.”100 In addition to the “immoral sexual act” clause,
Margot Canaday states that the 1952 INA had two other provisions that restricted entry of the
homosexual population:
One provision was based on conduct and treated homosexuality as a behavior; it barred
from entry immigrants who had committed unspecified ‘crimes of moral turpitude.’ A
second provision relied on the notion that the homosexual was a type of person; it barred
immigrants based on status by excluding homosexuals as persons ‘afflicted with
psychopathic personality.’101
Canaday identifies how the term “homosexual” concomitantly refers to a conduct and a status –
both of which rendered a person understood to be a member of those categories ineligible for
citizenship. Here, the INA defined homosexual acts as immoral and homosexual people as
98
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psychopathic. Although the term homosexual does not appear anywhere in the 1952 INA, it was
explicitly discussed in the Senate subcommittee meetings in which that legislation was
drafted.102 The 1965 revision to the INA was widely lauded for its elimination of restrictions
based on race, but it further solidified restrictions based on sexual orientation - introducing the
“sexual deviation” clause, which more plainly denied entry to anyone identifying or identified as
homosexual. Here, “sexual deviation” was combined with “psychopathic personality” afflictions
under the same sub-clause. The word “homosexual” does not appear in the 1965 amendment, but
it was assumed to fit under the umbrella definition of sexual deviance and psychopathic
personality. Under the list of revisions from the 1952 policy “sexual deviation” was added in
place of the word “epilepsy.”103 While medical opinions on epilepsy shifted away from
categorizing it as a psychopathic disorder, fear of homosexuality was increasing – leading to the
seemingly incongruous substitution in terms.
The Immigration Act of 1990, introduced by Senator Ted Kennedy, was the first major
revision of U.S. immigration policy since the 1965 INA. Along with the removal of the English
literacy requirements, the implementation of a lottery system for low admittance countries, and
changes to the visa requirements for highly skilled workers, the 1990 INA excluded the “sexual
deviance clause.” Because of this, the U.S. could no longer consider sexual orientation an
excludable violation for prospective immigrants. This was, in many ways, a victory for LGBTI
rights groups, but this version of the INA brought increased restrictions on HIV-positive
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migrants – tarnishing what appeared to be progress for sexual minorities and focusing the fear of
sexual deviance in one particular area.104
Although the United States did not revise its immigration policy to include LGBTI
migrants until 1990, the international community started taking steps for inclusivity as early as
1951. In the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, it was
determined that women, families, homosexuals and others could constitute a “particular social
group,” and it was acknowledged that people belonging to these groups in other nations may face
discrimination and persecution solely because of their membership in that particular group.105
The “particular social group” clause was the least explicated of the five grounds for refugee
status determinations in the international guidelines. In the United States, the “particular social
group” clause for refugee admission was not adopted until the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act
where it defined a refugee as “any person who is…unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of that country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”106 Note that sexual orientation was not explicitly included in the U.S. definition of a
“particular social group” in 1980. Eligibility for asylum in the U.S. required membership in a
group understood to widely face persecution in their home nation, and homosexuality was still an
excludable offense for any migrant. By the early 1990s, immigration courts still debated whether
or not homosexuals could constitute a particular social group – in spite of that group’s inclusion
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in the international refugee rights document – because they had not been listed in the 1980
Refugee Act as a group deserving of protection. Moreover, associations between LGBTI
migrants and HIV were commonly used as arguments in favor of further restrictions. Yet, despite
the removal of the sexual deviance clause from the INA and international regulations that treated
LGBTI people as a particular group deserving of human rights, there was not a clear precedent
for treating LGBTI asylum claims within the U.S. immigration system.
The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso preceded the removal of the sexual deviance clause, and
while it would be difficult to claim that the case was the impetus for the removal of that clause, it
can be said that 1990 was a moment of significant controversy over who should get access to
U.S. citizenship and which rights should be granted to members of a sexual minority. At the time
of Toboso-Alfonso’s appeal in 1990, there were a handful of other cases involving LGBTI
asylum seekers pending in the immigration system. The decision in Toboso-Alfonso had the
potential to influence decisions in similar pending cases even before it was officially set as
precedent. Before reading the opinions issued in the Toboso-Alfonso case, I consider how
arguments made in moments of controversy contribute to the collective imagining of a
subordinated population.
2.2

Controversy and the Public Sphere
The Toboso-Alfonso case is frequently cited in law journals and immigration studies

largely because it serves as precedent for similar cases.107 Its surrounding controversy, however,
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has been less widely addressed. Toboso-Alfonso receives its most thorough treatment in Eithne
Luibheid and Lionel Cantú Jr.’s Queer Migrations, specifically in Timothy Randazzo’s chapter
discussing the social and legal barriers to asylum for queer migrants. Randazzo helps to make
sense of the context in which Toboso-Alfonso was named as precedent in 1994. At that time nine
other nations had officially granted asylum on the basis of sexual orientation persecution, and in
which at least forty similar cases were pending in the U.S. immigration system.108 Randazzo
offers the most thorough scholarly discussion of Toboso-Alfonso, but he largely uses the case as
a starting point in a discussion of the barriers to this type of asylum. Lionel Cantú Jr., Eithne
Luibhéid and Alexandra Minna Stern discuss the ways the Toboso-Alfonso case (and the later in
re Tenorio case) reveal how gay asylum in the United States has been profoundly shaped by
relations with Latin America.109 Although Cantú, Luibhéid, and Stern address how the U.S.
asylum process often leaves claimants they must perform a particular type of identity in order to
gain asylum, they do not fully address the role Toboso-Alfonso played in the demand for these
performances.
Frequently referenced, but rarely the subject of thorough investigation, Toboso-Alfonso
occurred in a moment of controversy over rights and identities, and helped set in place the
system through which LGBTI people could gain asylum as members of a particular social group.
In this chapter, I turn to the text of Toboso-Alfonso case and its surrounding controversy to help
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make sense of the role this case played in shaping a path to citizenship for LGBTI asylum
seekers. The attention to controversy helps make sense of the origins of ruling images of LGBTI
asylum. As Robert Asen notes, the images produced within moments of controversy persist, and
in so doing, they can perpetuate power imbalances and function as barriers to entry for
counterpublics.110
In the 1991 Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, G.
Thomas Goodnight lamented the lack of scholarly attention to controversy. He noted that the
term itself appeared frequently in the journals and texts emerging from a variety of academic
disciplines, but that the term was not theorized or attended to in any way that helped us make
sense of its importance. He suggested that controversy “is a site where the taken-for-granted
relationships between communication and reasoning are open to change, reevaluation, and
development by argumentative engagement.”111 Controversy marks a moment in which
arguments have particular importance because they have the ability to alter the future in a
number of ways. In order to make sense of controversy, Goodnight argues it is necessary to find
both the “culturally constitutive moments” in which controversies arise and the arguments used
by all sides whose stake shapes the controversy.112 Several years later, Goodnight and Kathryn
Olson analyzed pro- and anti-fur arguments, defining social controversy here as “an extended
rhetorical engagement that critiques, resituates, and develops communication practices bridging
the public and personal spheres.”113 And while Goodnight would go on to publish several more

110
111

Asen, Visions of Poverty, 15.

G. Thomas Goodnight, “Controversy,” In Argument in Controversy: Proceedings of the Seventh
SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Don W. Parsons (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication
Association, 1991): 5.
112
Goodnight, “Controversy,” 8.
113
Kathryn M. Olson and G. Thomas Goodnight, “Entanglements of Consumption, Cruelty, Privacy, and
Fashion: The Social Controversy Over Fur,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80, no. 3 (1994): 249.

46

essays theorizing controversy,114 and these essays spawned a host of critiques and theoretical
interventions,115 the connection he made between controversy and conceptions of the public has
particular value for a project on the citizen imaginary.
The personal, public, and technical spheres are not completely discrete. Instead, they are
“vast, and not altogether coherent, superstructures which invite them to channel doubts through
prevailing discourse practices.”116 For Goodnight, the public sphere transcends the personal and
technical realms, and “while not reducible to the argument practice of any group of social
customs or professional communities, nevertheless may be influenced by them.”117 In this realm,
arguments attempt to appeal to an imagined public in which all involved have equal say and
equal capacity for action. Just as the argument practices of the public sphere transcend the
personal and technical spheres, so do the consequences of dispute within this realm.
While Goodnight’s conceptualization of the personal, technical, and public spheres is
influenced by Habermas, it moves beyond Habermasian notions of the “public sphere.” In Craig
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Calhoun’s introduction to Habermas and the Public Sphere he claims that Habermas’s
conception of the public sphere was two-sided – it focused both on the quantity and the quality
of rational-critical discourse. 118 While Calhoun takes issue with Habermas’s impossibly tidy
divisions between a public and a private sphere, he finds Habermas’s work to have value for the
debate and dissent it created. Goodnight acknowledges the exclusionary history of the term
“public sphere,” but notes that understanding the personal, technical, and public spheres “is a
useful way to uncover prevailing expressions of human conditions (the views of the world
implicit in particular practices of making argument).”119 He also notes that the spheres of
argument are not always stable or impermeable, but that they can permeate one another. Looking
to these moments of permeability can aid in the understanding of controversy. For Goodnight,
scholars of argument are especially equipped to analyze present argumentative practice and
provide (deliberative/public) alternatives.
Moving beyond the Habermasian roots of Goodnight’s study, I follow critical scholars
who have reinterpreted (and riposted) Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, namely, Lauren
Berlant, Nancy Frazer, and Michael Warner to guide my reading of one moment in a larger
controversy over identity, citizenship, immigration, and policy. Critiques of Habermas and
public sphere theory in general note its neglect of gendered privilege and the struggles of
subaltern populations. Studies of counterpublics have helped bring forth these issues in a way
that allows discussion of the political (and of publics) while still acknowledging the masculinist
power structures at play in the world. Nancy Fraser, for example, suggests that Habermas’s
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conception of the public sphere is fundamentally “masculinist,” and she introduced the term
“subaltern counterpublics” to describe groups of people subordinated within social hierarchies.120
Within the rhetorical discipline, a number of scholars have relied on this idea of
counterpublics in order to address the cases made by subordinated populations for equality,
visibility, and validation.121 For Michael Warner, counterpublics are a type of public that has a
subordinate position within a society, that is constituted and socially marked by discourse, and
that is in possession of transformative identities.122 Michael Warner and Lauren Berlant clarify
that the relationship between publics and counterpublics is more intimate than antagonistic,
because counterpublics can only exist within (and not necessarily against) a public. The turn to
counterpublics is essential for considering the citizenship claims of LGBTI asylum seekers,
because counterpublic theories can provide a way of conceptualizing what is at risk for this
population and for better understanding why their access to citizenship is especially tenuous.
Robert Asen finds that the ability to access a public sphere can exist outside of counterpublics
because “exclusion is never total.”123 For Asen, in discussions about a group of people, the group
is entered into the public sphere (whether or not they are participating), and their imagined image
is circulated in public discourse. Because they are thrust into the public sphere through their
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imagined image, Warner states that a counterpublic can “make possible new forms of gendered
or sexual citizenship.”124 Although Warner addresses the need to create a literal space for queer
counterpublics to make possible these new forms of citizenship, the needs of LGBTI asylum
seekers require space within the law as well. Their path to citizenship is predicated on the
existence of legal and social spaces that account for their identities. Yet, in order to be legible
within these spaces, and to ultimately be eligible for citizenship, LGBTI asylum seekers are
expected to present evidence of their subordination within some other public – evidence that
requires them to make public information they may have needed or wished to keep private.
The potential permeability of private and public spheres precedes discussions of
counterpublics, as Hannah Arendt noted the ways participation in the public sphere was
predicated on certain behaviors in the private sphere.125 For Arendt, the ability to speak freely in
public required certain wealth, genetic lineage, and adherence to expectations of culturally
acceptable behaviors. Berlant takes this observation further in order to investigate how the
“collapsing of the political and personal into a world of public intimacy” is enacted in violent
ways.126 For Berlant, the ideals of citizenship are measured more through private and personal
acts than through civic ones, meaning that what one does in their home has a greater impact on
their cultural citizen standing than more public acts associated with citizenship like voting,
protesting, or public deliberation. The result is what Berlant calls an “intimate public sphere,”
one in which value to the citizenry is predicated on private actions and through which the unborn
child becomes the ideal citizen. Like fetuses, immigrants function as “incipient” citizens – they
are potential, future citizens around whom a new national public sphere is constructed. Further,
for Berlant, the people who are most impacted by the collapsing of the private and public spheres
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are those whose private identities are least legible in public, or which deviate the furthest from
expected behaviors.
Berlant claims that immigrants, as potential citizens, are useful for the establishment of
“patriotic nationalism” because they allow us to construct an image of a future good life in the
United States.127 To extend Berlant’s argument, refugees are especially useful because not only
do they embody democratic ideals as people “who desire America,” but they also require access
to U.S. citizenship to escape persecution in their home nation.128 LGBTI asylum seekers are in
need of U.S. support, and the U.S. sees itself as distinctly qualified to incorporate them as future
citizens.129 The potential future citizen Berlant describes is different from the LGBTI asylum
seekers because LGBTI asylum seekers belie the national heterosexuality assumed for the
nation’s future. Yet, the incorporation of different bodies and identities into the U.S. citizenry
has been met with competing representations of LGBTI migrants and U.S. citizens more broadly.
However, these representations of LGBTI asylum seekers in the civic imaginary are not merely
oppositional. Rather, they incorporate understandings of national heterosexuality, patriotic
nationalism, and the potential future of the citizenry. In a case like Toboso-Alfonso, it is possible
to see how the population of LGBTI asylum seekers is constructed within the case and in what
ways that constructed imaginary shifts understandings of private and public spheres. Moreover, it
is possible to examine how these representations of citizen and non-citizen actors enable and
constrain subsequent discourses about asylum and citizenship. But first, a brief note on the
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this examination.
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For Robert Asen, moments of controversy become active sites of collective imagining
because they are especially visible and attended to by people on all sides of an issue. Asen claims
that controversy “engenders moments especially amenable to shifts in imagining. Controversy
unsettles collective imagining as a background understanding and engages imagining as an active
social force.”130 In order to make an argument for a possible outcome within a controversy, each
side must advance images of their imagined outcome – images that can be contested and that can
have effects on people excluded from the actual debate. Drawing from Sarte, Asen explains that
imagining is a process of “connecting consciousness to objects through mental images.”131
Visual and verbal representations of people or groups contribute to the enduring understandings
of these people or groups. That is, the discourse about citizenship in these cases and the actual
images that become part of that discourse function to create a collective understanding of what
citizenship itself means.
Both Asen and Goodnight base their discussions of controversy and the civic imaginary
on the concept of the social imaginary. As described by sociologist Charles Taylor, the social
imaginary is “that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely
shared sense of legitimacy.”132 In moments of crisis or uncertainty, people engage social
imaginaries in order to support their side of an argument. For Goodnight, policy debates often
tap into social imaginaries in an effort to “name, frame, tame, and thereby capture the disruptive
moment.”133 Social imaginaries are normative in that they require collective understanding of
images, and they perpetuate ideas about groups of people that adhere to certain norms. At the
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same time, social imaginaries are not stagnant. Every moment in which a social imaginary is
invoked, its meaning accumulates – it shifts to incorporate new perspectives and progressing
ideals. Social imaginaries provide “a vocabulary of identifications and meanings that can be
extended, contested, and reshaped to renew older practices or inaugurate different activities.”134
In the Toboso-Alfonso decision, the LGBTI asylum seeker is constructed in the social imaginary,
and its construction relies on past understandings of migrants, asylum seekers, and LGBTI
people. The majority and dissenting opinions each attempt to construct Toboso-Alfonso in a
particular way as a member of a particular social imaginary.
In an analysis guided by Goodnight’s efforts to uncover the themes produced in
arguments on either side of a controversy, and the imagined citizen stemming from that
controversy as discussed by Asen and Berlant, among others, I read the majority and dissenting
opinions in The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso to uncover how either side spoke to the public, private
(or social or technical) spheres, and to find the places where the distinction between these
spheres becomes unclear. After this, I turn to the institutional response to Toboso-Alfonso, in
Janet Reno’s statement listing the case as precedent for future sexual orientation persecution
asylum hearings as well as a case that is credited with contributing to Toboso-Alfonso’s status as
precedent, in re Tenorio.
2.3

Story of Toboso-Alfonso
The controversy surrounding The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was shaped both by

contextual factors and the facts of the case itself. Before turning to an analysis of The Matter of
Toboso-Alfonso in the decision rendered by the Board of Immigration Appeals on March 12,
1990, I first discuss Toboso-Alfonso’s story and the geopolitical context in which his case
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emerged. This case existed in a moment of controversy over how citizenship and asylum should
function in the United States following shifting social attitudes and mass immigration. Norms of
citizenship – both explicit and implicit – are in tension here with institutional and social changes.
I read the final decision and dissent in the Matter of Toboso-Alfonso (A23 22 644) for the
institutional response to this controversy, paying particular attention to the ways in which this
case set forth an imagined queer refugee and helped to establish future norms by which asylum
applicants would be measured. Further, I address the ways in which this case blurred the
boundaries of the public and private realms. The Toboso-Alfonso case required a new
interpretation of legal precedent, which I discuss below, and more importantly for this study, it
constructed the images of queer asylum. While the legal precedent helps set forth guidelines
regulating asylum within the immigration system, the images produced by the case help to
structure the understanding of LGBTI asylum seekers in the broader social imaginary, ultimately
contributing to a rhetorical precedent that impacted future LGBTI asylum cases.
2.3.1

Toboso-Alfonso and Cuba: Historical and Legal Context
Laws guaranteeing civil rights for LGBTI people in the United States have clearly

evolved since the 1952 INA, but for the broader public, that evolution did not make itself widely
known until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Along with gradually shifting attitudes toward
LGBTI people in the United States, the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba was foundational
in the shifting of immigration policies toward less exclusion of particular groups. While Cuban
policy under Castro drove people to flee its borders, Richard Fagen and T.J. O’Leary argue that
the willingness of the U.S. to adapt its policies to the incoming migrants made possible the entry
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and resettlement of the migrant population.135 From 1959 until the early 1990s, several hundred
thousand Cubans migrated to the United States, with the largest numbers arriving in 1980.
Referred to as the Mariel Boatlift, more than 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States on a
series of boat migrations from April 1, 1980 through the end of that year.136 Fidel Armondo
Toboso-Alfonso arrived in June of 1980, the month with the second highest number of
Marielitos. Despite the U.S. regulations on immigration written into the INA, the Mariel Boatlift
brought to the U.S. a large number of people who were listed as being barred from entry in the
United States including mental patients, criminals, and homosexuals – people classified as
“undesirable” by Castro’s regime.137 Thus, the Toboso-Alfonso case emerged in a moment of
great change when the largest numbers of Cuban migrants in history sought refuge in the U.S.,
when international refugee law met with major changes, and when U.S. public sentiment on
sexual orientation very gradually began to shift.
These separate moments of political, legal, and social change collided in the TobosoAlfonso case, as shifting social norms gave rise to shifting legal regulations. Although TobosoAlfonso was exiled from Cuba and arrived in the United States with other people who sought
residency in the U.S. through the Cuban Adjustment Act, he was not granted asylum upon first
request.138 In his first hearing, Toboso-Alfonso was denied asylum because of a drug possession
135
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conviction in the United States. The drug conviction, however, did not prevent him from staying
in the United States. The lower court judge ruled that he was technically eligible for asylum
because his status as a homosexual made him belong to a particular social group and because he
was able to show a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Cuba. Because of his drug
conviction he had to show a higher likelihood of persecution – a “clear probability of
persecution” in order to receive a withholding of deportation. The judge ruled that he was able to
prove a clear probability of persecution, and he was allowed to stay in the United States. In the
appeal to this first ruling the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) cited the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act’s prohibition of migrants guilty of “crimes of moral turpitude”
to claim that Toboso-Alfonso could not be granted asylum or a withholding of deportation
because he was a homosexual. Yet, in his hearing with the Board of Immigration Appeals
following the INS appeal, the reasons for his exclusion were considered alongside his rights as a
refugee as delineated in the Refugee Act of 1980. Thus, the panel of judges determined that the
lower court’s ruling should stand, and Toboso-Alfonso should be granted a withholding of
deportation. What was especially novel in the lower court and BIA ruling was the decision that
homosexuals could constitute a particular social group eligible for asylum. The decision that
homosexuals constituted a particular social group largely relied on Toboso-Alfonso’s ability to
prove that that population was targeted and systematically persecuted in his home nation of
Cuba.
Toboso-Alfonso was raised in Guines, Cuba and reports that for thirteen years of his life,
Cuban police and government officials repeatedly threatened his peace and safety. In 1967, at the
age of nine, Toboso-Alfonso was classified as a homosexual, and the Cuban Government opened
a file to keep track of him. As part of the maintenance of this file, he was subpoenaed to appear
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for a hearing every two to three months over a span of thirteen years. During these hearings, he
was often detained for several days even though no charges had been filed against him. At some
point during every hearing, Toboso-Alfonso received physical examinations and was questioned
about his sexual behavior. One of those prolonged detainments caused him to miss several days
of his factory job. As his punishment for missing work and, he claims, as punishment for being a
registered homosexual, he was forced to attend a labor camp for two months. His string of
detentions and hearings were not handed to him as a punishment for his participation in any
particular sexual act. At that time in Cuba, it was illegal to be homosexual. Because of this, one
could be punished for identifying as a homosexual or being identified by another person as a
homosexual regardless of their private or public sexual activity. In other words, TobosoAlfonso’s crime was related to his identity, not his conduct.
In addition to the institutional punishment he faced, Toboso-Alfonso recalls harassment
from other Cuban citizens not affiliated with the government. In 1980, the Union of Communist
Youth held an anti-homosexual rally at the factory where he worked. The demonstrators shouted
that all homosexuals should leave Cuba for the United States. One day in 1980, Toboso-Alfonso
returned home from work to find a sheet of paper telling him to report to local officials. He
reported to the Guines police station where the chief of police gave him an ultimatum: leave
Cuba for the United States or serve a four-year prison sentence for being a homosexual. Given
one week to decide, Toboso-Alfonso ultimately chose to leave and arranged his exit. His initial
attempt to leave Cuba was reportedly met with harassment from neighbors yelling and throwing
eggs and tomatoes at him. With the help of authorities he rescheduled his exit for 2:00 a.m. to
avoid meeting the same harassment.
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In June of 1980 Toboso-Alfonso arrived in Miami by boat as part of the Mariel Boatlift
migration and was paroled into the United States. His parole was terminated in 1985, and he was
found to be excludable from the United States because he violated three statutes of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952: a criminal statute, an immigration paperwork statute,
and the sexual deviance clause. While the failure to maintain a valid immigrant visa and a
controlled substance violation for possession of cocaine constituted part of Toboso-Alfonso’s
excludability, it was his violation of a “crime involving moral turpitude” that became the subject
of the immigration system’s debate over whether or not to allow him to stay in the United
States.139 Following the termination of his parole in 1985, Toboso-Alfonso applied for asylum
and withholding of deportation to Cuba. The immigration judge in his first hearing ruled that he
was eligible for asylum because he was a member of a “particular social group” who showed a
clear probability of persecution if returned to Cuba.
Although legal matters regarding the rights of LGBTI people have met with staggered
acceptance (and other rights have not yet been granted), following the decision rendered in the
1990 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso case, political refugees who identified as lesbian or gay met with
increased acceptance in U.S. immigration courts. The International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission (IGLHRC) reported that in the first three years following the TobosoAlfonso decision, the U.S. provided asylum to 164 applicants from 25 countries on the basis of
sexual orientation persecution.140 By 2003, those numbers reached 773. Less than one percent of
the successful applicants were women – a fact that will be discussed more fully in a subsequent
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chapter.141 The acceptance of LGBTI migrants in the United States was slow – ‘exceptional in
terms of its homophobia’142 – but the changes set in place by Toboso-Alfonso ensured that slow
acceptance would not fully restrict LGBTI asylum.
2.3.2

The Controversy of the Citizen in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso
In Toboso-Alfonso’s first hearing in immigration court, the judge ruled that homosexuals

were a “particularly identifiable group,” stating “Though Congress may have intended to exclude
homosexuals from entering the United States, there is no indication that Congress ever sought to
condemn homosexuals to a life of suffering and persecution solely as a result of their sexual
orientation.” At the time, this was a fairly progressive move for a judge to make – basing the
argument on the intent of the legislature with regards to the exclusions brought forth by their
immigration policy. Nevertheless, the INS appealed the Houston court’s ruling that TobosoAlfonso should not be granted a withholding of deportation because:
homosexuals [are] not a particular social group contemplated under the [Refugee]
Act…the applicant has not presented adequate evidence to show either a well-founded
fear or a clear probability of persecution, and…the applicant is ineligible for relief under
section 243(h) of the Act because of his conviction for possession of cocaine.143
The appeal cited Toboso-Alfonso’s drug conviction and the 1952 INA as reason for their appeal
of Toboso-Alfonso’s case. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued their decision to that
appeal on March 12, 1990, with Chairman David L. Milhollan writing the majority opinion.144
Board members Dune and Heilman joined Milhollan’s majority opinion in the Toboso-Alfonso
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case, and the dissenting opinion was written by Fred W. Vacca and joined by James P. Morris.
Taking the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion, and the events through which this case
became precedent for future LGBTI asylum cases, I turn to the controversy over what rights
should be offered to LGBTI asylum seekers and the construction of the LGBTI asylum seeker in
the social imaginary.
2.3.3

Majority Opinion
In the 1990 ruling, Chairman Milhollan upheld the lower court’s ruling from February 3,

1986, which claimed that Toboso-Alfonso “both established his membership in a particular
social group in Cuba and demonstrated that his freedom was threatened within the meaning of
section 243(h)(1) [of the 1952 INA] on account of his membership in that group.”145 Thus,
Milhollan’s ruling upheld the withholding of deportation but sustained the denial of asylum to
Toboso-Alfonso. Milhollan’s opinion offered arguments from the personal and public spheres to
make the case that Toboso-Alfonso should be allowed to stay in the United States because he
could prove a “clear probability” of persecution.
A large part of Toboso-Alfonso’s ability to prove “clear probability” of persecution relied
on the history of discrimination in Cuba. The Mariel Boatlift was widely known to have carried a
large number of people identified by Cuban authorities as homosexuals, and there were multiple
stories of Fidel Castro’s efforts to rid the nation of those he considered undesirable citizens.146 In
his majority opinion, Milhollan lists the materials (aside from his own personal narrative) that
Toboso-Alfonso brought as evidence of homosexual persecution in Cuba. These include:
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…several articles describing ‘Improper Conduct,’ a film which centers on the testimony
of 28 Cuban refugees and recounts the human rights violations, including incarceration in
forced labor camps…suffered by Cubans whom the Government considers to be
dissidents or ‘antisocial,’ particularly male homosexuals; a newspaper article entitled
‘Gay Cubans Survive Torture and Imprisonment,’ in which Cuban homosexuals in the
United States, most of whom were part of the Mariel boat lift, describe their treatment by
the Cuban Government, including repeated detentions, incarcerations, and physical
beatings…147
The ability to document human rights abuses made it possible for Toboso-Alfonso to paint a
clear, discernable picture of what happens to homosexual people in Cuba. The BIA’s decision to
grant Toboso-Alfonso a withholding of deportation depended largely on the clear documentation
of persecution in Cuba. Because Cuba kept a register of homosexuals, forced them to appear
regularly for hearings and examinations, and ultimately forced or “encouraged” most of them to
leave the country, there was little to no question about the hospitability of Cuba for people
identified as homosexual in the eyes of those writing the majority opinion in the case.
In addition to the evidence of Cuba’s treatment of homosexuals, Toboso-Alfonso brought
multiple stories, some listed in the previous section that detail his personal struggle with
authorities because of his sexual orientation. Milhollan spends most of his decision telling
Toboso-Alfonso’s story, lending weight to his personal experiences, and granting credibility to
his need for state protection. Despite the specificity of legal jargon and its presence in all court
cases, the majority opinion in Toboso-Alfonso spends little time making appeals to the technical
sphere. Much of Milhollan’s opinion is directed at the formation and regulation of a public
sphere, one where arguments attempt to appeal to an imagined public in which all involved have
equal say and equal capacity for action. Milhollan lends weight to Toboso-Alfonso’s story, and
acknowledges the tension inherent in the imagined future of the United States if it takes TobosoAlfonso as a member of its citizenry. The first half of Milhollan’s opinion is dedicated to
147

In re: Toboso-Alfonso 821

61

explaining Toboso-Alfonso’s claim for asylum. He tells the story of Toboso-Alfonso’s
persecution while living in Cuba, explaining both the individual struggles he faced, and the
greater context in which his persecution occurred. This does not limit Milhollan’s arguments to
the personal sphere, despite his use of personal narrative as evidence. For example, Milhollan
explains that Toboso-Alfonso “testified that it was a criminal offense in Cuba simply to be a
homosexual” and then lists the different types of abuse that helped to construct his case,
explaining the Union of Communist Youth’s demonstrations against homosexuals in factory
where Toboso-Alfonso worked and acknowledging that Toboso-Alfonso would not have been
sent to a forced labor camp if he were not a homosexual.148 Following the lower-court decision,
Milhollan claims that not only did he find “the applicant’s testimony to be credible and worthy of
belief,” but that Toboso-Alfonso was actually also “restrained in his testimony as to the difficulty
of his life during the years that he lived in Cuba.”149 For Milhollan and the others signing onto
the majority opinion, Toboso-Alfonso’s testimony is not only credible, but it proves his claim for
asylum even though it seems to be only part of the narrative of his persecution.
Milhollan takes a holistic perspective of the case with regard to U.S. citizenship and
migration more broadly, weighing the need for freedom over the need to uphold existing statues.
An example of this occurs in Milhollan’s choice to background Toboso-Alfonso’s criminal
charges as “not particularly serious crimes” and to foreground Toboso-Alfonso’s right to not live
in fear of persecution:
This is not simply a case involving the enforcement of laws against particular
homosexual acts, nor is this simply a case of assertion of ‘gay rights.’ Particularly in view
of the final governmental threat that precipitated the applicant’s departure from Cuba, we
agree with the immigration judge’s finding that the applicant’s freedom was and is
threatened within the contemplation of section 243(h)(l).150
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Here, Milhollan describes Toboso-Alfonso’s story as one that ultimately concerns his lack of
freedom. Although Milhollan spends a substantial amount of time discussing the difference
between status and conduct (elaborated below), here he explains that this is not really a case
about gay rights, and is not really a case about Cuba’s laws. Instead, this is a case about what
type of people should be granted asylum in the United States. The opinion never positions
Toboso-Alfonso as an outsider, even when taking into consideration his violation of the policies
that currently structure the boundaries of the U.S. citizenry. Instead, Toboso-Alfonso’s situation
marks a moment in which those boundaries are permeated and permanently altered to account for
changes in cultural attitudes.
The ability for an asylum applicant to prove that homosexuals are a particular social
group who face either “well-founded fear of persecution” or “clear probability” of persecution
does not automatically grant them asylum in nation of first application. In the words of BIA chair
Milhollan, “once he establishes that he qualifies for withholding of deportation, it must be
granted and he cannot be returned to the country where he would face persecution. He can,
however, be sent to another country under certain circumstances.”151 This means that Milhollan
does not necessarily have to make the United States accept Toboso-Alfonso into the U.S.
citizenry – he could recommend sending the applicant elsewhere. However, he does create a
space for Toboso-Alfonso, and he does it by arguing for a citizenry that allows public
homosexuality. This argumentative move happens more implicitly through his repeated claims
about homosexuality as a status rather than an action or set of actions. He uses Toboso-Alfonso’s
stories of abuse at the hands of the state to argue that this state-sponsored subordination was
unfair because it was targeted at a person who had no choice over his identity; his punishment
151
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and persecution were not the result of any direct action; instead, he was targeted for merely
identifying as (or being identified as) gay. For example, on page 821 of the opinion, Milhollan
states Toboso-Alfonso’s persecution occurred “not in response to a specific conduct on his part
(e.g, for engaging in homosexual acts); rather, they resulted simply from his status as a
homosexual.”152 And later, on page 822, Milhollan states, “The applicant’s testimony and
evidence…do not reflect that it was specific activity that resulted in the governmental actions
against him in Cuba, it was his having the status of being a homosexual.” While one of the early
versions of the INA forbid entry of LGBTI people by classifying homosexuality as both a status
and an action, the opinion in the Toboso-Alfonso case determined that one could face persecution
for their status alone. It is not clear whether Toboso-Alfonso’s actions mattered – the court saw a
problem with the persecution of someone based on his status. In this – and many other civil
rights related claims – the persecution was deemed especially problematic because it targeted a
person for something that could not easily be changed.
The attention to status over action served as the foundation of Milhollan’s ruling about
persecution and immutable characteristics. Following the immigration court’s decision,
Milhollan ruled that sexual orientation is an “immutable” characteristic and that one should not
be denied access to citizenship because of an inherent element of their identity. In fact, Milhollan
states that the INS appeal did not challenge “the immigration judge’s finding that homosexuality
is an ‘immutable characteristic. Nor is there any evidence or argument that, once registered by
the Cuban government as a homosexual, that characteristic is subject to change.”153 Even if the
INS did not consider homosexuals capable of constituting a “particular social group” under the
Refugee Act of 1980, they did not argue against the lower court’s definition of homosexuality as
152
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immutable. Refugee laws had long protected people who faced persecution for something like
race or religion which were treated under the law as immutable. In this case, sexual orientation
was added to the list of immutable characteristics for which someone might face persecution and
is thus deserving of protection. The declaration of its immutability made sexual orientation
justifiable for inclusion as a “particular social group.”
In the majority opinion, the courts defer to the rights of asylum seekers as outlined in the
Refugee Act of 1980, effectively placing international human rights over the rights of U.S.
sovereignty. The most progressive, and surprising development in Toboso-Alfonso was the
constitution of homosexuals as a “particular social group.”154 This is the moment at which
private, subordinated LGBTI identities became protected within U.S. immigration law.155 In the
Refugee Act of 1980, the U.S. limited “particular social group” to religious, ethnic, and political
minorities, but here the category expanded through the addition of sexual minorities to that list.
However, in adding sexual minorities because of the “immutability” of their identity, the court
restricts identity to that which is inherent. This denies the flexibility and fluidity of sexual
identity and the process through which many people come to understand their identity. Thus, the
majority opinion imagines LGBTI asylees as people with the capacity to prove their sexual
orientation and their persecution.
2.3.4

Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Fred W. Vacca denies the immutability of homosexuality and

disputed Toboso-Alfonso’s claims about the inhospitability of life in Cuba for those identified as
homosexuals. Vacca notes that to prove a “clear probability” of persecution, the case “requires a
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showing that is more likely than not that an alien would be subject to persecution.”156 When
presented with the stack of articles and films Toboso-Alfonso provides as evidence of his
continued threat to persecution, Vacca dismisses the evidence, claiming that much of it relates to
the 1960s and 1970s, and he claims The 1985 Amnesty International Report does not address
homosexuals at all.157 Twice he calls for Toboso-Alfonso to be deported back to Cuba.158 In
attempting to understand Toboso-Alfonso’s claim for citizenship, Vacca repeatedly espouses the
ways in which Toboso-Alfonso does not meet the “clear probability” standard for a withholding
of deportation. In so doing, Vacca constructs the potential LGBTI asylum-seeker as someone
who is especially threatened, and delineates the way in which Toboso-Alfonso is not threatened.
Because Toboso-Alfonso was able to live as an out homosexual in Cuba, Vacca does not
think Toboso-Alfonso’s case showed a clear threat of persecution. He states, “I find the
applicant’s situation best evaluated in light of his own experiences over his 13 years as a known
homosexual in Cuba.”159 Here, Vacca finds Toboso-Alfonso’s ability to live in Cuba as an out
homosexual for 13 years to be evidence that he would not face a clear probability of persecution
– failing to acknowledge that existing and facing persecution are not mutually exclusive. It
seems Vacca considered Toboso-Alfonso’s ability to exist without ever experiencing violence as
an indication that he was not actually persecuted. Following his statement about living as a
“known homosexual,” Vacca delineates the ways Toboso-Alfonso would not fare better in the
United States than in Cuba. He mentions how the United States found regulation of private
behaviors to be constitutional, citing Bowers v. Hardwick, and defers to Cuba and their decisions
to prosecute Toboso-Alfonso for violating Cuban laws prohibiting homosexuality. Overall,
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Vacca is less interested in Toboso-Alfonso’s relationship to the current laws of the United States
and more interested in Toboso-Alfonso’s inability to act within the laws governing Cuba while
living there. He states:
I do not find this testimony regarding the circumstances of the applicant’s previous
experiences in Cuba as a known practicing homosexual to be such as to indicate a ‘clear
probability’ that his life or freedom would be threatened if he were to return to that
country. There are apparently Cuban criminal laws regarding homosexuality.160
In this statement, Vacca seems to contradict himself. He says he does not believe TobosoAlfonso faced a “clear probability” of persecution, but he also acknowledges the laws
criminalizing homosexuality in Cuba. Vacca does not consider the criminalization of
homosexuality to constitute persecution, and he finds Toboso-Alfonso’s inability to follow this
law since the age of nine to be a problem with Toboso-Alfonso, not Cuba. In continuing to place
the blame on Toboso-Alfonso instead of Cuba, Vacca later states that Toboso-Alfonso knew his
homosexuality was in violation of Cuban law, yet he knowingly lived as “a practicing
homosexual since he was 9 years old.”161 This statement denies the immutability argument made
in the majority opinions by suggesting that Toboso-Alfonso knew he was in violation of Cuban
law but chose to violate it anyway.
Vacca’s opinion repeatedly addresses Toboso-Alfonso’s health as a way of understanding
his lack of threat in Cuba. He argues that Toboso-Alfonso himself classifies his detentions with
the Cuban government as “health examinations,” which is less threatening than the physical
examinations depicted in the majority opinion. He uses Toboso-Alfonso’s own testimony to
show how the Cuban health examinations were for his benefit and could not be classified as
persecution: “When asked whether the government examinations were primarily health
examinations, the applicant responded: ‘Yes, and mostly … so there wouldn’t be any kind of
160
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disease or sickness.’”162 Later, Vacca returns to Toboso-Alfonso’s detentions by the Cuban
government, stating, “The applicant himself characterized his experiences with the authorities as
part of either investigations or health examinations. He did not describe these incidents as being
‘incarcerated’ because he was a homosexual.”163 And again, while citing Bowers v. Hardwick,
Vacca states, “Considering the applicant’s own characterization of the events, these experiences
appear related to the investigation of criminal activities and the control of health matters rather
than persecution of the applicant.”164 For Vacca, the periodic detentions, questionings, and
physical exams were not at the same level as incarceration or proven abuse as they were
performed out of concern for the health and safety of other Cubans.
Vacca’s dismissal of the “health examinations” as a form of persecution or threat reveals
the tensions at play in this case between what type of homosexual would be allowed in the
United States and under what circumstances. Vacca does not indicate any concern with the
periodic health examinations Toboso-Alfonso was required to undergo even though he was
selected for these examinations solely because he was registered as a homosexual. At the time of
Toboso-Alfonso’s hearing, fear of HIV and AIDS had given way to a fear of queer bodies, and
the fear of immigrants as “sites of contagion” was doubled in the fear of queer immigrants.165
Eithne Lubhéid notes that migrants are often “portrayed as the bearers of aberrant sexual
practices, questionable sexual morals, and sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS that
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threaten to ‘contaminate’ the citizenry.”166 The way Vacca talks about the regulation of TobosoAlfonso’s body in Cuba indicates that instead of seeing this regulation as persecution, he sees it
as a necessary measure to protect the health and safety of other Cubans. Just as migrants, and
particularly HIV-positive migrants have been treated in the United States as threats to our health
and safety, Tobso-Alfonso could not show a clear probability of a threat on his life because, to
Vacca, he was the threat.
Vacca claims that the crux of the case lies in Toboso-Alfonso’s ability to prove a “clear
probability” of persecution if deported to Cuba, and he argues that this case did not reach that
standard because Toboso-Alfonso was unable to prove that he would face persecution in 1990s
Cuba. When discussing Toboso-Alfonso’s testimony that he was given an ultimatum between
leaving Cuba or being jailed for four years, Vacca states:
In my view, this threat must be evaluated in the context of the time and situation in which
it was made. During the massive exodus of Cubans from Mariel in the spring of 1980,
some departures were entirely voluntary, some coerced. Fidel Castro used the plight of
the ‘Marielitos’ as an opportunity to rid Cuba of many who were deemed undesirable by
his government, including criminals and homosexuals. In view of his prior experiences, it
is clear that the purpose of the particular threat to the applicant was to get him to leave
the country. If he were to return to Cuba today with the permission of the Cuban
authorities, has he demonstrated a ‘clear probability’ that the threat made in 1980 has
relevance?...I would find that such is not the case.167
Vacca goes on to note that the Cuban government has agreed to take back any Marielitos who so
desired a return to Cuba, assuring “no reprisal” if they returned. Not only did Vacca dismiss
Toboso-Alfonso’s suffering in Cuba as persecution worth granting asylum for, he also showed he
believed Cuba had made progress since 1985 that would prevent Toboso-Alfonso from suffering
any more than he would in the United States. For Vacca, Toboso-Alfonso’s story paints the
picture of a man who was not persecuted, but rather, one who was subject to uncomfortable and
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unorthodox regulations – regulations that do not rise to the level of persecution. Fully dismissing
the evidence Toboso-Alfonso provides as part of his explanation of the threat to homosexual
people in Cuba in the early 1980, Vacca claims the only real threat he sees in Toboso-Alfonso’s
case came in the ultimatum that led him to voluntarily leave Cuba. He suggests that even
Toboso-Alfonso’s departure from Cuba may not indicate a “clear probability of persecution” in
the context of the 1990 hearing. For Vacca, there are significant contextual differences between
Cuba in the 1980s and Cuba in the 1990s. He raises the question, “If [Toboso-Alfonso] were to
return to Cuba today with the permission of the Cuban authorities, has he demonstrated a ‘clear
probability’ that the threat made in 1980 has relevance?” This question embraces a hypothetical
shift in Cuban attitudes toward LGBTI people, and it sets forth the notion that while TobosoAlfonso may not be widely embraced within Cuba, he would likely not be actively persecuted.
Vacca positions Toboso-Alfonso not as a case about the public sphere, but rather as the
story of one man’s private difficulties with national laws. The dissenting opinion revealed how
Toboso-Alfonso could do little to convince Vacca of his well-founded fear, and it raises the
question over who (or what kind of case) might make Vacca consider asylum to be the best
outcome for the applicant and the nation. Vacca’s standard for proving well-founded fear and
clear probability is substantially higher than that of those writing the majority opinion, and
Vacca’s other BIA opinions reveal his tendency to deny asylum or green cards far more often
than he votes to grant asylum. Some of the most widely publicized cases in which Vacca argued
to deny entry include cases involving a writer and political activist born in the U.S. but living in
Central America,168 a woman from Togo seeking asylum out of fear of genital mutilation,169 and
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an Afghan man seeking asylum for political persecution.170 In reading his opinions on a variety
of cases, Vacca’s standard for “well-founded fear” and “clear probability” of persecution
requires the asylum seeker to have experienced violence that absolutely, unquestionably resulted
from their membership in one of the groups eligible for asylum. This hard stance allows the
courts to help maintain U.S. sovereignty and reserve asylum for the most desperate, persecuted
person. What this high standard for proving persecution fails to account for, however, is the
difficulty many asylum seekers face in migrating to the United States. Those who face the most
intense and violent persecution may never have the ability to leave their current situation,
eliminating the possibility to even apply for asylum. In his essay discussing barriers to asylum in
the United States, Timothy Randazzo states that most LGBTI people seeking to escape
persecution through migration never make it to the United States, and that the poor are both more
likely to experience persecution and less likely to have the resources necessary to leave.171
Vacca’s hard standard ensures that asylum can only be granted to those who can offer some sort
of definitive proof of identity and persecution and who possess the means necessary to leave
their current situation. Vacca’s imagined queer refugee, then, is in many ways a paradoxical
figure. In his view, an acceptable refugee is one who is both unable to live safely in their home
nation and who possesses great resources and legal knowledge to navigate the immigration court
system. Moreover, the ideal refugee possesses the capacity to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that their identification as lesbian or gay caused them to face interminable persecution.
Vacca’s positioning of Toboso-Alfonso as a private individual struggling to obey national
laws is in stark contrast with the majority opinion’s narrative of the struggling asylum seeker
whose public freedoms outweigh his personal downfalls. For Milhollan and the other judges
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signing the majority opinion, Toboso-Alfonso was worthy of protection because of his identity,
because identity is public – especially in Cuba. Private sex acts, on the other hand, are private
and not the concern of the state – a stance that is countered in Vacca’s dissent under the
precedent set by Bowers v. Hardwick which upheld states’ rights to prosecute private sexual acts
(and was largely used as a way to incarcerate gay men). The Toboso-Alfonso case granted rights
to a homosexual person because of his homosexual identity, not in spite of it. And it did this not
by presenting homosexuality as a deficiency or deviance, but rather as a locus of human rights.
In order to recognize homosexual people as eligible for state protection, the case needed to
situate homosexual identity as a public status. Despite the multitude of ways in which private
acts determine public eligibility for citizen status, it is precisely those public actions that
constitute a “civic” identity and make possible social and civic imaginaries. Berlant discusses
how the regulation of bodies and identities is often targeted at the regulation of sexual acts.
Further, Berlant notes that the government’s investment in what queer people do in the bedroom
is one of the fundamental sites of the intimate public sphere in which private behaviors become
the site of public worth.172 In his Toboso-Alfonso opinion, Milhollan is not willing to make that
leap, classifying Toboso-Alfonso as worthy of protection because of his identity and status and
the persecution he could face in Cuba merely for existing as he (immutably) is.
2.4

Toboso-Alfonso as Precedent
In addition to the removal of “sexual deviance” as an excludable offense, the Immigration

Act of 1990 brought to the United States a set of more progressive immigration policies,
including the elimination of English language testing in the naturalization process and an
increase in overall numbers of admitted immigrants. President George H. W. Bush signed the
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Act into law and stated that he supported the Act because it “facilitates immigration not just in
numerical terms, but also in terms of basic entry rights of those beyond our borders.”173 The
passage of this law in late 1990 meant that William Clinton’s Administration and then Attorney
General Janet Reno became primarily accountable for implementing and regulating the changes
brought forth by this Act. Although she called for more restrictions on immigration in some
areas, like greater border agent presence at the U.S. Mexico border, Reno also oversaw more
inclusive asylum policies emerging in this context. When Reno set Toboso-Alfonso as precedent,
her words helped to frame the case as having a broader application than it had upon the initial
writing of the decision. She stated that the board appropriately applied the law and that their
decision could help to guide immigration judges hearing similar cases. Reno set the case as
precedent for all future cases “involving the same issue or issues,” where an individual
“identified as homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone may be
eligible for relief under refugee laws on the basis of persecution because of membership in a
social group.”174 Beyond its status as legal precedent, the case would also go on to establish the
rhetorical precedent through which identities would be measured, persecution would be
understood, and arguments for asylum would be generated. For example, Reno’s use of the
words “identified as” made possible asylum in the case of imputed homosexuality and not just
admitted homosexuality, meaning someone could receive asylum after facing anti-LGBTI
persecution whether or not they identified as a member of a sexual minority. But despite Reno’s
choice of words, the burden to prove not only persecution but also a sexual minority identity
remains high.
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In setting this case as precedent, Reno may have unknowingly set an unreasonably high
burden of proof for LGBTI people claiming persecution. The rhetorical precedent set in place by
Toboso-Alfonso was shaped by the specific context of U.S.-Cuba relations at play in that case.
Both the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles
living in the U.S. created rich corroborated documentation of the persecution of LGBTI people in
Cuba. And while the majority of LGBTI asylees came to the U.S. from Central and South
America, especially in the first ten years after Toboso-Alfonso was set as precedent, not every
asylum seeker was able to provide the same type of documentation of political and statesponsored persecution of LGBTI people. In many cases, the abuse was hard to prove, and
maintaining documentation of abuse while living in a nation hostile to LGBTI people could be
dangerous. There were few to no stories of LGBTI persecution in other nations circulating in the
U.S. media in the years following Toboso-Alfonso, so the ability to prove persecution was met
with a far greater challenge than that faced by the Marielitos of Cuba.
One of the few cases to receive national attention following Toboso-Alfonso was that of
Brazilian national Marcelo Tenório – a case that is at least partially responsible for Reno’s
declaration of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent.175 In 1993, Tenório was one of the first LGBTI
refugees to be granted asylum in the United States on the basis of sexual orientation-based
persecution, and was the first from a nation with less explicit or publicized prejudices against
LGBTI people. Similar cases prior to in re: Tenorio primarily involved people seeking refuge
from Iraq, Iran, and Cuba– nations with laws prohibiting homosexual behavior and a history of
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state-sponsored hostility toward homosexuals.176 In these cases, there was not a high burden to
prove that the state was hostile and that being gay could endanger someone’s life. For Tenório, it
proved more difficult to make the same claims to persecution as someone from Iraq, Iran, or
Cuba. By the early 1990s, Rio de Janeiro was already home to one of the biggest gay pride
parades in the world, and it had acquired a reputation as a LGBTI vacation mecca. Like the U.S.,
Brazil formally listed homosexuality as a mental illness for many years – finally changing the
designation in 1990.177 Although Tenório had been severely beaten, stabbed multiple times, and
had faced systematic (and at times, state-sponsored) violence, he still had to convince his
immigration judge that Rio de Janeiro was a hostile environment for members of the LGBTI
community.178 While Brazil does not keep statistics on LGBTI violence, a Brazilian human
rights group estimates that in 1993 one homosexual was murdered every five days and only ten
percent of those murders were ever prosecuted.179 The precedent for proving national hostility
toward homosexuals set by Toboso-Alfonso was one in which documentaries, news articles, and
the personal records of thousands of gay Marielitos made strong proof of their persecution. In
order to be granted asylum in the U.S., Tenório had to perform a convincing gay identity – the
very same identity he worked to keep secret while living in Brazil.180 Judging Tenório by the
standard set in Toboso-Alfonso would make it difficult to prove sexual orientation in the same
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way. There were no known public records of Tenório’s sexual orientation and no required
participation in “health examinations” or interrogations.
In making the immutability standard of Toboso-Alfonso one which relies on public
identities instead of private acts, the case seemed to simplify the confusing distinctions between
public and private. However, as Berlant shows, the line between public and private is not stable,
and does not always exist in the same ways for all people at the same time. The judges siding
with Tenório stated, “Respondent is openly homosexual, a characteristic the court considers
immutable, and one which an asylum applicant should not be compelled to change. Thus, a
reasonable person in respondent’s circumstances would not stop fearing persecution.”181 The
court’s interpretation of Toboso-Alfonso’s precedent shows how they apply the immutability
standard. However, the way in which that standard was applied here required particular evidence
that the applicant was “openly homosexual.” As a result, Tenório’s case involved a lengthy
debate over what it meant to be openly homosexual, and much of this debate relied on making
sense of his seemingly contradictory public and private identities. Juana María Rodríguez’s
reading of the In re: Tenorio transcripts highlights Tenório’s “seemingly contradictory
statements about hiding and visibility” that the court had to parse:
Marcelo Tenório did not belong to any gay political groups, had not declared himself a
homosexual in any recognized public forum, and was not engaged in any sexual act or
other overt manifestations of homosexual desire…In his testimony, Tenório states he had
been a practicing homosexual since the age of fourteen, and claims ‘everything in
hiding.’ Yet, when asked by Allen Lee, the trial attorney for the INS, ‘Well, how would
people know that you were gay?’ Tenório responded, ‘Because I live among gays, I live
with gays. My friends are gay, and I can’t live in hiding. Sometimes when I talk in Brazil,
just because of my voice, they’ll say I’m gay.182
Tenório was both publicly and privately homosexual and both publicly and privately straight.
Public and private acts and identities do not have clear boundaries. Unlike the public records
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kept to track Toboso-Alfonso’s “health examinations,” Tenório’s evidence of public
homosexuality was less explicit and less official. Tenório’s case shows how the standard of
public identity in Toboso-Alfonso is only roughly applicable to cases involving asylum applicants
from other nations. And while Tenório was granted asylum, his case shows how the application
of Toboso-Afonso’s immutability standard could place overwhelming burdens on asylum
applicants to parse the complexities of public and private identities in a way that makes sense to
an immigration judge.

Figure 1: Tenório in the news, photo published in Reuters, 1990

Like Tenório, those who wish to obtain asylum in the United States must first
successfully prove to a judge that they were persecuted or are at a high risk for persecution and
that they actually are members of a sexual minority. In order to become eligible for citizenship,
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they must prove some acceptable and believable level of homosexual identity – a standard not
needed in the Toboso-Alfonso decision. While there exists fear of people using the precedent set
by Toboso-Alfonso to get sexual orientation asylum in the United States, as of 2016, no cases
have been found to create a false narrative of persecution. In fact, the majority of sexual
orientation asylum cases are rejected. The standard set forth through Toboso-Alfonso’s precedent
is one that places a large burden on the asylum seeker to prove what is difficult to prove –
identity and persecution. In the shifting moment of controversy over LGBTI asylum in the early
1990s, the decision to grant asylum to LGBTI people won the day, but in making TobosoAlfonso the precedent for these cases, asylum became an option only for those who were legibly
gay or lesbian according to widespread understanding of identity categories.
2.5

Conclusions
In his book Visions of Poverty, Robert Asen notes, “Especially in moments of

controversy, imagining may unsettle established evaluations of policy initiatives and positions of
advantage and disadvantage.”183 We see this unsettling occur following the Toboso-Alfonso
decision, where a group once barred from entering the United States was provided a path to
asylum and eventual citizenship based on their membership of that same group. The positions of
advantage and disadvantage became cloudy in the Toboso-Alfonso decision, as his persecution
and institutionally marginalized identity – a great disadvantage and traumatic experience in his
own life – became the advantage necessary to be granted permission to stay in the United States.
Regardless of the court’s intent in writing this particular decision, the establishment of TobosoAlfonso as precedent made immigration courts most likely to understand cases where the asylum
claimants most resembled Toboso-Alfonso. Thus, eligible asylum claimants came to be widely
183
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understood as men who could perform their sexual identity in a way that made sense to
immigration officers and who had the means to provide certain evidence of persecution like news
stories and public declarations that showed the subordination of LGBTI people.
Legal scholar Joseph Landau calls Toboso-Alfonso’s precedent a “soft immutability”
standard that requires proof of sexual orientation but allows criteria to shift to fit the context of
each case.184 While this may benefit people whose cases do not look exactly like TobosoAlfonso’s (and given the specific context of the Mariel Boatlift, most do not), it does require
applicants to prove the immutability of their identity. This means that LGBTI asylum seekers
must be able to prove their sexual orientation or gender identity and the ways in which it has
persisted in their lives – they must show that they were “born this way” and that they cannot
change. For many asylum applicants, this is possible, but it requires the presentation of an
identity that is especially legible to immigration officers and judges. They must be able to be
understandably, immutably gay, or lesbian, or transgender, and deviations from these categories
like bisexuality or genderqueer identities become more difficult to prove. People who identify as
bisexual or genderqueer are not any less likely to face persecution, but the soft immutability
standard implies that only those with more obviously LGBTI “traits” are at a greater risk of
persecution. The subsequent cases show that this soft immutability became the method by which
systemic heteronormativity is upheld within the institution of citizenship, and through which
legibly gay men in particular become the most likely to gain asylum under this standard. TobosoAlfonso was able to prove persecution in a way not all LGBTI migrants could (or can), and his
classification as a homosexual by the Cuban government removed the demand for TobosoAlfonso to prove his sexual orientation in his hearing.
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Further, Reno’s statement that the case would apply to similar cases involving “gay and
lesbian” asylum seekers was both in line with vocabulary in use at the time and an improvement
from the often derogatory term “homosexual.” However it also helped to institutionalize a fairly
narrow understanding of sexual orientation and identity. Transgender asylum seekers have faced
some of the harshest decisions because the courts could not recognize the immutability of their
identity and because their cases did not necessarily look like those of Toboso-Alfonso –whose
persecution began at the age of nine years old and was monitored in a register by his nation. In
setting Toboso-Alfonso as precedent, Reno simultaneously expanded the possibilities for
inclusivity in U.S. asylum policy and narrowed the definitions of identity for future applications
of the case.
Toboso-Alfonso slightly eroded the traditional heteronormativity of citizenship because it
opened a pathway to rights for people previously excluded from the nation. More importantly,
though, it set forth standards of legibility in identity that institutions continue to wrestle with
today. Toboso-Alfonso became a case that influenced debates over who belongs in the United
States and who does not. The controversy surrounding the course was, in many ways, one over
the unspoken desire for purity in citizenship. In deciding to account for the persecution of
LGBTI individuals, the immigration courts still needed to delineate how, and in what
circumstances someone could be granted asylum. The ways in which that decision has privileged
certain identities and people from certain nations has helped to shape the face of LGBTI asylum.
The norms set in place by Toboso-Alfonso have expanded access to U.S. citizenship in some
ways, but they have also established criteria that limit the identity performances and even the
types of asylum applications processed in the immigration system. In the next chapter, I explore
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the ways the U.S. immigration system has wrestled with these established norms in LGBTI
asylum policy.
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3

REGULATING QUEER ASYLUM: HETERONORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP AND
HOMONATIONALIST POLITICS

Following the decision in The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, immigration officials in the
United States were faced with the task of delineating who met the standard for sexual orientation
(and eventually, gender identity) asylum. Their efforts led to the creation of a training module
that relied on the rhetorical precedent set in Toboso-Alfonso to create a definition of the
successful sexual orientation or gender identity asylum claimant. Definition and naming are
means of rhetorical representation that construct certain subjects within the public imaginary.
Constructing more than just rhetorical representation, these definitions codify a rhetorical
precedent that sets in place demands for particular identity performances and particular
arguments that fit examples set forth in legal precedent from prior LGBTI asylum cases. I argue
that in defining LGBTI asylum seekers, the training module strives for inclusivity but ultimately
engages in a practice of homonationalism. This institutionalized homonationalism defines certain
bodies and identities as deserving of citizenship and excludes those who cannot be identified as
embodying the desired LGBTI citizen.
In the years since The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso set a precedent for cases involving
asylum granted on the basis of sexual orientation persecution, global persecution of LGBTI
people became a more prominent feature of news, and LGBTI rights in the U.S. shifted toward
greater inclusivity of different identities. These shifts in attitudes and awareness were met with a
shift in policy, and the Obama Administration laid out a plan in 2011 that would involve a
widespread effort toward global LGBTI rights objectives. As part of this effort, the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) began to offer greater support for LGBTI asylum
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seekers who fled persecution abroad. The USCIS released a training module to aid immigration
officers in the adjudication of sexual orientation and gender identity asylum claims. The module,
titled “Guidance for Adjudicating Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI)
Refugee and Asylum Claims,” was produced for the Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations Directorate (or RAIO).185 It provides 65 pages of research, guidance, and interview
materials for immigration officers working in the RAIO and dealing with LGBTI asylum claims.
The RAIO training module stands as an institutional effort to resolve the contradictions between
identity, orientation, persecution, and citizenship produced by LGBTI asylum cases. It sits at the
intersection of immigration law and the political sphere – speaking to an audience of lawyers,
judges, and most importantly, immigration officers in their efforts to parse the political
contradictions surrounding LGBTI asylum. In this chapter, I read the training module through
the lens of critical rhetoric to uncover the structures of power it upholds and/or resists. While the
training module marks an effort toward a progressive understanding of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex asylum seekers, it ultimately codifies norms of sexual orientation and
gender identity and contributes to a system of homonationalism.
The USCIS training module represents recent efforts by the government to extend the
rights of citizenship to people long denied those rights. The rights of U.S. citizenship have never
been fully granted to people identifying as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer. Rights to
marriage, spousal benefits, private sexual activity, and public use of spaces have all been
restricted from LGBTI people at one point in U.S. history. In addition, LGBTI people continue
to be denied protections granted to heterosexual people in employment, housing, and beyond.
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Elizabeth Freeman and Lauren Berlant claim that citizenship has long been reserved for people
inhabiting a “straight, undiseased body,” that the regulation of bodies through immigration
policy literally supported these exclusions in multiple ways, and that this practice of regulation
ultimately defined citizens accordingly.186 Heterosexuality is presumed, and any identity that is
not explicitly, legibly heterosexual is treated as a deviation from a norm. This treatment takes a
variety of forms – from the explicit denial of rights to more covert incidences of prejudice or
inequality.
While this presumed, institutional heteronormativity can be traced through the history of
U.S. legal regulations, the cultural dimensions of heteronormative citizenship are more difficult
to parse. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner claim that in the United States, national
heterosexuality has become the dominant, unspoken space of pure citizenship that allows
systemic inequalities regarding sexuality to remain in the shadows.187 This renders unintelligible
the relationship between sexuality and citizenship and makes heteronormativity the standard
operation of the state.188 The world that Berlant and Warner paint is one marked by dispute over
identity, rights, privacy, and publicity. In The Queen of America Goes to Washington City,
Berlant describes how citizenship has always functioned as a false promise for many living in the
U.S. including women, immigrants, and homosexuals who have “long experienced
simultaneously the wish to be full citizens and the violence of their partial citizenship.”189
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Berlant further addresses how laws may expand to provide pieces of citizenship to those
populations, but full incorporation into the world of democratic national privilege is impossible.
One of the places where we can see this ongoing deferral of rights is in the “intimate
public sphere” ushered in through Regan-era politics and through which individual public worth
became dependent on private interactions.190 For Berlant, the public and private spheres are only
independent for people whose lives fit within the established heteronormative boundaries of
citizenship. In an intimate public sphere, regulation of private sexual acts became a focus of
public political activity.191 Further, political focus on upholding an ideal version of a family
became a crusade to protect our “most vulnerable citizens” – namely children – from the threat
of sexual activity, particularly from LGBTI people themselves. Much like efforts to protect
Americans from immigrants, we have seen fear of LGBTI people play out in legislation
regulating private sex acts and the regulation of their mere existence in certain public spaces.
In The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, private sexual acts were differentiated from sexual
orientation as a status in a way that left a dent in the heteronormativity of citizenship by
expanding LGBTI access to citizenship. However, it also set in place a rhetorical precedent for
the arguments and identity performances most likely to earn someone sexual orientation asylum.
The decision in Toboso-Alfonso created a path to citizenship for a person who had been legally
barred from entering the United States but who could not return to his homeland for fear of
persecution. The case established LGBTI people as eligible for asylum because their
membership in that particular group made them a target of persecution. The Toboso-Alfonso case
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also set in place a rhetorical precedent that established the types of arguments that would be most
salient in future LGBTI asylum cases as well as the types of identities that could be most clearly
depicted as eligible for this type of asylum. This rhetorical precedent inflects the language of the
training module, and structures the types of identity and orientation categories accounted for in
current immigration officer training.
Following the decision in The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso to offer asylum to people fleeing
persecution on the basis of their sexual orientation, a number of tensions arose in the
adjudication of LGBTI asylum cases and the effort to interpret its rhetorical precedent. When the
case was set as legal precedent, Reno’s statement only included “lesbian and gay asylum
seekers.” This means that the application of Toboso-Alfonso in subsequent cases required
immigration officers and judges to broaden their interpretation of its meaning as the U.S. began
to acknowledge a greater variety of identities and orientations. Further, the demand to prove
one’s sexual orientation (and in some cases its immutability) demanded asylum seekers to
provide evidence from their private lives. The Toboso-Alfonso case set in place a standard by
which LGBTI asylees would be judged, but it did not – and could not – fully establish how that
standard would be applied. In setting both a legal and rhetorical precedent for future LGBTI
asylum cases, Toboso-Alfonso both “paved the way for hundreds of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender individuals as well as individuals with intersex conditions (LGBTI) to obtain refugee
and asylum status in the United States” and established the image to which future LGBTI asylees
are expected to adhere.192
Although Reno set the case as precedent in 1994, it took almost twenty years for any
official statement from the U.S. government in support of LGBTI people fleeing persecution,
partly because the drive for rights remained mostly stagnant under the George W. Bush
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presidency. Near the end of President Obama’s second term, he began to make more public
statements of overt support for LGBTI people. Preceding his more widely publicized defense of
same-sex marriage in May of 2012, President Obama and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
separately issued statements of support for global LGBTI rights on International Human Rights
Day in December of 2011. Both of their statements acknowledged that across the world, LGBTI
people face persecution and must flee their homelands to escape it. In her speech to the United
Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Clinton declared, “gay rights are human rights” – a
statement that would resonate through future statements of support from Obama and members of
his administration.193 On that same day, President Obama issued a memorandum announcing a
host of initiatives aimed at responding to human rights abuses of LGBT people in the U.S. and
abroad. One section of his statement was dedicated to “protecting vulnerable LGBT refugees and
asylum seekers.” Here he discussed programs designed to ensure “appropriate training” for
governmental offices working to protect LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers.194 As immigration
courts began to hear different cases of LGBTI persecution and claims for asylum, there arose a
need to deal with the varied claims to citizenship. Obama acknowledged in his memorandum that
there are a variety of challenges facing a population he described as “highly vulnerable persons
with urgent protection needs.” Here, Obama not only acknowledges the suffering sexual
minorities face, but he classifies their need as “urgent,” and pledges his support to the programs
that will process these asylum claims and resettle this population. Obama and Clinton’s
statements acted both as a response to the exigence created by global human rights abuses
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involving LGBTI individuals, and as their own exigences, calling into being texts that could aid
in the enactment of this new policy.
Less than six months after Obama’s declaration, the USCIS released the training module
titled “Guidance for Adjudicating Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI)
Refugee and Asylum Claims.” It provides 65 pages of training resources to aid in authenticating
these asylum claims as well as prompts for how to interview asylees fleeing potentially abusive
or violent situations. The training module reflects current conceptions about the relationship
between sexual orientation and citizenship even as it seeks to revise them on behalf of potential
citizens. In this regard, the manual functions as a rhetorical handbook for immigration officials,
who must produce convincing representations of prospective citizens. The efforts to provide
comprehensive definitions of worthy LGBTI asylum seekers may seem at first glance to merely
identify who is eligible and illegible for asylum, but I argue this module actually creates worthy
asylum seekers.
In addition to being made available on the USCIS website, the module is occasionally
distributed at CLEs (Continuing Legal Education) for immigration, asylum, and refugee law. The
document explains how to determine which asylum applicants are eligible for and should be
granted asylum and whose claims should be denied. As Eithne Luibhéid notes in the introduction
to Queer Migrations, the refugee and asylum system shapes the nation through inclusions and
exclusions. Although some exclusions are explicitly written into immigration policy, exclusions
also emerge because “the refugee/asylum system involves an inherent tension between, on the
one hand, providing protection to people who are persecuted by national governments and, on
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the other hand, respecting the sovereignty of individual nation-states.”195 Tasked with upholding
sovereignty, immigration officials must adhere to both legal guidelines and cultural norms in
order to determine which individuals meet the criteria for asylum and who must be turned away.
The RAIO training module exists as a comprehensive effort to guide immigration
officials in their adjudication of LGBTI asylum cases which require them to determine whose
cases are worthy (and not worthy) of asylum. In this chapter, I read the training module as an
index of the social imaginary. This examination is informed by work in critical rhetoric, which
approaches texts as sites of power relations. Through this reading, I argue that the training
module strives for inclusivity but ultimately engages in a practice of homonationalism, which
draws boundaries that exclude the potential for a queer understanding of sexual orientation and
identity. This institutionalized homonationalism defines certain bodies and identities as
deserving of citizenship and excludes those who cannot be identified as embodying the desired
LGBTI citizen. The training module is a response to heteronormativity in U.S. culture that,
though claiming itself to be progressive and accepting of difference, reifies the boundaries of
queer identity and produces the subject worthy of sexual orientation asylum. While efforts
toward inclusivity of different identities and orientation has seen significant progress over the
past twenty years, the institutional response ultimately upholds a version of national
heteronormativity through the projection of homonationalism. Where heteronormativity is the
normalization of heterosexual identities, unions, and family structures, homonationalism is more
insidious. It involves the incorporation of LGBTI bodies and identities into the national culture
in a way that limits what those bodies and identities can look like. In other words,
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heteronormativity is fully, obviously exclusionary and homonationalism appears to be inclusive
while masking the ways in which it perpetuates exclusions.
To make this argument, I establish my critical framework informed by both theories of
heteronormativity and homonationalism. Next, I analyze the ways in which the construction of
and directive to the implied immigration officer audience sets in motion the homonationalist
system. I follow this by uncovering the sources of power and repression in the LGBTI initialism
itself and each of the identity categories represented by that initialsm. Finally, I discuss the
implications of this analysis, which include a consideration of essentialism in definitions and the
ways a foreclosure of “queer” from the training module helps to codify the norms of sexual
orientation for the LGBTI asylum seeker.
3.1

Heteronormativity, Homonationalism, and Critical Rhetoric
When the USCIS training module was released, it was lauded for its inclusivity and

because it appeared to show the ways in which the Obama Administration was enacting
progressive asylum policies.196 It served as one of the highlights of President Obama’s global
LGBTI rights program through its attention to the unique cultural needs of different LGBTI
asylum seekers and its comprehensive definitions of categories of sexual orientation and gender
identity. In structuring the training module to delineate categories of identity, however, the
USCIS contributes to a system of homonationalism through which certain nations are presented
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as more progressive (or “better”) than others, and certain identities and orientations are presented
as more worthy of asylum. Before reading the module to help make sense of this argument, I
place the system of homonationalism in conversation with concepts of heteronormativity and
national sovereignty.
In order to uphold the sovereignty of a nation-state, the nation is driven to maintain a
certain level of purity. It does so by excluding or expelling those who threaten that sovereignty.
This drive toward a pure citizenry results in a number of institutional efforts to enforce the
homogeneity of a nation. For example, Judith Butler claims that most nations deal with this
effort at homogeneity through the “recurrent expulsion of national minorities,” implementing
exclusionary policies that impact both birthright citizens and migrants.197 One of the results of
these efforts is the national heteronormativity that persists in both legal and vernacular
discourses. Berlant and Warner define this heteronormativity as “material practices that, though
not explicitly sexual, are implicated in the hierarchies of property and propriety.”198 They use the
word “material” here to note the ways certain spaces in the nation are constructed to protect
heterosexual privacy; at the same time, laws and norms both condemn queer publics to certain
spaces and require performances of acceptable public actions. Policies that make space for
LGBTI people to be publicly queer have filtered through U.S. legislature over the past twenty
years. These policies, however, continue to set forth certain norms about what being queer in
public looks like. Lisa Duggan calls this “the new homonormativity – it is a politics that does not
contest dominant heteronomative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them,
while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized
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gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.”199 Duggan’s homonormativity is not at
odds with national heteronormativity because they rely on and contribute to one another.
Drawing from Duggan’s homonormativity, Jasbir Puar finds “homonationalism” to be an
especially powerful companion to national heteronormativity. Puar wrote her book Terrorist
Assemblages partly in reaction to the constant claims of national heteronormativity and the
assumption of full exclusion of queer bodies echoed in queer theory and transnational feminist
discourses. Homonationalism helps make sense of the ways a nation’s status as “gay-friendly”
results in the expansion of normativizing identity practices and ultimately, allows nations to
justify military intervention in places that do not share their same perspective of progress.200 For
Puar, homonationalism consists of the interdependent efforts to incorporate some homosexual
bodies and exclude or quarantine others.201 Within homonationalism, what appears to be progress
for queer rights is really another way to discipline LGBTI people into certain normative
categories through exclusionary practices in law and conservative political imaginaries. Puar
explains that the grounds for these exclusions rely on Orientalist ideas about treatment of
homosexuality outside of the U.S., particularly in Muslim countries. This move toward
homonationalism both allows the rights-granting (Western) nation to see themselves as
embodying the “right” side of human rights history and simultaneously maintain their
sovereignty from what is constructed as terroristic threats from other nations. Puar explains:
Queerness is proffered as a sexually exceptional form of American national sexuality
through a rhetoric of sexual modernization that is simultaneously able to castigate the
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other as homophobic and perverse, and construct the imperialist center as ‘tolerant’ but
sexually, racially, and gendered normal.202
Homonationalism is what allows the U.S. to create space for LGBTI people in a generally
heteronormative nation while predicating their admission on the construction of their home
nation as a place that is violent, regressive, and homophobic. Homonationalism is not a
methodology, “not simply a synonym for gay racism,” not an identity politics, or even a position:
It is rather, a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some)
homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and
fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and
sexuality.203
To say that certain practices of LGBTI asylum are homonationalist is not to say that that they are
not also heteronormative. The efforts of the Obama Administration to provide asylum to
persecuted LGBTI people does not stem from heteronormativity, however. The practices that led
to those policies are at least partly a reaction to heteronormativity in the decisions of early
LGBTI asylum cases. The Obama Administration’s declaration of support, and the RAIO
training module that was released after that declaration reflect the attempt within the U.S.
government to provide a system for processing LGBTI asylum claims. The resulting system is
rooted in the heteronormativity of national U.S. identity, but is simultaneously homonationalist
through its articulation of certain bodies as acceptable and migrants from certain nations as most
persecuted.
Attending to heteronormativity and homonationalism in institutional rhetorics as well as
acknowledging the public formations that exist within and as a result of those rhetorics demands
a broad, critical approach. Following Foucault, Raymie McKerrow called for a critical rhetoric
that would unmask and demystify discourses of power through a critique of both domination and
202
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freedom in rhetorical texts.204 His 1989 essay sparked criticisms of his reading of Foucault,205 a
debate over whether criticism can and should have a telos,206 and a discussion of material
rhetorics,207 while also significantly shaping the way rhetoricians “do” rhetoric. McKerrow
defends critical rhetoric as an “orientation,” not a methodology, and provides space for critical
rhetoric to happen within institutions instead of only in opposition to them. Since the 1980s,
critical rhetoric has persisted, making a path for debates about the relationship between ideology,
power, and rhetoric. The analysis of texts produced by dominant institutions or that advocate
dominant ideologies has been a common focus of critical rhetoric scholarship that seeks to make
sense of identity formation in civic life.208 While much of this literature follows McKerrow in
citing Foucault as a way to make sense of power relations, Louis Althusser is almost as
frequently cited in an effort to understand the ways in which power and ideology function in
discourse. Whereas Foucault characterizes power as a set of relations that cannot be fixed or
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located in a specific institution,209 Althusser locates power in ideological state apparatuses
(among other places). For Althusser, ideological state apparatuses dominate through ideology
and constitute subjects through interpellation.210 Drawing from Louis Althusser’s concept of
interpellation, much of the identity formation scholarship seeks to understand how certain
discourses might call subjects into existence.211 Ideological state apparatuses function through a
largely unconscious, material process that masks the means of production and makes us aware of
our own subject positions through interpellation. This is important for LGBTI asylum because
immigration officers function as part of the ideological state apparatus – they are able to
perpetuate ideologies through discourse. Thus, the training module itself exists as a statesanctioned handbook that not only helps immigration officials identify subjects – it also
represents or imagines them.
The training module establishes guidelines that will result in the exclusion of migrants
seeking asylum in the United States, but it also accounts for sexual orientation and gender
identity as complex categories for which some people in the world are violently persecuted.
Following McKerrow, the critique of power in this case helps us consider the ways citizenship
itself can be oppressive in its heteronormativity and provides a way to read the training module
209

Michel Foucault, “Disciplinary Power and Subjection” in Power, ed. S. Lukes, (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1986), 229-242.
210
Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” The
Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2006): (2006): 86-111.
211
Those who call this “constitutive rhetoric” mostly follow Althusser – See: Maurice Charland,
“Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 73, no. 2
(1987): 133-150; James Jasinski and Jennifer R. Mercieca, “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics,” in The
Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address, ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (Hoboken:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 313-341. Yet, others who deal with constitutive discourses and are particularly
interested in locating concepts of a “public” find Ernesto Laclau to provide a better approach for talking
about the ways “A subject…is not simply interpellated by one discourse; rather, a subject is constituted
as the nodal point of a conglomeration of conflicting discourses, a position that leaves room for agency,
but not the free will of a preconstituted subject.” Kevin Michael DeLuca, “Articulation Theory: A
Discursive Grounding for Rhetorical Practice,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 32, no. 4 (1999), 338; See
also: Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: Verso, 2005).

95

for the places where it might embody or uphold national heteronormativity. While some have
found fault with McKerrow’s separation of freedom and domination,212 this language helps us
consider the ways discourse is never fully oppressive or fully dominating or fully liberating. The
critique of freedom requires reflexivity about one’s own role in systems of power and directs
attention to the ways these systems might perpetuate advantage and disadvantage that could
simultaneously benefit and harm. In the case of the training module, the critique of freedom
combined with the critique of domination helps parse the ways this progressive document,
created to increase access to rights, might simultaneously limit and foreclose rights. These
critiques alert us to the system of homonationalism reinforced by these progressive “liberating”
discourses. An analysis of the RAIO training module for adjudicating LGBTI asylum claims
considers the ways it resolves contradictions of heteronormative citizenship and the ways in
which it reinforces or reinscribes those contradictions, effectively upholding homonationalism.
To make this argument, I look at the effort to train immigration officers and facilitate their
“sensitivity” before I analyze the definition and categorization of queer asylum seekers.
3.2

Reading the RAIO Training Module
As a document intended to structure the rhetorical approach of U.S. immigration officers

in their interactions with LGBTI asylum seekers, the Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations (RAIO) training module exists within a long tradition of rhetorical handbooks. For
Janet Atwill, the handbook was initially intended to serve as “a neutral tool in service to the
higher causes of ethics, politics, or philosophy,” and only in practice did these admirable goals
212
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shift focus toward oratory as material, persuasive product.213 Although the training module does
not necessarily seek to make the immigration officers more persuasive, it does seek to make
them more rhetorically effective. It serves as a tool to aid a political process by training
immigration officers to be informed of the technical requirements of their position and to be
culturally and rhetorically sensitive when engaging in interviews with asylum seekers. The
training module makes formal and prescriptive the rhetorical precedent that was informally
established in Toboso-Alfonso.
The RAIO training module was produced for a fairly limited audience of immigration
officers who are responsible for adjudicating LGBTI asylum claims. It is available to the public
through the USCIS website in the section containing information for employees and immigration
officers. It is not a private document requiring certain clearance or credentials to obtain. The
module lists its objectives on page three – noting that it seeks to provide guidelines for the
immigration officer to “elicit all relevant information from an LGBTI applicant” in order to
properly adjudicate their claim. More specific objectives take shape in three main categories: 1)
description of harms and legal guidelines, 2) identification of potential constraints on the
evaluation of these cases, and 3) a call for rhetorical sensitivity in interviewing. The training
module contains a list of required and recommended reading for officers, scripts to aid in the
conducting of interviews, descriptions of relevant case law, and definitions pertaining to sexual
orientation and gender identity. The module contains three separate sections dedicated to directly
defining terms and it also contains multiple pages throughout that explain topics related to
LGBTI asylum and sexual identity categories more implicitly. In so doing, the module constructs
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the subject of LGBTI asylum claims in a particular way, and thus, shapes the imagined LGBTI
asylee/citizen.
Immigration officers conduct interviews with asylum seekers in order to build the asylum
claim. Through their interviews they are tasked with determining whether the asylum applicant is
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex, whether their actual or imputed sexual orientation
is immutable, and whether it lead them to face persecution. The training module provides lines of
questioning and suggested question order depending on the asylum seeker’s particular needs.
Because asylum on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity persecution requires asylum
seekers to prove both that they have been persecuted, and that their persecution was the result of
their actual or imputed identity, immigration officers have a responsibility to elicit as much
information in their interviews as possible. Thus, a successful asylum claim is largely dependent
upon the thorough, sensitive, nuanced, and strategic interview tactics of the immigration officer.
The assumption through which the RAIO and the USCIS operates is that at the end of an
hour-long interview, an immigration officer will be able to determine whether or not the asylum
applicant is authentic in their claim and fits within the established categories of people who can
get asylum on the basis of LGBTI persecution. Because the training module explicates
definitions of identity and sexual orientation categories, it provides a way for immigration
officers to elicit information in the interview and then use that information to place the asylum
seeker in a particular category (e.g. “lesbian, not socially visible, no credible threat of
persecution” or “transgender, socially visible, evidence of state persecution”). I argue that while
this categorization certainly occurs as a result of these interviews, the immigration officer has
even more power than what is listed on their job application. They not only possess the ability to
define the LGBTI asylum seeker/citizen – they also have the ability to create them. Immigration
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officers hearing LGBTI asylum claims call into being an entire group of citizens and also shape
the nation’s exclusions. Despite the weight of this responsibility, sufficient training is presumed
to be possible within a fairly limited training system.
Immigration officers who handle asylum claims undergo several weeks of training. In
some cases it is possible for an officer to gain expedited approval, which limits their training. If
this occurs, the officer is monitored for a period of time before they are allowed to conduct
interviews on their own. Most asylum interviews are one-hour long, and in that hour, officers are
expected to determine whether or not to recommend a claimant for asylum. If the officer does
not grant asylum to the applicant, the case is then referred to an immigration judge and that
initial decision can also be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) within the U.S.
Department of Justice.214 Immigration officers handle a variety of cases and typically do not
focus on only one type of refugee or asylum category. Because of this, immigration officers must
be prepared for different types of cases involving asylees fleeing persecution targeting them
because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group.215 This means the asylum seeker they interview could have any level of English language
proficiency and could have experienced persecution in one of many different cultural climates
for a variety of reasons. Asylum seekers who are not fluent in English are expected to provide
their own interpreter, but that person cannot be their attorney, a witness in their case, or a
representative of their home country’s government.216 Although the USCIS website offers
information for interpreters handling these cases, the RAIO training module notes that it is
214
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possible for a hired interpreter to feel uncomfortable relaying some of the asylum seeker’s
information to the officer, making it difficult for the interview to accurately represent the asylum
seeker’s case.217 Thus, while the asylum seeker is responsible for providing the interpreter, the
immigration officer is responsible for determining whether the interpreter may be obscuring or
excluding any details pertinent to the case.
Despite the universal training module for all immigration officers adjudicating LGBTI
asylum claims, the application of its recommendations varies depending on regional cultures
within the United States. For example, a gay male working with an immigration officer in San
Francisco, California is more likely to be granted asylum there than in rural Arkansas for a
number of reasons including but not limited to the amount of LGBTI asylum cases that
immigration officer has personally adjudicated, the number of cases in that region that act as
precedent, the presence of local organizations dedicated to resettlement of LGBTI asylum
seekers, and the existence of local political figures who have vocally supported or denounced
measures to aid in LGBTI asylum and resettlement. The choice of San Francisco and rural
Arkansas are not random in this example. The California Bay Area has one of the highest
numbers of resettled LGBTI asylum seekers, and Arkansas takes in the smallest number of
refugees per capita in the United States. Another barrier to successful LGBTI asylum in the U.S.
emerges from the increasing tolerance toward LGBTI people both in the U.S. and abroad. While
a lawyer in Denver was able to argue in 2010 that transgender asylum applicant Alexandra Reyes
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could face violent threats if forced to return to her home in Mexico, in 2015 a judge in Lumpkin
County, Georgia denied asylum to a transgender woman from Mexico claiming Mexico City’s
legalization of gay marriage proves increased acceptance of LGBTI people and a reduced risk of
violence if she would be returned to Mexico. These examples could be understood as evidence of
something that looks like progress in attitudes toward sexual minorities in the U.S. and abroad,
but these cases also reveal the rift in LGBTI asylum case adjudication between major metro
areas in more progressive states and courts in more rural, conservative regions of the country.
Immigration officers may have a number of LGBTI asylum cases involving applicants
from different countries, and as the Georgia case reveals, it is necessary to have an understanding
of the cultural landscape from which the asylum applicant has fled in cases involving asylum for
gender identity or sexual orientation persecution. The RAIO training module provides required
reading on LGBTI persecution around the world, but it does not offer specific guidance for
regionally specific issues. There exist different attitudes and laws regulating the expression of
gender identity and sexual orientation around the world including pressure for people identifying
as lesbian or gay to undergo sexual reassignment surgery in Iran,218 the problem of “corrective
rape” in South Africa and other nations,219 and the criminalization of certain sexual acts in a
number of countries.220 These factors can contribute to pressure to hide or deny one’s orientation
218
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or identity, and thus, may unwittingly decrease the evidence available for proving an asylum
claim once in the United States. Websites and publications that seek to aid LGBTI asylum
seekers in arguing their case for asylum recommend providing news articles or other published
information that can speak to the abuse faced by LGBTI people in their home nation, but in
many cases, this type of persecution does not become news.
3.2.1

Training Officers for Sensitivity in Asylum Interviews
An asylum seeker may only get to speak with one immigration officer, and their access to

asylum is largely contingent upon that one immigration officer’s interpretation of their
authenticity as a person who has (or could have had) faced persecution due to their actual or
imputed identity. In Sara McKinnon’s 2009 essay about the role of judges in determining
outcomes of gender-based asylum cases, she argues that evaluation of certain cases rely mostly
on the interpretation of the credibility of the claimant rather than on the content of the claimant’s
case.221 This means that the responsibility for determining eligibility for asylum falls on one
person’s interpretation of a case, and that the decision made by that one person often relies more
on their interpretation of a claimant’s authenticity or adherence to expected norms than any other
factor. In tasking one person with the majority of responsibility for determining whether an
asylum applicant has faced persecution as a member of a particular social group, that one person
plays a role in the way this population is collectively imagined through the cases they determine
eligible for asylum and those they reject. Keeping in mind the individual agency of the
immigration officer and the regional and cultural factors that might impact a case’s
interpretation, I turn to the text of the training module itself. After first examining the way the
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RAIO training module speaks to immigration officers and calls for their sensitivity, I look to the
ways the training module defines categories of identity and orientation in order to aid
immigration officers in their adjudication of LGBTI asylum cases.
One third of the pages in the 65-page training module reference the need for the
immigration officer’s “sensitivity” in adjudicating LGBTI asylum claims. The term “sensitivity”
is used to describe the tone officers should maintain when asking questions, their attitudes
toward cultural and sexual difference, and their approach to discussing violence and persecution.
Throughout the document, the call for sensitivity takes place through the training module’s use
of the imperative mood written in the second person. The imperative mood commands “you,” the
reader, to take certain actions following your encounter with this text. The call for immigration
officers’ nuance and sensitivity is highlighted in a section set apart from the rest of page 30 in a
gray shaded text box that reminds immigration officers to “Explore all relevant aspects of the
claim, even if they make you particularly uncomfortable…You must not shy away from your
duty to elicit sufficient testimony to make an informed adjudication.”222 Here, the immigration
officer is addressed by the text as a person who may feel discomfort when discussing abuse and
sexual orientation but is nonetheless responsible for responding to the applicant in an informed,
appropriate way. They are asked to “create an interview environment that is open and nonjudgmental”223 and to “be particularly sensitive when questioning the applicant about past sexual
assault.”224 There are constant reminders in the training module to not let the officer’s own
cultural biases and perspectives keep them from uncovering the amount of information needed to
process the asylum claim.
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In addition to “processing” the asylum claim, there is interpellation that occurs in the
encounter with the immigration officer and the asylum seeker. Through the types of questions
asked and the way in which they are presented, the asylum seeker is hailed as a particular type of
subject. For them, the law will operate one way or another depending upon the type of subject
they are hailed to be. Ultimately, the acceptance or rejection of their asylum claim renders them
citizen or non-citizen. Rejecting a claim or recommending it for a hearing with an immigration
judge automatically hails the claimant as an insufficient citizen in some way. Even if their claim
is eventually accepted, they are always already less of a citizen in the eyes of the legal system
than an asylum seeker whose claim is quickly granted or a non-queer migrant who has full access
to rights upon entering the country. This process of interpellation relies on rhetorical precedent
as earlier images of the potential citizens become codified and perpetuated. These images vary
from region to region, culture to culture, and identity category to identity category.
Officers not only need to understand the cultural context from which the claimant fled,
but they must also navigate categories of identity and orientation for which they may not share
language. For example, people in some countries may talk about sexual orientation and identity
using language considered in the U.S. to be inappropriate or offensive. Furthermore, there may
not be direct or clear translations for all of the identity/orientation-related terms used in these
cases. The RAIO provides a variety of training materials to help immigration officers make sense
of the nuances of different asylum cases. It does this by providing a host of explanations and
definitions that operationalize categories of identity and orientation and by referencing the
potential divisions in language and culture that may act as a barrier for a successful LGBTI
asylum claim. This is addressed in most detail on page 30 where the module notes, “for many
LGBTI individuals who come from countries where topics of sexuality are taboo, the way that
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applicants express themselves may be different from what an interviewer would expect from an
LGBTI person in the United States,” and later recommends doing extensive research on the
applicant’s country of origin because:
Awareness of country conditions may also assist you in conducting the interview with
cultural sensitivity and may help you put the applicant at ease during the interview. If the
applicant notices that you took the time to try to understand the situation he or she faces
in the country of origin as an LGBTI individual, he or she may be more inclined to talk in
detail about his or her experiences and fears.225
The training module repeatedly addresses how the immigration officers must not be tied to their
own understanding of cultural norms surrounding orientation and identity.226 It reminds officers
that the understanding of LGBTI people in the U.S. is not universally applicable in all of these
cases, and country of origin information must be used to make all decisions instead of rendering
judgment based on a myopic, Ameri-centric conception of identity and sexual orientation.
This myopia is only one of the factors that contributes to the system of homonationalism
enabled or perpetuated through progressive immigration policies. Puar explains that “the
production of ‘homosexuality as taboo’ is situated within the history of encounter with the
Western gaze.”227 For Puar, there is Orientalism in the claim that sex is a certain way in the East,
broadly with the implication that it is an inferior or backward compared to the treatment of sex in
the United States, a perspective she calls “sexual exceptionalism.” While this sexual
exceptionalism may be a disadvantage to queer politics more broadly, it is this exact
understanding of persecution as worse, or more violent in other nations, that allows LGBTI
asylum to exist in the United States. In order to grant asylum to someone who is fleeing
persecution targeting their sexual orientation or gender identity, the immigration officer must
perceive the threat they face in their homeland to be greater than the threat they would face in the
225
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United States. Homonationalism may also structure the immigration officer’s perception of the
United States as uniquely suited to aid the world’s LGBTI population in their search for freedom
and peace. Thus, the immigration officers reading the module and using it to guide their asylum
interviews must be sensitive to the concerns and fears of each asylum seeker, and they must be
able to see U.S. asylum as a way to improve the life of those making these claims. While the
immigration officers are expected to understand what it means to be culturally sensitive when
told to do so in the training module, they are not expected to have a vast, rich understanding of
sexual orientation and identity prior to reading the module. To account for this, the module
spends much of its ink defining terms related to sexual minority status, and in so doing,
constructing the image of the successful LGBTI asylum claimant.
3.2.2

Representing LGBTI Asylum Seekers
Looking for the word “homosexual” in government documents produced since the early

2000s yields few results.228 The term first appears in the RAIO training module for adjudicators
of LGBTI asylum on page 12 of the document’s 65 pages, and the note that includes the word
reminds readers: “It has a somewhat derogatory connotation within the LGBTI community as it
has historically been used in a medical context to describe being gay or lesbian as an illness.”229
Just as the dramatic transition in policy impacting LGBTI migrants occurred over a short span of
years, the terms used to define and categorize this population evolved at a similar rate. From
“homosexual” in Janet Reno’s 1994 statements, to “gay” in former President George W. Bush’s
policies, to “LGBT” in Obama’s 2011 statement of support for refugees, the term used to
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represent the population of sexual minorities has become more expansive over the past 20 years
in an effort at inclusivity. The RAIO training module uses the initialism LGBTI for Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex.230 This initialism appears multiple times on almost
every page, but it is not officially explained until page 12 where it is acknowledged that
terminology is still evolving, and the creators of the training module chose to use the terms
LGBTI and “sexual minorities” interchangeably to best represent this population. Following the
statement about the use of these two terms, the module provides a brief definition of related
terms and provides a hyperlink to a glossary in the latter pages of the module. The brief
definitions include an explanation of the differences between sex and gender, a discussion of
why the word “homosexual” is not typically appropriate, and a summary of the differences
between gender expression, gender identity, and sexual orientation. The LGBTI initialism and its
parts function as one of the main ways in which the RAIO training module provides immigration
officers with the inventional resources for representing potential citizens. Through the definitions
provided throughout the training module, immigration officers are able to construct an image of
successful or rejectable lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex asylum claimants. This
process has the potential to negatively affect asylum seekers who do not fit the image of the ideal
LGBTI refugee, or who might even fit the image of the dangerous, deficient, or unworthy
citizen.
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Definitions narrow – they specify – they categorize. We use definitions to draw
boundaries and make sense of the world around us and, sometimes unknowingly, to produce
subjects. Edward Schiappa claimed, “Definitions tell us when it is ‘proper’ or ‘correct’ to use
words in a particular way and, in doing so, they tell us what is in our world.”231 The claim that
definitions shape or represent our understanding of reality is not new to scholars of
communication, but what Schiappa’s studies highlight is the way (what he calls) “real”
definitions tend to tell us what is rather than what ought to be. He claims that definitions, by their
nature, essentialize.232 This essentializing function of definitions is especially worthy of attention
when discussing definitions of sexual identities and orientation, positions that, at the point of
identification, are already in danger of becoming essentialized. Defining allows us to influence
not only the interpretation of a particular concept’s meaning but, more importantly, definitions
influence “the relations of the concept with the whole system of thought,” creating entirely new
perceptions of what is normal or even true.233 By creating associations through definition, we
create categories, map arguments, and shape understanding. Our shared definitions help
construct shared images in the social imaginary. Yet, in defining terms – particularly those that
are presumed to help us understand categories of identity and orientation – we essentialize. In
defining, and even in the process of determining categories, we create depictions of what the
world is. And, in so doing, we draw sharp boundaries around what are often hazy and
immeasurable experiences that elude definition.
In the RAIO training module for adjudicating LGBTI asylum claims, the provided
definitions act as tools or instruments for making sense of complicated categories of identity and
231

Edward Schiappa, “Arguing about Definitions,” 404.
Edward Schiappa, “Arguing about Definitions,” 412.
233
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 213.
232

108

orientation within the legal realm.234 The definitions create the grounds of an argument about
which asylum applicants should be granted refuge and which applicants should be rejected.
Despite the challenges that arise in attempting to define identities and orientations that may be
fluid or in transition, any attempt to provide space for LGBTI people within the asylum system
requires the establishment of clear, measurable definitions. For any asylum policy to function,
there must be guidelines, and those guidelines are inevitably going to rely on definitions to draw
the boundaries of acceptable asylum claims. The creators of the RAIO training module for
LGBTI asylum seekers take the power of definition to heart, as there are definitions provided on
almost half of the document’s pages. There is clearly great effort taken in crafting definitions of
various identity and orientation categories as the document’s footnotes, suggested readings, and
careful wording throughout indicate. Even with an audience of primarily upper- to middle-class,
white, cisgender, heterosexual immigration officers, the document offers a host of definitions
that are sensitive to the unique concerns of LGBTI migrants seeking asylum in the United States.
However, the training module’s definitions often fall into a pattern of representation that, while
providing asylum as an option to a new and evolving population, defines the people within that
population in terms of essential notions of identity.
Currently, there is not one agreed-upon initialism or acronym used to represent the group
of people classified in the module as sexual minorities. The “LGBT” initialism is widely used in
the U.S., especially in legal texts, but over the past twenty years, different forms of the initialism
have been popular among different groups at different times. In an effort to represent a greater
variety of orientations and identities, it is sometimes written as LGBTQI, LGBTQIA or LGBTC,
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incorporating queer/questioning, intersex, asexual, and sexually curious people. In most versions
of the initialism used in the past decade, the “L” (for lesbian) precedes the “G” (for gay). This
ordering of letters is not arbitrary, as leading with the “L” helps “to avoid the sexist connotation
implied when “gay” (the masculine generic term for homosexuality) is used first.”235 Detractors
sometimes refer to the expanding initialism as an “alphabet soup” because its effort at inclusivity
is seen as cumbersome and ultimately serving to emphasize differences instead of creating
unity.236 Further critiques claim the long string of initials “masks more than it reveals about the
diversity of sexual and gender expressions and practices, as well as the myriad forms of
coalescing across common interests and common struggles.”237 Critiques like this one raise the
argument that instead of enveloping difference into one unified group, the expanding initialism
merely emphasizes an ever-growing list of normative categories of identity. In reading the
training module for the definitions it provides, and thus, the reality it depicts, I break down the
LGBTI initialism and read the module’s construction of each of the identity categories
represented by that initialism and the ways in which that construction contributes to or denies a
system of homonationalism.
3.2.2.1 Gay Asylees
Since the decision to grant Toboso-Alfonso a withholding of deportation in 1990, the
majority of attempted and approved asylum claims on the basis of sexual orientation persecution
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have involved a gay male claimant.238 One of the most telling examples of the ways gay asylum
cases become the preponderance of LGBTI asylum cases is in the list of “LGBTI-Related Case
Law” that begins on page 57 of the training module. Of the 37 cases listed, 24 of them, or about
65 percent, involve men identifying as or imputed to be gay. Cases involving transgender women
and then transgender men have the second and third greatest representation, respectively.
Further, with Toboso-Alfonso and Tenorio serving as the most widely cited cases of LGBTI
asylum, there seems to be a greater understanding of how to adjudicate cases involving gay men
than there is of other LGBTI cases.
The most widely cited concern with gay asylum involves the pressure for an applicant to
“act” according to the stereotypes most widely associated with a particular population. Because
gay men are the most globally visible members of the LGBTI community, there is an assumption
that this population is also the easiest to point out or label or understand. Most often, gay men
seeking asylum are told they must act effeminate in order to prove their sexual orientation.239
Tenório and other men involved in publicized cases reported being told to act effeminate to
increase their chances of being granted asylum for gay persecution. An immigration judge in a
2010 case involving a gay man from Serbia did not grant asylum because “[t]he Court studied
the demeanor of this individual very carefully throughout his testimony in Court today and this
gentleman does not appear to be overtly gay.”240 Upon appeal, the court ruled that stereotypes
would be considered impermissible evidence in asylum hearings. Yet, since that ruling, the
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claims of being told to “act gay” in asylum hearings have not exactly ceased. There persists an
understanding that there is a particular gay identity that can be performed and read by an
informed audience. This understanding is evident in cases like in re Tenorio and Todorovic v.
Attorney General, where a rhetorical precedent in which “gay” is associated with femininity
becomes the standard by which gay asylum claimants are encouraged to adhere.
Finding ways to visually present one’s sexual orientation in an effort to make it legible in
asylum hearings can improve the chances of getting asylum. Swetha Sridharan states, “Judges
look for material proof of sexual identity in asylum applicants’ answers.” Sridharan explains that
this proof often requires “an effeminate or masculine appearance that indicates homosexual
identity.”241 In other words, a common feature of successful LGBTI asylum cases involve gay
men who appear more feminine and lesbian women who appear more masculine, based on
shared images within the social imaginary. The logic behind this expectation is unquestionably
flawed. However, the expectation of a visually legible queer identity is a common feature of
LGBTI asylum cases – a feature that has become the subject of many legal studies of LGBTI
asylum cases.242 While “looking gay” is sometimes a way to expedite or ease the asylum process,
the idea that there is one common image of all people of one sexual orientation is neither
possible, nor something one could reliably act upon in an effort to gain asylum.
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The training module accounts for the critique that LGBTI asylum is most often bestowed
upon asylum seekers who fit stereotypes of their identity category, noting, “…it would be
inappropriate for you to hold against the applicant the fact that he or she does not fit your notion
for how LGBTI people should look or behave,” and reminding immigration officers:
While there are some individuals who identify as gay who may also consider themselves
effeminate and some individuals who identify as lesbian who may also consider
themselves masculine, many men who identify as gay will not appear effeminate and
many women who identify as lesbians will not appear masculine.243
The training module further explains that the stereotypes the officer might hold could potentially
differ from the stereotypes held by the applicant.244 Later, the module reminds immigration
officers again to not assume the applicant’s masculinity or femininity indicates anything about
their sexual orientation: “A man may identify as gay and not appear or consider himself
effeminate. A woman may identify as lesbian and not appear or consider herself masculine.”245
Gender presentation is repeatedly explained as a masculine/feminine binary, but it does not
explain what it means to act effeminate or act masculine. This interpretation is left up to the
immigration officer, so where one officer may consider a vocal inflection to be the greatest
indicator of an applicant’s masculinity or femininity, another may consider something like
clothing or stature to act as a visual indication of sexual orientation.
The list of questions provided for immigration officers to ask applicants when
determining sexual orientation treat “gay” as the baseline or norm. Some of these questions
include: “When did you first realize you were gay (or lesbian or bisexual?),” “Did you know
243
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other gay people in your home country?,” “Did you hear about other gay people in your home
country?,” “Have you met other gay people?,” and “Does your family know you’re gay?” Only
one question does not begin with “gay”: “How do lesbian [or gay, or bisexual] people meet one
another in your country?”246 This section on “appropriate lines of inquiry” and “inappropriate
lines of inquiry” regarding sexual orientation is the shortest of the available guidelines for
interviewing in the training module. The only item listed as “inappropriate” for a gay, lesbian, or
bisexual asylum seeker addresses the applicant’s specific sexual practices. All other sections of
the document tend to gloss over or presume understanding of “gay” orientation. Even the
sections that address cultural sensitivity and variation say little about gay men specifically. It is
implied throughout that the immigration officer understands how to handle these cases. There is
an implied homonormativity, persisting even in this document that attempts to widely and
thoroughly address sexual orientation and gender identity, that presumes a collective
understanding of “gay,” and thus, does not explicate the unique needs of gay asylum seekers.
In Lisa Duggan’s Twilight of Equality she suggests homonormativity privileges domestic,
nationalist gay and lesbian cultures, and these cultures are invested in rights that look like the
rights of heterosexual people. Homonormativity is invested in the inclusion of gays and lesbians
into the citizenry, but does not make space for other queer bodies. And while public acts of
intimacy between gay men are still treated as taboo in many parts of the United States, the rights
of gays and lesbians to marry, adopt, and receive partner benefits have expanded over the last
few years. Further, despite lingering prejudice, a gay male asylum seeker is more likely to apply
for and receive LGBTI asylum. The mode in which homonationalism operates is visible in the
training module’s treatment of gay male asylum seekers as most common and most likely. Gay
men who self-present as feminine become the most commonly associated with access to LGBI
246
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asylum, and their cases end up establishing norms (as in Toboso-Alfonso and Tenorio) in a way
that suggests to other gay male asylum seekers that they must present themselves in a similar
way to have the best chance at asylum.247 Although homonationalism tends to privilege gay men
most of all, it also impacts the adjudication of cases involving lesbian asylum seekers.
3.2.2.2 Lesbian Asylees
Lesbian asylum seekers (along with bisexual asylum seekers) receive the least specific
treatment throughout the training module. Although the initialism chosen for the training
materials is LGBTI, the module primarily focuses on the “G” (gay), the “T” (transgender), and
the “I” (intersex). In all but three mentions, the term “lesbian” is discussed alongside the term
“gay.” What this means is that the 65-page module dedicates only a handful of sentences to the
unique challenges facing lesbians seeking asylum. The training module itself addresses the
minimization of this population, noting, “The most common LGBTI claims are based on sexual
orientation and involve gay men, and to a lesser extent lesbian women.”248 The terms “gay and
lesbian” are frequently discussed in tandem (even in policy, LGBTI asylum seekers are
frequently referred to as “gay and lesbian asylum seekers”), but this pairing tends to neglect the
ways in which gay identity is normalized and lesbian claims are infrequent. Where the lack of indepth interview advice about gay men appears to exist because of a presumed understanding of
gay male sexual identity, the absence of lesbian women appears to have more to do with the
presumed invisibility and flexibility of female sexual identity. This minimization of lesbian
asylum could be partially responsible for the small number of successful lesbian asylum claims.
More likely though, this minimization both feeds and is fed by the invisibility of lesbian asylum
seekers.
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Figure 2: Successful lesbian asylum claimant AJ, photo by Lauren Ober, 2015

Women who identify (or are imputed to identify) as lesbians file far fewer asylum claims
than gay men,249 and those who do file face difficulties proving that their sexual orientation
caused them to be persecuted.250 A 2003 report found that the U.S. had only three successful
lesbian asylum claims since 1994.251 Low numbers can be partially attributed to the fact that
fewer women know about the option to seek asylum on the basis of sexual orientation/identity
persecution, and also that in some nations, women have less access to the resources needed to
physically leave their current domestic situation.252 Shannon Minter explains, “For many
lesbians, fleeing persecution is an economic impossibility” because many women do not possess
their own incomes or the ability to travel without approval from a male partner or guardian.253 In
addition to the need for resources, there are multiple barriers to lesbian asylum emerging from
attitudes about women and refugee policy more broadly:
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The courts have typically considered human rights abuses more commonly associated
with men, such as arrest and torture for government activism, as legitimate ‘political’
persecution deserving asylum protection. On the other hand, acts of violence more often
experienced by women, such as rape, forced marriage, or honor killings as punishment
for refusing to conform to societal norms, have typically been labeled as ‘private’ matters
outside the scope of asylum law.254
Thus, asylum is typically reserved for people who have the ability to voice political opinion in
the public sphere, and the violence that many women face does not get considered as persecution
in refugee and asylum law because of its domestic or private nature. Lesbian identity in
particular is often treated as invisible, malleable, and private in a way gay, transgender or
intersex identities and orientations are necessarily treated – making the proof of that
identity/orientation especially challenging. The shared image of lesbians in the social imaginary
lacks a consistent or stable rhetorical precedent that makes lesbian asylum cases particularly
challenging for both the claimant (in their identity performances) and the adjudicator (in their
effort to compare this case to those which have been set as precedent.
In the training module, the term “lesbian” is mostly mentioned in definitions and brief
examples to illustrate larger claims about subjects related to LGBTI asylum. There are few
stories recounted or cases cited that pertain specifically to lesbian asylum seekers. One of the
first mentions is a definition: “The term lesbian is used to mean women who are attracted to
women, although homosexual women also sometimes use the term gay to describe
themselves.”255 Here the module defines sexual orientation in terms of attraction. Also, as one of
the two places lesbian asylum seekers are discussed apart from gay asylum seekers, it is
interesting to note that this particular mention establishes that “lesbian” may not exist in an
asylum seeker’s vocabulary at all. Although this does not provide significant insight into how an
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immigration officer might construct their image of a lesbian asylum seeker, it does help to show
the ways in which lesbian asylum seekers face barriers and exclusions from the very beginning
of their journey.
One section where the training module does separate lesbian asylum seekers from others
is in its discussion of persecution. On page 23 the training module discusses forced marriage:
Societal and cultural restrictions that require them to marry individuals in contravention
of their sexual orientation may violate their fundamental right to marry and may rise to
the level of persecution. For instance, a lesbian who has no physical or emotional
attraction to men and is forced to marry a man may experience this as persecution.256
This passage footnotes a paragraph in a United Nations High Commission on Refugee (UNHCR)
document which sites a 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women document that establishes the right to freely choose a spouse. While forced marriage can
also affect men and boys, it disproportionately impacts young women.257 In the following
paragraph, the training module notes, “Lesbians often experience harm as a result of their gender
as well as their sexual orientation. The types of harm that a lesbian may suffer will frequently
parallel the harms in claims filed by women in general more closely than the harms in gay male
asylum claims.”258 This statement is evidence of the above suggestion that persecution of lesbian
women is often viewed as gender-based, not sexual orientation-based persecution. Because gay
males are treated as the default or paradigmatic LGBTI asylum seeker, lesbian women’s claims
of persecution are often considered to be gendered, “domestic” violence in a way that
persecution of male asylum seekers is not. This is noted in a following sentence: “In many parts
of the world persecution faced by lesbians may be less visible than that encountered by gay
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men.”259 It is good that the training module makes note of the ways lesbian persecution can be
less visible than persecution of other sexual minorities, but without explaining what types of
questions to ask or key terms to listen for, the module runs the risk of dooming lesbian asylum
seekers to the invisibility to which they alert us.260 The tendency to treat women’s persecution as
“private” or “domestic”261 can make it difficult for an asylum officer to characterize the
persecution they hear about in interviews as sexual orientation persecution.
3.2.2.3 Intersex Asylees
In the training module, the chosen initialism of LGBTI incorporates the traditional LGBT
but adds “I” for Intersex. Like “transgender,” intersex is not a sexual orientation. The training
module spends a substantial amount of time discussing intersex applicants and the unique
challenges they present immigration officers in interviews. One of these challenges is that
intersex is distinguished from the other parts of the LGBTI initialism specifically through
biological distinction. This means that immigration officers who are trained in law and
immigration policy must evaluate whether intersex applicants are biologically intersex and faced
persecution because of that status.
Although intersex people only make up between 0.02% and 2% of the general
population, they constitute a significantly larger percentage of sexual minorities seeking asylum
for sexual orientation or gender identity.262 Intersex is not a sexual orientation, nor is it explicitly
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understood to be an identity. The training module describes intersex as a “condition” in which
the anatomical features or chromosomal pattern with which someone is born does not “fit typical
definitions of male or female.”263 Affiliate terms and causes for intersex include DSD
(Differences in Sex Development), congenital adrenal hyperplasia, Klinefelter’s syndrome,
Turner’s syndrome, hypospadias, and others. The module notes that the term “hermaphrodite”
should only be used if the applicants use it to describe themselves. The Organization Intersex
International (OII) has denounced the definition of intersex as a “condition” in this particular
training module. The group instead prefers a description of intersex as a “natural human
variation,” or as an identity, claiming: “Intersex is not something one has, but who one is.”264
Despite the OII’s concerns, medical definitions of intersex still tie it to anatomy or chromosomal
make-up.265 The OII’s clarification reveals a need for intersex to be treated as something other
than a medical problem to solve. In the immigration court system, however, the biological
distinction of intersex makes it slightly less difficult to “prove” than “gay,” “lesbian,” or
“bisexual” as these terms are tied more widely to identity than biology. Further, in some
countries, intersex people face a threat of forced gender (re)assignment surgery – a threat that is
cited in U.S. immigration policy as persecution that could more clearly constitute a well-founded
fear in the eyes of an immigration officer than some other types of persecution. Although
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intersex asylum applicants may not have specific terms to describe their situation, the biological
factors that contribute to a person’s status as intersex makes the burden of proving eligibility for
asylum slightly less complicated than in cases involving other sexual minorities. Nevertheless,
the training module is careful to address the different ways an intersex person may understand
their body and that the understanding may vary greatly depending upon the cultural context from
which the applicant arrived. This means that while intersex asylum applicants may be able to
more clearly articulate the biological basis of the identity that has led them to face persecution,
the ways in which that identity or biology manifests itself may not be legible to either the
applicant or the immigration officer.
In President Obama’s declaration of support for LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers, his
statement used the initialism “LGBT” instead of “LGBTI,” and most other government
documents use the shorter set of initials instead of adding intersex people. The inclusion of
“intersex” in the training module allows the USCIS to train immigration officers for the unique
needs of people whose biological sex does not adhere to normative conceptions of male or
female anatomy. Of all the terms in the initialism, “intersex” is the only one that appears to be
undeniably inherent. Because of this, it is treated as a status, or even a “fact” in a way other parts
of the initialism are not. In being treated as a biological status in the training module (or even as
an identity by the OII), intersex becomes tied to genitalia and chromosomes, identifications of
which would require a medical examination. In the United States, there are no medical exams
given as part of the asylum process. This means that immigration officers are responsible for
determining the validity of an intersex asylum claim based on their interpretation of the
claimant’s stories and experiences. In a section beginning on page 37, the training module offers
“Appropriate Lines of Inquiry” for cases involving “Intersex Conditions.” The module
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recommends using the same approach used in all other cases, but implores the immigration
officer to think about the variety of ways in which intersex conditions may express themselves
and the variety of ways in which nations of origin may treat intersex people. It suggests that
understanding of intersex conditions not only varies from nation to nation, but from family to
family, noting:
Where the condition is known in a given culture, an applicant should be able to describe
how people like them are treated. Where the condition is known to run in a family (but
not throughout the culture), the entire family may face stigma, or family members may be
on the lookout for signs of the condition in order to keep the family secret.266
The module goes on to list different versions of intersex identity including Androgen
Insensitivity Syndrome in order to explain how there is no clear, absolutely reliable way in which
intersex status may present itself. Immigration officers are reminded in the training module that
many asylum applicants may not know that there is a specific type of asylum that can be granted
for people who identify as (or are imputed to identify as) LGBTI. And while the biological
factors contributing to intersex asylum may imply an easier path to citizenship once in the United
States, the intersex population is one of the least likely to seek this type of asylum. If their
identity as intersex is a source of shame, they may struggle to speak about their situation with an
unknown immigration officer. If their identity does run in their family, it would be unlikely for
the whole family to receive asylum. Intersex asylum claims and their reliance on unseen
biological characteristics make them a complicated, and subsequently more carefully parsed area
of LGBTI asylum within the training module.
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3.2.2.4 Transgender Asylees
Along with discussions of intersex, the training module most frequently defines and
discusses the term “transgender” and its ancillary terms. In the training module, transgender is
defined as:
a term used for people whose gender identity expression, or behavior is different from
those typically associated with their assigned sex at birth. Some transgender people dress
in the clothes of the opposite gender; others undergo medical treatment, which may
include taking hormones and/or having surgery to alter their gender characteristics.267
The note below this definition links to a document created by the National Center for
Transgender Equality with more transgender terminology. The training module clarifies,
“Transgender is a gender identity, not a sexual orientation. Thus, like any other man or woman, a
transgender person may have a heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual sexual orientation” but the
training module also points out that “transgender individuals may be more visible and may be
viewed as transgressing societal norms more than gay men or lesbians. Therefore they may be
subject to increased discrimination and persecution.”268 In addition to these definitions
throughout the text, the glossary at the end of the document defines a series of terms related to
transgender identity including “birth sex,” “corrected gender,” “FTM,” “MTF,” “Passing,” and
“Sex Reassignment Surgery.” The definitions provided reveal an effort to be careful with its
definition of trans – attempting to account for all of its variations. However, despite the effort
toward sensitivity for trans people, the document does not do much to clarify the ways in which
gender transitions may be complex, partial, ongoing, or unknown. Transitions are explicitly
mentioned, and even defined, but in the sections of the module focused on interviewing
transgender people, the prompts tend to assume the transgender person has in some way
“completed” their transition.
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Figure 3: Transgender asylee Jennicet Gutiérrez, photo by Al Dia Dallas, 2015

In his book Transforming Citizenships: Transgender Articulations of the Law, Isaac West
notes, “One of the inherent problems associated with defining transgender is that in naming it we
risk assigning a normative telos to an identity category that is often employed to oppose this
modernist, binary logic.”269 It becomes difficult to trace the rhetorical precedent within the social
imaginary when the identity in question is in transition. This drive for a “telos” in transgender
identity is evident in the training module in its discussion of “completed” transitions and
“corrected” genders.270 In assigning gender a telos, the training module may fail to lead
immigration officers to an understanding of the liminal spaces that accompany gender identity
more broadly. West goes on to suggest that Susan Stryker’s definition of transgender is best for
capturing “the performative, or non-essential, nature of identity,”271 but it would be
understandably difficult to adopt her definition (“the movement across a socially imposed
boundary away from an unchosen starting place”) in asylum law where an identity must be
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proven and legible to an immigration officer.272 This conundrum over the need to define
identities is heightened in discussions of transgender people, as the concept of “transgender” is
immersed in periods of transition that can express this liminality differently from individual to
individual and from month to month. The problematic pitfalls of essentialism that accompany
most definitions are especially precarious for transgender people, as there are a number of ways
in which the chosen definition might exclude certain applicants but allow space for others.
The struggle to understand what it means to be transgender is both a current feature of
post-same-sex-marriage politics and also a feature of the history of transgender asylum.273 The
training module takes this struggle to heart, offering a long discussion of appropriate and
inappropriate lines of inquiry for adjudicating transgender asylum claims. Where most asylum
interviews would begin with basic demographic information like age, place of birth, and gender,
the training module reminds officers that in transgender asylum cases, the “gender” question may
be difficult to answer. Because the beginning of the interview should be dedicated to “putting the
applicant at ease,” the module recommends that “For transgender applicants, it may be better to
come back to the question about ‘gender’ at the end of the interview as this issue may be
sensitive and go to the heart of the claim.”274 The module recommends being sensitive and not
making assumptions about a transgender applicant’s anatomy or putting “words in the
applicant’s mouth.” Instead, it notes, “It is important to remember that being transgender
involves an overall dissatisfaction with the gender assigned at birth; it is not about having one
particular surgery.”275 Throughout, the training module frames transgender identity as an
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inherent “dissatisfaction” with one’s birth gender and explains the ways this dissatisfaction has
made life particularly difficult for transgender people.
The training module’s lines of inquiry for transgender applicants requests treating their
issues with heightened sensitivity. Statements along these lines include, “Start off with easy
questions and gradually ease into asking the most sensitive ones,”276 and “It may be appropriate
to elicit information about what steps the applicant has taken in his or her transition but
remember how personal and difficult it will be for the applicant to talk about these issues.”277
While it is good that the training module suggests being sensitive to the specific challenges
facing someone who decides to undergo a gender transition, the result is a sort of infantilization
that reduces the agency of transgender applicants to comfortably embrace their gender
expression. Transgender applicants who may proudly and comfortably discuss their gender
identity or transition might be seen as not also being a victim or as not experiencing persecution
as harshly as someone who might be reluctant to talk about their gender identity. Part of this
perspective of trans people as lacking agency (or needing to show a lack of agency) likely comes
from the rhetorical precedent set in cases that rejected asylum claims of transgender people
because the judge considered the “choice” to transition or live as another gender to belie the
immutability of gender identity. The result is one where the most legible transgender asylum
applicant is one who has suffered deeply and struggles to speak about their identity. While this
may be the case for many transgender asylum applicants, considering it as the standard or norm
for transgender asylum cases runs the risk of failing to acknowledge transgender identity as
something that may bring comfort or peace.
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3.2.2.5 Bisexual Asylees
In addition to the relative invisibility of lesbian asylum seekers, the RAIO training
module offers only two sentences specifically addressing bisexuality. In all other instances
“bisexual” is attached to lesbian, gay, or transgender, and often it is the last term mentioned in
the series of terms. Despite the presence of “bisexual” in almost all widely used versions of the
sexual minority initialism, bisexuality is relatively invisible in most discussions of LGBTI
rights.278 Although I discuss sexual orientation and object choice later in this chapter, it is worth
noting here that one of the two sentences specifically addressing bisexuality in the RAIO training
module notes that bisexuality is not a choice.279 The other specific mention notes how an asylum
claimant may use inconsistent language to discuss their sexual identity/orientation, defining
themselves as gay at one point in an interview and bisexual in another.280 Although the training
module discusses this as a reminder to immigration officers to not treat inconsistent labels as an
incitement of a claimant’s authenticity, it raises the point that for many people, claiming to be
bisexual may stand in for the confusion or evolution of one’s own identity or orientation. This is
not to say that bisexuality is not a perfectly legitimate identity on its own, but that there is
evidence to suggest that bisexuality is sometimes invoked as the most appropriate term when one
is unsure of how to deal with instability and liminality in their own identity.281 Bisexuality can be
a telos, but it does not have to be. It is even sometimes listed as a “stepping stone” for people
working to understand the complexities of their own sexual orientation and identity.
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Bisxuality is lumped in the “Sexual Orientation” section for lines of appropriate and
inappropriate inquiry. There is no question listed that addresses bisexuality specifically. Further,
not one of the 37 cases listed at the end of the training module involves a bisexual applicant. This
lack of precedent for adjudicating cases involving bisexual applicants and the lack of specific
guidance for adjudicating these claims means that immigration officers are largely left to decide
what to do with these cases on their own. Further, the lack of information about the unique needs
of bisexual applicants may lead immigration officers to consider these cases to be less sensitive
or the people in these cases less deserving of asylum.
3.2.2.6 The Absence of “Queer”: Definition by Omission
In laying out his plan for a critical rhetoric, McKerrow declared that a critical orientation
should analyze the text that exists, but must also account for “what is absent, unmarked, the
unspoken, the unsayable.”282 McKerrow claims that what is missing from a text or set of texts is
as important as what is present because the choice to not include certain terms, concepts, or
images can reveal underlying ideologies. I mentioned above that lesbian and bisexual asylum
seekers are addressed in a minimal capacity within the training module, but they are addressed,
and they are always present in the initialism itself. The term “queer,” on the other hand, does not
appear anywhere in the document – not even in the comprehensive glossary of related terms that
begins on page 52. Yet, an initialism that omits the “Q” leaves out an important piece of sexual
minority existence.
Teresa de Lauretis suggested a turn to “queer theory” in 1990 as a way to move toward a
discussion of sexual orientation and identity as something other than sexual preference or sexual
deviance. In Tendencies, Eve Sedgwick offers multiple descriptions of queer, which includes
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terms like “transitive,” “athwart,” and “troublant,” as well as the explanation that queer can refer
to: “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and
excesses of meaning…”283 Michael Warner points out that “queer” is not always or only about
sexuality – it is anti-assimilationist, and it is a source of upheaval.284 For Judith Butler, “the term
‘queer’ emerges as an interpellation” that can never purport to fully describe those it seeks to
represent. It must always be contingent.285 The instability of queer is appealing because it offers
a way out of structured categories of identity and orientation, or for Eithne Luibhéid, it provides
a way to “transform, rather than to seek accommodation within, existing social structures.”286
Those who self-identify as queer find it less limiting than the continually expanding normativity
within other parts of the LGBT initialism. Queer is both an appropriation of a formerly
derogatory term and an upheaval of identity categories altogether.
Critical/Cultural and Rhetorical scholarship since the mid-2000s often uses the initialism
LGBTQ to account for the power of queer discussed above. However, adding the “Q” to the
initialism does not necessarily help remedy the problems with an “alphabet soup.” For example,
Sharalyn R. Jordan explains that the initialism LGBTQ “holds both the contesting and the
essentializing possibilities inherent in naming,” making it “an imperfect approach to an
irresolvable issue.”287 What Jordan means is that the LGBTQ initialism is a paradox that runs the
risk of essentializing through the use of a normativizing acronym while accounting for the
revolutionary practices of queer politics through the addition of the “q.” Adding the “Q” to the
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initialism helps to remind us of the instability and immeasurability of identities and orientations,
but it does not solve the problem inherent in definitions’ essentializing functions.288 Furthermore,
the choice to use LGBTQ in the RAIO training module would not necessarily provide more
comprehensive opportunities for queer asylum seekers.
Official/legal discourse rarely incorporate the term “queer” – and understandably so.
Within the law there is a need to categorize, elucidate, and concretize, and queer shatters those
efforts. It rattles or unsettles rather than affirms or solidifies. It may seem as though there is no
space for “queer” in law, yet the absence of “queer” could possibly impede an immigration
officer’s comprehensive understanding of identity’s complexities. Proponents of an initialism
like LGBTI and those who advocate the use of “queer” may seem to contradict or oppose one
another, as those who use a term like LGBT are interested in seeking rights within the existing
system and those who use “queer” seek to overhaul that system. However, Jeffrey Bennett claims
that these two approaches can inform one another:
Far from being a reactive form of scholarship, queer theory can offer insightful
alternatives to diabolically heterosexist politics, attempting to alter the frames through
which people understand issues and events. In this manner gay and lesbian scholarship,
as well as queer theory, are productive in as much as they seek to forge new spaces for
understanding civic identity and its discontents.289
Queer does not need to exist only in contradiction to LGBTI – these concepts can function
together to create a more comprehensive understanding of the worlds from which sexual
minority asylum applicants arrive. It would be possible to either include the “Q” in the chosen
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initialism, or to at least provide an explanation of “queer” in one of the training module’s
glossaries to help make sense of this. Further, in leaving “Q” out of the initialism and in
excluding a discussion of “queer” entirely, legal documents like the RAIO training module
produce a limited understanding of the complexities of identity. The training module addresses
this complexity briefly when it notes that applicants may not be familiar with LGBTI
terminology, and that it is possible that the applicant “does not even have words for different
sexual orientations other than homophobic slurs…The fact that an applicant may be
uncomfortable with these terms may be a result of his or her own ingrained homophobia from
growing up in a country where such terms were the equivalent of violent curses.”290 This
statement defines the applicant as an outsider – one who may not understand western, English
terms for identity and orientation categories – even though these are the categories upon which
their claim for asylum rests. Further, it is possible that the people writing the training module
understand “queer” to be a “homophobic slur,” since it was used as such for so long. It is also
possible, but less likely, that the authors of the training module were fully aware of the radical
politics associated with “queer” and wanted to distance the institutional effort to include LGBTI
people from a politics of radical change and upheaval.291
There does exist in the training module an effort to make the process of asylum more
comfortable for people whose persecution in their homeland may involve sensitive topics like
sexual or physical abuse, but in foreclosing “queer,” the training module fails to train its officers
to understand and account for the multiplicity and complexity of identity and orientation related
to sex and gender. Even though the training module notes that sexual orientation and identity
290
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may evolve or transition over the course of a person’s life, it leaves out a discussion of how
“queer” fits into that equation. Therefore it creates the impression that these identity and
orientation categories have a telos – implying that there is an end point toward which identity is
moving – instead of the possibility for an identity or orientation to be always unsettled. In
excluding definitions of “queer,” the training module helps to uphold the system of
homonationalism that excludes bodies and identities that cannot be neatly categorized or easily
read. This not only helps to enforce exclusions of people based on the legibility of their identity,
but it helps to enforce Western ideals of sexual orientation as inherent, categorizable, and
permanent.
3.3

Conclusions
The Toboso-Alfonso case set in place the norms by which future LGBTI asylum seekers

would be judged, but the RAIO training module serves as an institutional response that both
alters and codifies those norms. The ability for LGBTI asylum seekers to access citizenship is
still dependent upon their performance of an identity that adheres to categories established in the
technical realm of legal discourse. And while the training module for immigration officers
adjudicating LGBTI asylum cases attempts to offer definitions that respect the varied and
culturally bound expression of gender identity and sexual orientation, it does not go far enough
to account for the complexities of identity or orientation. LGBTI asylum seekers’ identity
performances are expected to be especially legible as belonging to the categories as defined in
the training module. Now, in a moment of broadly heightened scrutiny on refugees and asylum
seekers in the United States and abroad, LGBTI asylum seekers are further expected to prove
themselves as especially persecuted, often being viewed in relation to people in the mass
migrations from Syria. It is a seemingly arduous and unwinnable process that requires a
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particular performance of identity that will be judged as authentic or inauthentic by a person who
may or may not have a rich understanding of subtle differences in identity and orientation or a
culturally specific understanding of language used to discuss these identities and orientations.
Immigration officers are primarily people in the legal field (but not necessarily lawyers) who are
trained in immigration law and policy. These officers are not necessarily trained in
gender/sexuality studies or even the nuances of another culture’s customs or language. Each
individual decision to accept or deny an asylum claim is made by an immigration officer in the
region where the claim is being filed. Taken together, these individual cases shape the precedent
for future applicants, ultimately indexing the LGBTI asylum seeker. There are several
implications for LGBTI asylum and the collective imagining of citizenship brought forth by the
RAIO training module. To make sense of these implications, I turn now to a discussion of the
training module and the (im)possibility of non-essentialized definitions, and discuss the absence
of choice from the training module. Finally, I turn to the ways in which these attempts at
definition and the foreclosure of queerness and choice help contribute to homonationalism in
LGBTI migrant policy.
3.3.1

The (Im)possibility of Definition
The RAIO training module for LGBTI asylum cases highlights the problem inherent in

attempts to define people. In some instances, it is beneficial for definitions to essentialize, to help
uncover a truth or reality through language. But when addressing a group of people, especially
one that is typically understood to be a minority, making claims about how that group of people
innately is becomes a less worthwhile task. Looking to the potential for definitions to queer,
however, a roadblock may lie in one of definition’s main functions – they essentialize. In her
book on Aristotle’s understanding of definition, Marguerite Deslauriers claims that in Aristotle’s
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Topics, Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics he illustrates how definitions not only tell us what
something means, but what it is – definitions reveal essence.292 Although for Aristotle,
understanding essence is desirable, when discussing complex categories of sexual identity and
orientation, arguments about the existence of a true essence become less helpful. Although some
people may embrace an argument for an essential gay identity, discussions of essence are, in
many ways, antithetical to discussions of queerness. Any attempt to locate the essence of queer
is doomed to fail because queer is without the structure needed to support an essence. The most
productive notions of queer are undecidable and “de-essentialized.”293 Further, in adhering to or
upholding an “essential” definition of different gender identities or sexual orientations, we fall
into the trap of homonormativity.
Yet, in order for LGBTI asylum to function in the United States, there must be
boundaries, descriptions, and benchmarks. If a category of people is not defined at all, there
could not be asylum procedures written to accommodate them. This leads me to wonder whether
there is space to craft definitions that can both facilitate productive, sensitive asylum interviews,
be clear or limited enough to provide a legal function, and be inclusive enough to account for
different expressions of gender identity or sexual orientation in the public imaginary. Definitions
for argument need to limit – they need to essentialize in order to craft strong claims. Definitions
in this case (existing at the nexus of law and identity) potentially need to do something else.
Susan Stryker’s definition of transgender (“the movement across a socially imposed boundary
away from an unchosen starting place”)294 is an example of what a non-essential definition
might look like, but it is not necessarily one that could help facilitate the asylum process for trans
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people. Much of the anti-normative literature within queer theory addresses how the constant
expansion of the LGBT(I/Q/C/A) initialism may only continue to create normative categories to
which queer people must adhere in order to maintain rights or gain access to citizenship.
Combining all people under the banner of “queer” does not necessarily solve this dilemma either.
As evidenced by the exclusion of queer entirely from the RAIO training module, the term
“queer” does not easily fit into discourse of legal regulation because of its capacity for rupture
and upheaval. Perhaps what is needed in the immigration system is not merely a better system
for training lawyers and immigration officers to understand queer theory, but rather, an
incorporation of people who understand queer theory into the immigration system. Instead of
seeking better definitions, perhaps there is a way to incorporate a greater diversity of
immigration officers. One of the places this group of officers could start is with an effort to
problematize the treatment of “queer” and “immutability” within U.S. asylum policy.
3.3.2

Identity and the Absence of Choice
In addition to the foreclosure of “queer,” the training module also asserts that the U.S.

grants asylum on the basis of these types of persecution because the asylum seeker did not
choose the identity/anatomy that led to their persecution. Arguments for admission to the U.S.
only for those who are biologically or immutably identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, or intersex require proof of one’s identity as something stable and innate. The
training module states:
Sexual orientation, gender identity, and having an intersex condition can be classified as
either innate or fundamental. They are characteristics that an individual cannot change
about him or herself or should not be required to change. Most experts agree that sexual
orientation – whether heterosexual, lesbian, or gay – is set in place early in life and is
highly resistant to change.295
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The definition here limits sexual orientation to people identifying as “heterosexual, lesbian, or
gay” – a definition which excludes bisexuality altogether. Further, the quoted passage above
refers to the existence of a “natural” orientation and the proposition that sexual orientation is “set
in place” – it is presumed to be fixed and unchanging from a young age. The module defers to
experts who, we are told, “agree” that sexual orientation is “highly resistant to change.”
Although this likely appears to remind immigration officers that asylum applicants were not in a
position to hide their identity, and that efforts to “reform” someone’s sexual orientation do not
work, the consequence is one in which identity is presented as immutable, and those who
identify as LGBTI are stripped of agency within their own identity. Later, the module states that
officers should “not assume that being a sexual minority is a lifestyle or choice.”296 Here, the
document turns away from the language of choice not in an effort to dissolve the agency of the
asylum applicant, but to train the officer to be reflexive about their prejudices.
The “choice” rhetoric also appears in the glossary definition of “bisexual” where there is
a reminder that bisexual people “cannot ‘choose’ whom (or which gender) to feel attracted to any
more so than a heterosexual or homosexual individual can.”297 Even though “B” is included in
the training module’s chosen initialism, bisexuality has long complicated arguments for an
essentialist perspective of sexual-object choice. Sean Rehaag, for example, found that asylum
claims by people identifying as bisexual are accepted far less often than claims from people
identifying as gay, lesbian, transgender, or intersex.298 He argues that there does exist a failure on
the part of immigration officials to account for bisexuality in asylum claims and that these claims
are met with skepticism more often than other claims. For Rehaag, “bisexual refugee claims
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mark a border—an unruly edge—in struggles by adjudicators to understand sexual
orientation.”299 The lack of a clear position on one side of a sexual orientation binary inhibits the
ability to clarify one’s identity in a way comprehendible within the law. Rehaag found that
immigration officers describing the claimant’s explanations of their sexual orientation frequently
used the word “confused” with the implication that the claimant could eventually figure out their
sexual orientation instead of remaining bisexual.300 Bisexuality troubles the law’s treatment of
identity as immutable and innate, but in the case of the RAIO training module, it is still defined
as something one is born with instead of something one becomes.
One of the earliest debates around which queer theory formed was the debate over
identity as essential or constructed, whether identity is “natural, fixed, and innate,” or whether it
is “fluid, the effect of social conditioning and available cultural models.”301 In the late 20th
century (and still today), arguments for the rights of LGBTI people have often centered on the
inability to choose sexual orientation or gender identity. These arguments held that antidiscrimination statutes, same-sex marriage, and a host of other protections and rights should be
granted to LGBTI people because their status as a sexual minority was not under their control –
they were “born that way.”302 Thus, the definition of identity and orientation as immutable
became fundamental to many arguments for LGBTI rights, and LGBTI rights become (in the
eyes of queer theorists) another way to discipline and normativize queer bodies. Much like the
arguments for accepting refugees that address the lack of choice refugees have in leaving their
home nations, many arguments for LGBTI rights address the ways the law should accommodate
this population because they did not choose to be part of a population of sexual minorities. This
299
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analogy is not without precedent, as Lisbeth Lipari claims that human rights discourse itself
tends to be essentialist. Lipari finds “our definition of rights often relies on an ideology of
immutable identity” and that our capacity to help them requires their helplessness.303 In
contemporary, individualistic societies, it is difficult to comprehend the need to help a person
who has agency within their current situation. However, claims for LGBTI rights based on a lack
of choice means that those rights can only be granted within the same system that differentiates
and subordinates people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. As Karma
Chávez has argued, “homosexuality is not a choice” rhetoric is complicit with the essentialist
binary opposition between choice and pre-determined sexuality. 304 By denying choice, the
module enforces a biological determinism that “made” the applicant the way they are – and in
this case – made them the target of persecution.
Although the training module upholds an essentialist perspective on identity and
orientation, the essentialism/constructionism debate in queer theory and LGBT studies is as old
as queer theory itself. In Judith Butler’s 1990 book Gender Trouble for example, she critiqued
Beauvior’s essentialist assumptions about gender and sexuality and turned instead toward Wittig
to develop her argument that gender is an action, it is something one becomes, not something one
is born into.305 In 1996 Michelle Eliason argued in the Journal of Homosexuality that all
sciences, not just social sciences, needed to embrace a more fluid understanding of gender
identity.306 Annamarie Jagose traces the highlights of the essentialism/constructionist debate,
noting that for constructionists, identity itself “is not a demonstrably empirical category but the
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product of processes of identification.”307 Yet, for Jagose, the relationship between
constructionism and essentialism is more complicated than many queer projects project, and
notes that, “Combinations of the two positions are often held simultaneously by both
homophobic and anti-homophobic groups.”308 For Jagose, it is likely that her both/and
perspective on essential/constructed identities was drawn, at least partly, from Eve Sedgewick.
Sedgewick argues that debating essentialism versus constructivism fails to account for the ways
in which “there are, with equal certainty, rhetorical and political grounds for underwriting
continuously the legitimacy of both accounts.”309 I am not arguing here for the module to adopt a
fully constructivist queer politics, but rather that denying LGBTI applicants choice altogether
risks upholding discourses that continue to treat certain identities as problematic.
The possibility to account for instability in identity categories would not necessarily
make these cases harder to argue if the officers were trained to account for choice. However, it is
implied in the module that to be eligible for asylum, claimants must fit neatly into an identity
category and be especially representative of the perceived norms of that category as interpreted
by an immigration officer. The absence of “queer” and foreclosure of choice denies the ways
identity is a process rather than a property and upholds a perspective in which gender and sexual
expression must be made legible within the law instead of modifying the law to account for
varieties of expression.
3.3.3

Homonationalism in “Queer” Citizenship
Amy Brandzel claims that citizenship “functions as a double discourse: it serves as a

source of political organizing an national belonging and as a claim to equality, on the one hand,
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while it erases and denies its own exclusionary and differentiating nature, on the other.”310 For
Brandzel, there is no space for “queer” within the citizenry. Instead, for Brandzel, citizenship
itself is irredeemable because it can never escape its cycle of exclusions.311 Brandzel finds no
possibility for queering citizenship because citizenship is inherently and violently exclusionary
and normativizing. And while I largely agree with Brandzel’s characterization of citizenship, it is
difficult to fight her fight of rupturing citizenship altogether. She argues that citizenship is
always exclusionary when it makes space for inclusions. However, LGBTI asylum has the
potential to include a large group of people who faced literal violence if they stayed in their
home nation. It would be ethically tenuous to argue that the inclusion itself is bad solely because
it will also create exclusions, particularly when no asylum at all would simply maintain the cycle
of violence and exclusions faced by LGBTI people all over the world. Isaac West notes in
response to positions like those taken by Brandzel that the “privileged position of legal critique
must negotiate the reality that the call to reject citizenship until it has been queered is a political
stand few, if any, can afford to take.”312 I see potential in the RAIO training module to broaden
the understanding of who belongs in the U.S. citizenry. Although I do not see how, given its
limited definitions, it can truly queer citizenship in the United States, I believe it is possible to
minimize exclusions and expand the ground on which inclusion happens. What is needed is
precisely what the RAIO training module seeks to provide. Yes, it falls short of accounting for
the complexities of identity, but it marks a movement toward a different, more inclusive type of
citizen space.
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While heteronormativity continues to reveal itself in policies enacted across the United
States, the U.S. system that grants LGBTI asylum may seem to exist in a space of acceptance and
progress. However, the failure of this system to account for queer bodies and practices as well as
its commitment to protecting immutable identities only makes space for certain people to gain
asylum. Further, those granted asylum in this system must adhere to certain norms in their
asylum interviews – proving themselves to be especially “gay” and especially persecuted. It is
estimated that the vast majority of LGBTI asylum claimants are denied asylum. For Jaspir Puar,
this is indicative of a homonationalist system that appears progressive and open to nonormative
identities and practices, but that ultimately one that uses the guise of progress and openness to
regulate the citizenry. The more sinister piece of homonationalism exists in the way this guise of
progress establishes a narrative that privileges Western understanding of sex and citizenship and
constructs Eastern – especially Muslim – understandings of sex and citizenship as backward,
threatening, and grounds for military intervention.
When I first found this training module I was optimistic that it might provide some way
to facilitate a queering or upheaval of citizenship. What I found was an expanding of accepted
sexual orientation/ identity categories in immigration law accompanied by fairly narrow
definitions of categories. Immigration officers evaluating these types of cases have the power to
exclude asylum seekers from the U.S. based on their interpretation of these definitions and their
interpretation of the asylum seeker’s adherence to these categories. These findings can be
disheartening – reminding us that not only does every inclusion create an exclusion, but that it
may even expand the types of exclusions possible. Even in its efforts to expand/incorporate a
greater number of subjects into the citizenry, legal discourse still upholds norms of citizenship
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that – though less heteronormative than in years past – still results in exclusions and upholds the
homonationalism of the United States.
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4

DEPICTING LGBTI REFUGEE CASES: LOOKING AT QUEER ASYLUM

“The bodies and faces of refugees that flicker onto our television screens and the glossy refugee
portraiture in news magazines and wall calendars constitute spectacles that preclude the
"involved" narratives and historical or political details that originate among refugees. It becomes
difficult to trace a connection between me/us – the consumers of images – and them – the sea of
humanity.”
- Liisa Malkki313
“You’re not a transsexual. You don’t look gay. How are you at risk?”
- Immigration officer to Jhuan Marrero
Ongoing efforts to represent the plight of refugees are necessary not only as part of the
process of documenting international relations and marginalized lives, but also for defining
relationships between refugees, citizens, and state powers. Refugee photographs constitute their
own genre of photography. They share formal features – almost always depicting movements of
suffering people, often blurring into a “sea of humanity” in which one face cannot be
distinguished from the next, depict women or children if focused on individuals, display
movement toward the camera, and feature boundaries like water or fences 314 Refugee
photography circulates widely in news media following any large-scale movement of refugee
populations. It alerts people across the world to the plight of a refugee population and to the
changes imminent in our own cities as we prepare to take in the displaced. These photographs
document tragedy, suffering, movement, and upheaval. Large-scale refugee crises, wars, and
famines are often a focus of photojournalism.
When asked to think of a “refugee photograph,” most of us likely have an image readily
available in our mind. But when asked to picture an LGBTI refugee, what do we see? What are
313
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the features of LGBTI refugee images, and how and where might photographs of LGBTI asylum
seekers fit within the genre of refugee photography? Unlike groups of mass movements of
refugees, the scattered, disconnected cases of LGBTI asylum seekers become more difficult to
depict. LGBTI asylees and refugees are largely left out of our collective mental picture of
“refugees.” This occurs largely because the term refugee is more often associated with mass
displacement following war or conflict, and LGBTI refugees more often migrate and travel alone
to escape persecution targeting them as an individual. In comparison to large-scale refugee
movements, LGBTI asylum seekers often struggle for visibility – both as individuals seeking to
be read as legibly queer and persecuted in asylum hearing, and in making known the plight of
this particular group of migrants.315 Further, when their stories are made public, it can be difficult
for viewers to understand photographs of LGBTI refugees as existing within the larger corpus of
refugee photography. Yet, seeing LGBTI refugees is an important step toward a collective
understanding of how they fit into a shifting social imaginary.
While photographs of large-scale refugee crises are prominent in Western media, LGBTI
asylum seekers are rarely the focus of news stories or photographs. Indeed, most media coverage
of LGBTI asylum does not seek to portray the plight of individual refugees in the United States.
When LGBTI asylum is the focus of a particular story, photographs of asylum seekers
themselves are rare. Most cases that are acknowledged receive a snippet or a brief mention in a
larger story about LGBTI asylum in general. One of the most in-depth news articles on this issue
– one that is listed as required reading in the RAIO training module – left all refugees
anonymous and focused solely on the process of moving gay men from Iraq to safer refuge in
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Western Europe.316 State-sponsored discrimination of LGBTI people in Russia and Uganda, as
well as the refugee exodus from Syria, has increased the numbers of LGBTI refugees arriving in
the U.S. and the media coverage of this population from those nations.317 Other recent articles
list the names of several LGBTI refugees or provide brief biographies.318 A common trope in
news stories about LGBTI asylum is the display of a rainbow flag and shadowed faces. When
there are photographs of individual LGBTI asylum seekers in news articles, they tend to look
similar.319 All of these examples highlight the ways in which individual LGBTI asylum seekers
are treated differently than mass migrations of refugees following war or conflict.
Like stories tracing large-scale refugee crises, news stories about LGBTI asylum seekers
still rely on photographs help to make visible the aftermath of persecution. Refugee photographs
from the last fifty years share many features. The increase in LGBTI asylum cases since
President Obama’s 2011 declaration of support has led to increased publicity of LGBTI migrant
claims and stories. The photographs included in LGBTI asylum stories may seem to function in
the same way that refugee photographs function more generally. However, while both sets of
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photographs depict refugees, the relationship between them is not fully clear. In this chapter, I
ask how photographs of LGBTI refugees fit within the larger genre of refugee photography, and
how these photographs highlight challenges faced by LGBTI asylum seekers as they seek to
appear worthy of citizenship. I argue that images of LGBTI asylum seekers both belong to the
genre of refugee photography and concomitantly challenge understanding of what is meant by
“refugee photography” through their construction of a different image of refugeeness. For this
reason, images of LGBTI refugees have the potential to queer our collective understanding of
what it means to be a refugee because they complicate the heteronormativity of typical refugee
photographs. However, photographs of LGBTI asylum seekers highlight the struggle of
rhetorical representation because they do not depict or call to mind suffering in the same way as
prima facie refugee photographs. This means LGBTI asylum photographs fail to make visible
the past tragedies that give the genre of refugee photographs a particular emotional weight.
To make this argument, I first discuss the scholarly literature that addresses the
relationship between Western photojournalism and depictions of refugees. Next, I discuss my
methodology, which is drawn from a public address approach to visual rhetoric. Following this, I
read photographs of widespread refugee crises and photographs of people who have received
asylum in the U.S. on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity persecution – turning here
to photographs of Alexandra Reyes, a transgender woman from Mexico, and Romulo Castro, a
gay man from Brazil. The findings of this chapter contribute to an understanding of visual
rhetoric and political imagining, what it means to be a refugee and a citizen, and the relationship
between images of suffering and policy action.
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4.1

Photojournalism and Refugee Photographs
Photojournalism has long been an important site of political and rhetorical representation.

We look to photographs in media to help us understand the world around us – to represent
groups of people, places, policies, and relationships that we do not have access to or that exist on
a scale we could never fully encounter. Yet, as we look to images to represent certain pieces of
the world, we remember that all representations are reductions – they only can show part of that
which they purport to represent. As reductions, representations function as both reflections and
deflections of reality.320 They show us part of some larger group and insist that they accurately
stand in for some whole.321 For Robert Asen, representation creates a “fundamental tension
between absence and presence, between standing for something and embodying that
something.”322 In looking at photographs of suffering, of difference, of “others,” the subject is
made present before us as spectators. John Lucaites implores us to consider how “‘seeing’ and
‘being seen’ are not simply metaphors for a representational process, but they actively and
performatively constitute the very terms of our identities in a multitude of palpably visible
ways.”323 As viewers, we are supposed to recognize that no image could fully depict what it
represents; we are to recognize that an image can never speak for its represented subjects. In an
effort to make sense of photographs, representation, and refugees, I discuss the features of
photographs of suffering and human rights tragedies more broadly before addressing the ways
photographs of refugees constitute their own genre of photography – looking here to the common
tropes of refugee photographs and the purpose they serve in photojournalism. Next, I turn to the
320

Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkley: University of California Press, 1962), 59.
See: Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983),
153.
322
Robert Asen, Visions of Poverty: Welfare Policy and Political Imagination (East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 2002), 13.
323
John Louis Lucaites, “Afterword: Border Optics,” in Border Rhetorics: Citizenship and Identity on the
US-Mexico Frontier, ed. D. Robert DeChaine (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012), 228.
321

147

promises and pitfalls of photography as a means to create bonds between the subjects and
spectators of refugee photography before finally explaining what we can gain from an analysis of
refugee photography from the perspective of visual rhetoric.
4.1.1

Looking at Suffering
Plenty of concerns exist over the politics of representation,324 but ultimately, photographs

in Western media are central to making sense of the relationship between nations, i.e., for the
“production of a contemporary geopolitics.”325 Looking at suffering may serve as a necessary
step in developing compassion for others.326 News articles that tell us stories about refugees and
share their photographs do not hide their efforts to educate us about a group of people’s
suffering.327 When we hear about suffering well beyond U.S. borders in a place we have never
been, we may struggle to comprehend or even believe the stories we hear. News photographs of
tragedy need to represent that tragedy in a way that compels a disparate, international audience to
respond with compassion. And while photographs have the potential to index global violence,
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there also exist concerns over how to represent another person’s suffering without exploiting
them, minimizing their suffering, or turning their suffering into spectacle. Photojournalistic
images of war, famine, disease, and other bodily horrors may be viewed with pity, disdain, or
fear – leading some to argue that we should limit publication of images of suffering.328 For Susie
Linfield, not only should we view photographs of suffering, we must; Linfield warns that in
looking, we have other responsibilities as well:
The suffering such photographs depict cannot, and should not be denied. But it does
mean that we, the viewers, must look outside the frame to understand the complex
realities out of which these photographs grew. Like human rights themselves, this
expansive kind of vision is not particularly natural but, rather, is something we must
consciously create.329
Linfield asks that instead of disparaging photography, we use the ambiguities of photographs as
places to begin a process of discovery and dialogue.330 Wendy Hesford notes that photographs
can haunt and that looking may not always compel people to do something about what they have
seen. She suggests that we can transform the pitfalls of looking by treating witnessing as
rhetorical and material and placing witnessing in part of an economy of affect.331 One of the
places where this witnessing is most needed is in the viewing of refugee photographs, which
often depict masses of people suffering because of injustice and inhumanity somewhere in the
world.
328
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4.1.2

Looking at Refugees
The genre of refugee photographs shares with other photographs of tragedies the ability

to alert audiences to the distant suffering of others. Refugee photographs constitute their own
genre of photographs, one that exists on a line between informing and objectifying.332 At times
it can be difficult to understand the magnitude of an atrocity on the other side of the world, and
it can be difficult for a photograph to accurately represent the horrors of such atrocities. When
looking at a photograph of refugees, we are reminded of, or in many cases, informed about,
persecution that we could not see or understand otherwise. For Anthony Downey, refugee
photographs rely on a paradoxical visible invisibility – one that alerts us to a moment that lives
on only as trauma but that can be represented visually.333 Photographs of many different refugee
groups have been credited with stirring compassion and acting as an impetus for international
involvement in refugee issues. Or, as Liisa Malkki argues, “Pictures of refugees are now a key
vehicle in the elaboration of a transnational social imagination of refugeeness.”334 Refugee
photographs index violence and persecution for people in all parts of the world and contribute to
a constructed refugeeness in the social imaginary.
In this process of representing refugees through photographs, certain patterns emerge that
obscure the agency of photographed subjects in ways different than do other human rights
images. Liisa Malkki, for example, harbors concern for the inability of refugee photographs to
humanize individual struggles, and for the tropes that most commonly appear in photographs of
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refugees. She claims that most photographs of refugees fit in one of two categories: those
depicting refugees “as a miserable ‘sea of humanity,’” or those that focus primarily on women
and children.335 These types of photographs, Malkki argues, create a false understanding of a
supposedly ideal refugee whose struggle is “pure,” and who is most visibly in need of rescue;
helplessness becomes the most important feature of a photographed refugee. Or, as Lynda
Mannik explains, “Refugees are observed. Their agency as observers is rarely recognized,” and
the effect of this genre of photography is one that ultimately silences refugees and erases the
necessary contingency for compassionate human rights action. 336 Mannik is further concerned
with the problematic nature of the phrase “refugee crisis” because it implies that refugees
themselves constitute the crisis, and this implication is exacerbated by the lack of narratives and
testimonies of individual refugees in news media. She notes, “Visual images of refugees also
devalue their suffering by hiding, commodifying and sensationalizing individualized and actual
experiences of suffering. Invisibility is damning, but misrepresentation can be just as
damning.”337 The term “refugee” itself implies a lack of safety or shelter, or as Louisa Edgerly
found in her analysis of Hurricane Katrina discourse, the term “refugee” carries a connotative
meaning that people under that label are somehow not full citizens in the United States.338 To be
a refugee, one must be in need, and while this construction of refugees might seem to indicate
that they are passive, it is a necessary part of the asylum process. If one proves that they are
unable to live in their home nation due to fear of violence or persecution, they may gain access to
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asylum in the United States. However, in gaining acceptance as a refugee, they may be seen as
subordinate to birthright citizens. For Alice Szczepanikova, there is essentialism in depictions of
refugees as “objects of assistance” who are utterly without agency. And, for Anna Szörényi, that
essentialism exists in the construction of refugeeness as “an intrinsic state of being, rather than
the effect of particular and changeable historical and political process.”339 Given Szörényi’s
perspective, we must also consider how humanity and individual agency could be restored
through a different type of photography and a different type of journalism.
Beyond their indexical characteristics, refugee photographs ask for more than our
recognition: they ask us to make space in our own nations and communities for those who are
displaced.340 Where photographs of other natural and man-made disasters might serve a similar
indexical function, and they may be used to solicit donations or other support for people
affected, refugee photographs signify a change to our own lives. They remind us about the
temporariness of our own living situations and the necessity of caring for others.341 In a 2009
essay, art theorist Anthony Downey stated that photographs of refugees remind us that they
“…are not liminal figures that exist in a hinterland of invisibility; on the contrary, they are
symbols of a ‘coming community’ that is based on exclusion.”342 Downey finds refugee
photographs to be especially powerful because they alert us as viewers to the potential for any
339
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of us to belong to the same, transitional community. They both alert us to the changes in our
own community, as people who will live among newly resettled refugees, and they remind us of
the fallibility of the seemingly sovereign nations we inhabit. Refugee photographs are important
because they capture something provisional – they tend to reveal the liminality of refugee status
and can even make plain human rights violations. Any new community of refugees and citizens
exists because of an earlier, potentially violent exclusion that we did not witness but now know
exists.
4.1.3

Creating Identification Between Spectator and Subject
The process of engaging with photographs has the potential to lead us to more

compassionately look at photographs of others and to make sense of our own, temporary and
tenuous place within the world. Looking at images of refugees holds the potential to create civic
bonds that can enable resettlement and ease the transition of displaced people. For Ariella
Azoulay, there is a way to look at photographs of others’ suffering that can mitigate the potential
violence of spectatorship. She calls for a type of looking that she refers to as a civil gaze.343 For
Azoulay, the civil gaze is the product of a civil imagination – an exercised, ongoing capacity to
understand how we are all governed and we are all equally subject to state violence.344 The civil
gaze allows us to view photographs of victims of violence without pity or disdain for the
photograph’s subject. A civil gaze provides a space to encounter the image with an open, nonjudgmental understanding of our relationship to the photograph and the photographed. Because
photography is a set of relations and not a stable, objective display, through a civil intention with
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photography, the act of witnessing itself can operate as a mode of citizenship.345 For Azoulay,
photography is the medium that allows noncitizens to make visible the ways in which they are
violated. It “marks the beginning of a demand to become citizens, even when that demand is
hidden behind a demand for the protection of human rights.”346 Like Azoulay, T.J. Demos argues
that photography depicting migrants and refugees can help make sense of the ways in which
“none fully belong, that all are displaced in one way or another, and that we all share in this
condition of immeasurability and opacity.”347 Likewise, Anthony Downey addresses how
looking at images of refugees and others existing in zones of indistinction serve as a marker of a
coming community of rightless individuals to which any of us could one day belong.348
Recognizing this can lead us to a new understanding of citizenship that accounts for the way in
which we are all subject to the dominance of the sovereign. Thus, photographs of refugees
function in a particular way to articulate the place of a group of noncitizens in a citizenry, and in
so doing, require us to look with compassion, if not with a truly civil gaze.349
Photography allows us to make present “what is now absent: the moment which no
longer exists as anything but trauma.”350 Photographs have the potential to help us become aware
of the failures of citizenship to protect people from atrocities and remind us to look at images in
a way that engages these failures. Those who seek refuge in the United States as a protection
from persecution targeting LGBTI people similarly warrant representation. But given the ethical
345
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challenges of depicting suffering, how might these representations look? How might they differ
from the most common refugee photographs? And, how might they make present a threat that is
individually targeted at a time some point in the past? To make sense of these questions, I briefly
address my methodology before turning first to photographs that depict current, large-scale
refugee crises and then looking to photographs of LGBTI refugees. This reading contributes to
the conversation about refugee photography by acknowledging the ways refugees exist not only
as mass movements of displaced people, but also as small-scale, individual movements that
demand attention. By approaching these images through visual rhetorical methodologies, we
gain insight into the arguments that get circulated through photojournalistic images of refugees
more broadly and LGBTI refugees specifically.
4.1.4

Visual Rhetoric and Refugee Photography
To make sense of how photographs of LGBTI refugees fit within and/or rupture the genre

of refugee photography, I approach the images through a perspective of visual rhetoric as Public
Address. A Public Address approach, as described by Brian Ott and Greg Dickinson, considers
the way images argue or persuade – it approaches visual rhetoric as a way of “doing.”351
Consideration of how a photograph functions as an ideograph,352 an enthymeme,353 or an
exigence354 all deploy this type of methodology because they draw on principles and practices
from traditional rhetorical analyses of public address scholarship. A methodology rooted in a
351
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Public Address perspective allows close reading of a photograph’s elements and also helps make
sense of the arguments conveyed by or within that image. This approach is especially helpful for
a study of images that seeks to make sense of the civic dimensions of images. For example,
Hariman and Lucaites consider the ways images appeal through a common spectatorship, and
Finnegan addresses how images might foster particular forms of civic engagement.355 This
provides a way to think about the national and international context in which this image is
produced, as well as a way to think about how this photograph might reflect our own
understanding of citizenship. A close reading of photographs through a public address
methodology considers the individual elements of the photographs – its colors, layout, framing,
central focus, subjects, shadows, and the like, while attempting to understand what argument
these elements combine to make. In this chapter, I look less at how those images may persuade
us of something, and I focus more on how the genre of refugee photographs functions as a set of
images, drawing here from rhetoric scholarship that combines visual rhetoric and genre
analysis.356 The roots of this type of analysis can be seen in Michael Osborn’s essay in which he
claims that rhetorical depiction is less evident in a single moment of discourse, and more often
“is a controlled gestalt, a cumulative impact.”357 Turning to the genre of refugee photography
and reading recent photographs depicting refugees, we gain a better sense of how the elements of
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individual photographs accumulate to construct the understanding of refugees in the United
States.
4.2

Reading Refugee Photography
Photographs of refugees have been a mainstay in media from news to art, surfacing en

masse every few years and drawing our collective attention to groups of people whose lives are
at an unimaginable intersection.358 In 2015 alone, more than fifteen professional photographic
essays were published in print and online sources depicting the refugee struggle. With titles like
“21 Photos that Capture the Heartbreak of Europe’s Refugee Crisis,” “War, Home, and Hope,”
and “The Flight and Plight of Refugees in Europe,” these essays prominently feature the
movement of large groups of migrants and life within refugee camps. In year-end lists of
photographs that defined the year 2015, most contained at least one photograph related to the
Syrian refugee crisis. In a Reading the Pictures blog post, rhetorician Robert Hariman presents a
photograph of a large number of refugees lying in a plastic structure. He states, “You don’t have
to see too many of the many photographs of the European refugee crisis before they all begin to
blend together. Even those that may seem moderately distinctive have a generic quality to
them.”359 Although Hariman’s larger argument addresses the decontextualization of cultural
images within globalization, his discussion of the images as lacking distinctive qualities is
important for thinking about images of refugees more generally.
Of the thousands of photographs taken and the hundreds published, the most widely
circulated of these depicts masses of people – groups so large they often fade into infinity in the
background of a photograph. While Liisa Malkki noted how “sea of humanity” photographs
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dominate, these photographs featuring massive groups of migrants have also been labeled a “blur
of humanity,”360 a “vast and throbbing mass,”361 an “anonymous corporeality,”362 and “massed
throngs of silent victims.”363 Malkki further notes that the most widely viewed photographs of
individual refugees primarily focus on children, women, and facial expressions of extreme
anguish or pain, and almost all of the photographs feature movement – often towards the camera
instead of away. Because most of these photographs are taken and produced for Western media
outlets (Reuters and the AP have produced the most photographs of the Syrian refugee crisis),
the photographs seem to literally show crowds of people moving toward (or encroaching on)
Western nations.
Of the “huddled mass” or “sea of humanity” photographs, one of the most widely
circulated in recent years depicts Syrian and Palestinian refugees walking through a bombed out
area of Damascus in the Yarmouk refugee camp. The photograph, taken by the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on January 31, 2014, was the
focus of stories on a variety of news sites,364 labeled as “The image that brought Yarmouk to the
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world’s attention” by the BBC,365 and given a clickbait title in the Huffington Post proclaiming,
“This one photo will show you just how terrible the Syrian refugee crisis is.”366 This photograph
is jarring because of the immeasurable amount of people packed into the image’s frame and the
desolate ruins that tower above them on both sides.

Figure 4: Yarmouk Refugee Camp, photo by UNRWA, 2014

This photograph draws attention to the plight of Syrian refugees by shocking us with the
enormity of suffering. Despite the widespread attention this photograph garnered, it is visually
similar to many of the images that appear with searches for “refugee photographs,” “refugee
crisis,” or “refugee.” This photograph and others like it appear to be almost in grayscale; the lack
of color or sun casts shadows over what appears to be a dirty and inhospitable place. These mass
migration images have become commonplace in representations of refugee movements from
Syria and beyond, whether the throngs of people fade into the background in the sea, the desert,
or road. The effect is at once unsettling and overwhelming. Lynda Mannik claims that
photographs of mass movements of refugees “make it very difficult for media viewers to find
365
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any emotional connection, thus they emphasize the ‘them/us’ distinctions common to
discriminating media repertoires.”367 Images of mass refugee migration draw attention to the
scale of the refugee population leaving Syria. By presenting refugees in massive throngs,
however, these photographs risk failing to elicit compassion for individual migrants. The
overwhelming nature of these massive crowds fading to infinity draws our eyes to the group –
specifically the infinity point in the background – not individual faces.
In addition to these “sea of humanity” photographs, the second most common refugee
photographs feature women and children, according to Malkki. As Birgitta Höijer notes, women
and children are “ideal victims” for circulated images of suffering.368 With most of these
photographs there is little known about the photographed subjects – they become anonymous
ciphers for the refugee struggle. An exception to this trope of anonymous, helpless women and
children can be seen in the photograph of three-year-old Syrian Aylan Kurdi whose lifeless body
was photographed on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea in Turkey where he drowned in the
process of fleeing Syria. The photograph of Kurdi inspired an outpouring of compassion not seen
as a response to other photographs – even those depicting death.369 Kurdi’s story is particularly
compassion-inducing, and it has served as an exigence for an international response to the
current refugee crisis in ways other photographs have not. Apart from the photograph of Kurdi,
367
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photographs of people whose faces show pain and fear remain anonymous. Many depict women
and children, but few stories report their names or narratives.
While Malkki’s observation of the most common subjects of refugee photography holds
in recent refugee photojournalism, my survey of refugee photography led me to observe several
other visual features common to most available refugee photographs. Two elements appear in
combination in most of the refugee photographs I surveyed: expressions of pain or suffering and
depicted or implied movement (that contributes to a sense of temporariness). Many photographs
depict movement toward the camera and feature a frenzied, chaotic scene that illustrates the
urgency with which refugees must move. These often depict a group of people running onto a
beach; the splashing water and strained faces indicating the effort exerted in the movement.

Figure 5: Refugees in Greece, photo by Vadim Ghirda, Associated Press, 2016

In this photograph from March 2016, we see two men helping a woman through a river
near Idomeni, Greece while the people following them extend into the distance. The
photograph’s caption tells us that these people are attempting to get to Macedonia through this
river in order to avoid a border control fence they would encounter by land. They move toward
the camera, and the group fades into an infinity point at the back (right) of the photograph. We
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see huddled families carrying their possessions through the murky waters of the river. While this
photograph highlights frenzied, chaotic movement, others – like the Yarmouk photograph –
feature what looks more like a slow, massive drudge toward some unknown camp. Some of these
photographs show people moving one another through or over some type of boundary. Railroad
tracks, fences, and temporary housing imbue the images with an unsettled feeling and indicate
the lack of permanence indicative of the refugee experience. Fences themselves are prominent,
with groups of people looking through a fence or passing children through barbed wire fences.
These fence and boundary images help to depict refugees as in need of assistance, as they mostly
appear to be fenced in or trapped. In combination with movement, these photographs of chaos
and frenzy depict a population in need; yet, they concomitantly depict a population encroaching
on the camera in a way that can be perceived as threatening.
The chaotic movement toward depicted in refugee photographs alert us to a coming
change in our own communities, and the desolation or pain depicted serves to remind us of why
this change is necessary. These types of photographs might obscure, make anonymous, or blur
the particular features and identities of individual refugees, but they also help us to see tragedy
we could not have imagined. The movement, the pain, and the desolation depicted in refugee
photographs alert us to horrors that we cannot see, but whose violent consequences persist.
Refugee photographs do double-work – they alert us to the presence of past (or ongoing)
violence so horrific it pushes masses of people from their homes, and they also alert us to the
changes this violence will bring to our own communities. They invoke our emotional responses
to aid us in accepting this change.
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4.3

Depicting Suffering of LGBTI Refugees
Like photographs depicting large-scale refugee crises, images of LGBTI asylum need to

depict a specific struggle and must somehow indicate the presence of a past violation. The
movement and resettlement of LGBTI refugees is lacking the representation of larger refugee
resettlement for many reasons. Most LGBTI refugees in the United States arrived on their own or
with little other support – sometimes entering the country illegally. In developing an argument
for how an asylum seeker possesses a “well-founded fear,” the asylee must discuss the sources of
that fear, and the court must determine whether those stories of fear are authentic. In large-scale
refugee crises, the burden of proof of abuse is far lower than in individual asylum cases for those
fleeing individually targeted persecution, as most are considered prima facie refugees –
eliminating the need for individual asylum interviews and assessments.370 Those who flee
persecution targeting people of a particular sexual orientation or identity cannot always carry
with them evidence of their abuse or of their accepted or perceived orientation. Instead, their
evidence is primarily anecdotal. Even if they were to reveal scars or wounds from an injury, they
would still need to convince immigration officials adjudicating their claims that those injuries
were tied to abuse they received and that they were abused because of their orientation or
identity. LGBTI asylum seekers are tasked with making their identities and their persecution
visible within the immigration system. Rachel Lewis claims:
Unlike other refugee claimants who are not compelled to perform a visible identity in the
country to which they migrate, lesbian and gay asylum applicants frequently are expected
to conform to neoliberal narratives of sexual citizenship grounded in visibility politics,
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consumption, and an identity in the public sphere in order to be considered worthy
candidates for asylum.371
Not only must they prove their sexual orientation throughout the asylum process, but LGBTI
migrants must also prove that their actual or perceived sexual orientation made them a target of
violent abuse. Without news stories of violence in their home region or war/terror, their bodies
become the evidence and their ethos bears part of the burden for proving the evidence connects
to the crime. Therefore, any claims require affective displays of fear and pain, while storytelling
and memories themselves become evidence.
Since the opening of U.S. borders to LGBTI people facing persecution, two stories of
individual asylum have garnered thorough coverage from national and local media – that of
Alexandra Reyes and Romulo Castro. Although more than 20 years have passed since The
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso created a path to asylum for LGBTI individuals, very few of the
several hundred cases heard have received any media attention, and almost none have been the
sole focus of articles that were accompanied by photographs.372 Reyes and Castro offer the best
opportunity to consider the position of LGBTI refugee photography within the larger genre of
refugee photography because they are two of the only LGBTI refugees in the United States to
have been the subject of multiple news photographs and multiple stories. And although more
photographs of them have been circulated than other refugees, their images share many
371
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similarities with other LGBTI refugee photographs depicted throughout this dissertation and
available in the news stories cited in footnotes 6 and 60.
Alexandra Reyes is a transgender woman who fled Mexico and was granted asylum in
2010. Reyes faced scrutiny as reactions to her case frequently mentioned gay-friendly resorts in
Mexico – her home nation.373 Articles about Reyes’s case discuss the deplorable violence she
faced at the hands of her own family while living at home in Cenotillo, Mexico. Her case
highlights the perceived visibility of queer identity and the privileging of this visibility in a legal
setting. Second, Romulo Castro’s case was brought to light through extensive profiles in national
publications like the New York Times and the Huffington Post.374 Like Reyes, Castro faced
scrutiny for his asylum claim because he was emigrating from Brazil – a nation known to have
popular gay pride parades in its major cities. Much of the discussion surrounding Castro’s case
repeatedly addressed visual elements of his claim – what he wore, what was provided as visual
evidence of his sexuality and persecution, and his own affective displays throughout the trial.
The process of LGBTI asylum relies on stories and images, especially photographs, as
evidence in multiple ways: they serve as evidence of the threat faced in their home nation, they
serve as evidence of the pain and uncertainty faced in the asylum process, and, in many cases,
they serve as evidence of the asylees’ sexual orientation. Photographs also help construct the
social imaginary of a population; they tell us what LGBTI asylum looks like. In the discourse of
LGBTI asylum hearings, visual evidence is used both in court and is circulated in stories about
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the trial. There exists a fear surrounding LGBTI asylum for some members of the government
and the public that people will gain citizenship in the United States through this clause
dishonestly. And while there have been a few reported cases of fabricated LGBTI asylum
cases,375 this fear mostly serves to illustrate the skepticism with which most LGBTI migrants are
treated. Their word is not enough – the courts require evidence: evidence of persecution,
evidence of minoritized identity or sexual orientation, and evidence of a hostile environment
toward those identities and orientations in another nation. The few falsified LGBTI migrant
narratives have increased the value placed on visual evidence in these cases. It is not enough to
tell a sad story. Asylum for LGBTI migrants requires visual depiction of sexual orientation
and/or persecution.
Visual representations of refugees generalize in ways that obscure the particulars of the
LGBTI migrant experience. In order to trace the construction of sexual orientation asylumseekers, and understand what concept of citizenship is promulgated through discussion of these
cases, I look to the media circulated images from two different LGBTI asylum cases. The images
of queer asylum depart from most photojournalistic images of suffering in multiple ways. They
do not capture the moment of violence or persecution, but rather, they depict the asylees in their
U.S. residences. They require meta-images to provide insight into the asylees life prior to and
after migrating to the United States. These images and the stories they accompany become a
starting point for conversations about LGBTI refugees in the United States. Further, the content
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made available to the public by the Bureau of Immigration Affairs looks different than
transcripts produced from criminal cases. At most, the public has access to a case brief authored
by the judge in the hearing – a document that “tends to erase the polyvocality of the actual events
of the trial.”376 This means that only through engagement with media coverage of LGBTI asylum
hearings does the public form their understanding of this population. First, I discuss Alexandra
Reyes – the story of her asylum, the photographs that accompanied news coverage of her story,
and what her photographs tell us about depicting queer asylum. Next, I turn to Romulo Castro’s
story of fleeing persecution, and I read photographs of him that accompanied a long profile in
The New York Times. Following this, I address the stories of both asylees together in order to
make sense of what these narratives and images tell us about the political imagining of
citizenship gained through LGBTI asylum.
4.3.1

Alexandra Reyes
Alexandra Reyes was born to a traditional Mayan family in Cenotillo, Mexico – a small

city on the Yucatan Peninsula. Named Carlos at birth and raised as a boy, Alexandra began
wearing her sister’s clothing and living as a girl when she was eight years old. Her father
reportedly beat her for wearing female clothes and her aunt attempted to murder her, claiming
Alexandra was not welcome in the family if she lived life as a woman. She reports a life filled
with abuse and threats of violence that were reported but not attended to by the local law
enforcement. At the age of 22, Reyes crossed the border into the U.S. with the help of a
smuggler. She walked for several days until reaching Colorado, where a friend told her she
would be safe. Reyes lived, undocumented, in Colorado for several years, but she faced
deportation in 2009 after encountering legal troubles. Reyes had been unable to pay a cab fare
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that a friend had promised to pay. When she arrived at the cab company’s headquarters a week
later and attempted to pay the fare, the company called the police, and the police called
immigration and customs enforcement. Reyes paid restitution to the cab company, but she spent
the next eleven months in immigration custody, detained with men, because she had not
undergone sex reassignment surgery. Attorney Bryan Large of the Rocky Mountain Immigrant
Advocacy Network took on her case pro bono to help fight her deportation.
Following a hearing in late 2010, the Board of Immigration Appeals withheld her
deportation, and Reyes was granted asylum. The court acknowledged that she documented a
well-founded fear of abuse in her home nation. Her lawyer, Large, argued that even walking
down the street could be dangerous for Reyes, and she faced threats of sexual assault if she were
forced to return to Mexico. In arguing the case, Large provided as evidence the story of Enrique
Villegas, a gay Mexican immigrant who was denied asylum in Canada and was murdered after
his deportation back to Mexico.377 The immigration judge in the case ruled that Reyes would
likely face continued persecution in Mexico, and determined that if she were deported, the
Mexican government would not be likely to protect her from abuse.
Reyes’s lawyer Large noted that people in the United States sometimes struggle to
imagine Mexico as a place hostile to those identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender,
given that Mexico City legalized same-sex marriages in 2009 and that many coastal resorts are
famous for hosting same-sex weddings and LGBTI events.378 Large anticipated that Reyes’s case
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might face scrutiny by people in the U.S. whose understanding of Mexico is one largely based on
knowledge of the capital city and costal vacation regions. To counter this conflation of Mexican
regions and cultures, Large needed to make salient the threat of violence faced by many sexual
minorities living in different regions of the country. Transgender men and women have faced
violence, particularly at the U.S.-Mexico border.379 A 2005 report by the National Committee to
Prevent Discrimination found that half of transgender Mexicans say they have been the targets of
violence because they were transgender.380 A 2015 report from a European human rights group
counted nearly 200 murders of transgender people in Mexico since 2008, making it the second
most deadly nation to be transgendered (after Brazil).381 Thus, despite progressive views in its
federal district, many regions of Mexico remain largely unsafe for transgender people.
Reyes’s detention in 2009 failed to garner any media attention. Her success in obtaining
asylum, however, brought attention from local and national media. Reyes was granted asylum in
a time between the revisions to international human rights law (including Reno’s accompanying
statements from 1994) and the official declaration of support from the Obama Administration in
2011. This meant that for the general audience of the Denver Post, Huffington Post, and other
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news outlets on both sides of the political spectrum, Reyes was their introduction to the
possibility of gaining asylum on the basis of sexual orientation persecution abroad.
As noted in the earlier chapter on The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, access to asylum in the
United States on the basis of sexual orientation persecution requires proof of a well-founded fear
of persecution and proof of membership in a particular social group. Reyes and her lawyer did
not sense that her identity as a transgender woman was ever in question. Although there were
comments on news stories about her case that questioned the existence of transgender people
more generally, and several comments that accused Reyes of dressing like a woman to get
asylum, the majority of the stories and comments did not question the veracity of her trans
identity. She did not have to work to align herself as having “membership in a particular social
group.” For Reyes, the question of whether LGBTI asylum in the U.S. would make sense for her
was predicated on her ability to prove her well-founded fear. The majority of negative comments
directed at Reyes’s case were concerned with her appearance and a general concern about
transgender people in the United States – regardless of citizen or refugee status. Further, many
commenters who found her unsuitable for citizenship were not using “well-founded fear” as the
threshold for asylum. Instead, they based their claims on general/perceived knowledge about
Mexico, the U.S., and migrants. For example, one commenter on the Denver Post article wrote,
“I don’t particularly have a problem with her staying in the US, as she may have experienced
local injustice. But ‘asylum’ is generally reserved for institutionalized injustice by the nation.”382
It can be assumed that an immigration judge has a better grasp on the asylum person than this
commenter, but the comment reflects the commonly held notion that asylum is reserved only for
those whose suffering is most legible to a global audience.
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The news coverage of Reyes’s case frequently included one or more of a series of
photographs, taken by Kathryn Scott Osler for the Denver Post and available through stock
photography source Getty Images. There are three photographs available as news stock images
available to accompany publication of Reyes’s story. All are credited to Osler and were taken in
2010. Articles about her case have most widely published the close-up image of Reyes in which
she appears to be crying (if any image accompanies her story at all). Another photograph depicts
Reyes speaking with her lawyer present. Reyes is in the foreground turned so that her right side
faces the camera, and her lawyer in the background is out of focus but facing the camera. They
sit in what appears to be her lawyer’s office, with framed certificates on the wall behind Reyes
and a shelf of large books behind Large. Reyes appears to be speaking and looking upward to
someone out of the frame. In the third photograph, Reyes is depicted smiling outside of a house.
She leans on a porch pillar on the left side of the frame. Her hands are folded in front of her, and
she wears a black blazer over a dark shirt. This is the only image where Reyes is smiling and
looking directly at the camera. The smiling image was not used in any article about her case, but
itremains available through Getty as a stock image.
4.3.1.1 Photograph of Reyes Crying
Almost all news coverage of Reyes’ case, including the widely referenced Denver Post
article, published the photograph in which she appears to be crying. This photograph is framed as
a close-up portrait, but Reyes is turning slightly away from the camera. Her shoulders are mostly
square to the camera, but her face is turned to the right and her eyes look even further to the
right. She is wearing black, and her long, dark hair blends in with her black blazer. She is
holding a tissue near her face, and her heavily lined eyes are glossy and red, showing signs of
recent tears.
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Figure 6: Alexandra Reyes 1 by Kathryn Scott Osler, 2010

The caption of the image on the Denver Post website reads: “Transgender woman
Alexandra Reyes cries as she recalls abuse she suffered in Mexico. An immigration judge
granted Reyes a form of asylum that allows her to stay in the U.S.”383 The caption on the stock
photograph, available on Getty images provides more detail:
Alexandra Reyes, a Mexican transgender woman, was granted asylum by an immigration
judge and can stay in the United States because she was subjected to violence in Mexico,
including at the hand of her own family members. Reyes begins to cry as she remembers
her father using a branch from a tree to beat her that was lined with sharp spikes.384
While the Denver Post caption references abuse in Mexico, the Getty caption describes the
nature of that abuse. It reveals that a member of her own family attacked her with a weapon. It is
unclear from either caption whether this abuse occurred frequently or only on one occasion. Both
captions note that the memory of the abuse was enough to move Reyes to tears.
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The picture is mostly dark, with Reyes’ dark skin, dark hair, dark eyes, dark eyeliner and
artificial dark eyebrows set against the stark white of the tissue she uses to dry her tears. We see
sadness and the possibility of past suffering, but the close frame of her face and hands keep us
from making sense of the surrounding context. Without a caption, we could not know what made
her cry, though her sullen expression indicates that she is crying out of sadness or loss instead of
out of joy or excitement. There is nothing in the photograph itself that would lead a viewer to
connect this image to the corpus of refugee photographs or to immediately make sense of Reyes
as a refugee.
Of the three photographs, only the one in which Reyes cries begins to present the
visible/invisible paradox discussed by Downey. The crying alerts us to a grievance or problem,
but the nature of the violation remains unclear. Reyes could be crying for multiple reasons, and it
is only through engagement with the image’s caption that we understand her tears were
motivated by her memory of her abuse. We see sadness in the crying photograph, but we cannot
know what caused that sadness without first engaging with Reyes’s story. The invisible trauma
experienced by Reyes is obscured in these photographs. In refugee images, the violence itself is
rarely depicted – only alluded to – but the fear and anxiety of migration is often made plain. In
the photographs of Reyes, her migration and efforts to find a home in the U.S. are in the past.
There are tears in Reyes’ eyes, but she has a clean tissue with which to dry her tears, and the
caption tells us she is in her lawyer’s office, reminding us that she has legal representation.
With the exception of the photograph of Aylan Kurdi, most refugee photographs show
people whose individual needs and concerns are abstracted in an effort to make known the
struggle of large refugee populations. The photograph of Reyes is a departure from mass images
of refugees not only because she is alone, but also because her photographs do not show the
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transition she faced to migrate to the United States. There are no photographs of her crossing the
border, or photographs of the violence she faced in her previous home. Instead, the migration we
witness is one of a legal system that regulates migrant bodies and has the ability to grant asylum
to some. In the photograph of Reyes crying and in the photograph of her in her lawyer’s office
we are reminded that asylum is not immediately conferred upon refugees when they cross the
border. Instead, they are asylum seekers. They exist in a liminal space between refugee and
citizen, and it is only through the legal granting of asylum that they can become citizens.
4.3.1.2 Photograph of Reyes Smiling
The photograph of Reyes smiling and standing on the porch is a visual departure not only
from the other photographs of Reyes, but also from depictions of refugees more broadly. It can
be viewed as the third photograph in the set of three – depicting the happy ending to a narrative
about Reyes’s challenges. It may also be viewed as an attempt to humanize a story that is unlike
most stories about refugees. In her studies of photographs of refugees taken by other refugees,
Lynda Mannik explains:
Images of smiling faces and eyes looking directly into the camera do not suggest that
these individuals are afraid, feeling seasick, hungry, sad or anxious…Instead, these
images emphasize…that refugees have families, have friends, belong, hope for a bright
future, and are human.385
In presenting her research on refugees’ own photographs, Mannik reports having to defend
posed, smiling photographs of refugees because audiences consider those photographs to be
counterproductive to refugee-friendly politics. When refugees do not look like they are suffering,
audiences fail to understand the difficulties they face – or fear that others will not understand. In
this way, the smiling photograph of Reyes illustrates the challenge of depicting refugees without
requiring them to look like a helpless victim.
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Figure 7: Alexandra Reyes 3 by Kathryn Scott Osler, 2010

The photograph of Reyes smiling is framed much differently than the close-up image of
her crying. Here, Reyes takes up only half of the frame. She is still wearing black, and has the
same dark eyebrows and makeup, but the sun is shining on her hand and reflecting off of her
smiling cheeks in a way that literally lightens her and also lightens the photograph’s mood –
even if the photo had been framed as closely as the one in which she cried. The right half of the
image depicts a clean porch with sunlight streaking across it. There is a potted plant in the
background, and the white porch is contrasted with a red door on the far right side of the
photograph. This image depicts a clean, safe, and happy world. Without the caption or any
knowledge of Reyes’ case, this could be a stock image for an advertisement about home loans or
the biography photograph for a realtor. It is utterly different than the refugee photographs most
often circulated in the media.
This image is not only unrecognizable as a “refugee photograph,” it is unrecognizable as
evidence of past suffering. In the context of the two other photographs, it creates closure on a
three-photograph narrative. It provides the happy ending, the “after” for the “before”
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photographs of fear and sadness. The pose and smile truncate the moment of photography,
making it difficult to imagine what preceded and followed the taking of the photograph. It is
possibly because of this incongruity that the smiling photograph was never run in any article
about her story and trial. It is the only one of the three photographs that can only be found as a
stock photograph – not as an image running alongside any news story about her case. As
evidence of Reyes’s legal struggle, the photograph of her smiling does little. Focusing on asylees
as individuals may humanize in ways that “sea of humanity” refugee photographs fail to do, but
because the photographed subjects stand or sit in permanent structures, wear clean clothes, and
are surrounded by personal artifacts (framed photographs, potted plants, art) their time of
transition, movement, and fear are utterly abstracted. Unlike other refugee photographs that meet
the “visible invisible” paradox suggested by Downey, these photographs do not help to make
visible the suffering that led to their moment of movement or transition to the United States. We
see the final parts of their migration in which sadness and nostalgia still exist, but they are not in
transition in a way that shows the anxiety and fear in persecution and forced migration.
Groups that resettle LGBTI refugees cite the challenges of finding homes and
communities for this population that will not subject them to the same types of abuse that caused
them to flee their homeland in the first place. LGBTI asylum seekers are both alone and othered
– their sexual orientation adds to the disenfranchisement experienced by refugees generally, and
their lack of familial support is both reason for their exodus and argument for their asylum.
Reyes noted that she had been a victim of violence at the hands of her own family members. For
Reyes, the marked identity is more complicated. She wears a woman’s blazer, wears her hair
long, and wears black eyeliner and other makeup on her face. Her face, however, maintains
masculine features, and her eyebrows have been removed and are drawn on with a thick black
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liner. She is not especially legible according to norms of female or male identity, but instead
marks a queer space in between. Turning to Romulo Castro, we see similarities between
photographs of him and photographs of Reyes. After discussing his photographs, I discuss their
shared features and what these features tell us about representing LGBTI asylum.
4.3.2

Romulo Castro
Born into a staunchly Catholic military family in Brazil in the late 1970s, Romulo Castro

spent most of his early life hiding his sexual orientation. Nevertheless, he reports a youth filled
with violence directed at him because he acted gay. Castro stated, “I was persecuted for being
fruity, a boy-girl, a fatso, a faggot – I felt like a monster.”386 In Brazil, Castro was raped by his
uncle at the age of twelve, sexually and physically abused by two police officers after leaving a
gay club as an adult, and the victim of violent persecution from his peers for most of his life.387
Castro initially came to the United States on a tourist visa in 2000 following the abuse he
suffered in Brazil. He overstayed his visa by eight years, but was able to get a hearing with
immigration officials in 2009. Following his hearing, he was granted asylum. Castro was the
feature of a New York Times profile and video interview in addition to several LGBTI blogs and
web news sites that covered his story.
Like Reyes, Castro faced skepticism from immigration officials who associated his home
nation with outlandish festivals and gay pride parades. Castro was told that he would not only
have to provide evidence of his own abuse, but also of widespread LGBTI persecution in Brazil.
Prior to his asylum hearing his immigration officer instructed him to gather evidence to show
that he risked persecution if he were to stay in Brazil. His file included articles detailing the
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persecution of gays in Brazil and a letter from his psychiatrist that confirmed his antidepressant
use and treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder related to the police officer abuse. He also
presented an affidavit written by his brother in Brazil that implored the U.S. to keep Castro
“forever away” from his family.388 In addition to the evidence of his past persecution, Castro
reports being advised by his immigration officer that flaunting his sexual orientation would help
him to best make his case for orientation-based asylum. He was encouraged to dress as his drag
queen alter-ego “Fidela Castro” – an alter-ego who had never made an appearance in Brazil but
who had appeared in several U.S. pride parades and drag shows.389 Although Castro declined his
immigration officer’s proposal to dress as Fidela, he did wear a pink, v-neck shirt and pink eye
shadow to his hearing. Pictures of him dressed as Fidela were used as evidence in his trial.
The irony of being told to perform the very identity that caused him to be persecuted in
Brazil was not lost on Castro. He stated that despite the abuse and suffering he faced in Brazil for
being gay, in the United States, “being gay was my salvation. So I knew I had to put on the
performance of my life.”390 Castro’s lawyer reportedly told him to “queen it up” – especially
because he had fled from a nation known for its massive pride parades.391 Lori Adams, a Human
Rights First lawyer who serves as an advisor to people seeking asylum based on sexual
orientation-based persecution, noted that in many of these types of asylum trials, immigration
officials must be able to visually verify the refugee’s homosexuality. Just as commentary around
Reyes’s case questioned the true threat of violence in her home nation, and whether she really
needed to be in the United States for her own safety, Castro had to prove that he was gay enough
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to be a target of violence, and that if he returned to Brazil he would face persecution for being
gay.
During his trial, Castro was reported to have cried several times. The articles available
do not state whether Castro was encouraged to cry, but Castro himself noted how stressful the
trial itself was. He stated that he was shaking and crying because he was afraid he would be
deported.392 In Juana Rodriguez’ analysis of the 1994 In re Tenorio asylum trial (which shares
many similarities with Castro’s trial), she reports that Tenório became emotional when the judge
began to recount the specific details of the most violent abuse he suffered while in Brazil. When
the judge asked questions about a time he was brutally beaten after leaving a dance club, Tenório
was forced “to both hear and repeat the epitaphs hurled against him.”393 For both Tenório and
Castro, the trial forced them to not only perform their sexual orientation, but to embody the
affect of queer citizenship. As Jose Cisneros argues, there is an inescapable link between affect,
performance, and citizenship that, when embodied, serves to constitute identifications and
motivate people to belief or action.394 These performances can make emotions present in a set of
cases, and they can serve as some mark of authenticity for refugees working to prove themselves
as credible and worthy of citizenship. The embodied affect of the performance allowed both
Tenório and Castro access to citizenship that is contradictory to traditionally masculinized (and
heterosexual) notions of citizenship.
The New York Times story about Castro features a brief (two minute and forty second)
video documenting his life in the United States. The video, produced by Dan Bilefsky and Ben
Solomon, repeats much of the same content as the New York Times article, but it warrants
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inclusion here through its footage of photographs that helped to document Castro’s sexual
orientation in court, as well as videos of Castro performing in drag. As the video opens, the
camera pans over Castro’s right shoulder to focus on a stack of photographs in his hands. It
zooms in on Fidela Castro in a short black wig and a black, purple and red dress, in front of a
rainbow flag on a parade float. The next minute of the film switches between the setting of
Castro’s apartment, where he is wearing t-shirt with the words “Legalize Gay” on the chest
showing photographs to the cameraperson, and alternatively, to footage of him walking down the
city street and speaking with the New York Times interviewer. All of the photographs Castro
holds in this scene depict him in some sort of drag. In addition to the pride parade float
photograph, there is a framed 8x11 photograph of Castro as Fidela in a black wig and red dress,
one of Castro in make-up and a dress without a wig, and another of him wearing a blue dress and
black bouffant wig performing with other drag queens in front of the Gay Men’s Chorus of New
York City.
In the photograph that accompanies the article, Castro sits solemnly on the couch,
holding the framed photograph of Fidela, looking down at a point between the camera and the
photograph in his hands. Behind him, there is another photograph of himself as Fidela in drag.
Here, he also wears a “Legalize Gay” t-shirt, but it is in colors different from the one he wears in
the video. The orchid color of this t-shirt is more traditionally feminine than the dark blue shirt
he wears in the short documentary. He also wears fingerless black and red striped gloves. Castro
is marked as a member of a sexual minority in this meta-photograph. He is both depicted in drag
and shown wearing a “Legalize Gay” shirt, which literally labels him as gay.
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Figure 8: Romulo Castro by Marcus Yam for the New York Times, 2008

The photograph is dark and shadow-filled, with Castro sitting in the middle third of the
photograph, surrounded by shadows on either side. He does not look directly at the camera, but
instead down, making what appears to be a pensive or possibly sad expression. The image itself
is very still. It appears to be posed rather than candid, and the dark shadows and Castro’s
downturned expression bring an air of sadness to the image. In the picture he holds, the frame is
too wide to determine his expression as Fidela, but the photograph in the background is cut
closer, showing Fidela smiling in the shadow over his shoulder.
Refugee photographs are typically indexical. The photographs from the Yarmouk camp,
the image of Aylan Kurdi’s body, and the pictures of the families moving through the river have
potential to make us aware of suffering we had ignored or not recognized. These images also
function as an exigence. They call us to recognize others’ suffering and implore us to consider
what we can do to help. In the case of refugees, this typically means that we must open our
borders and cities to a population seeking resettlement. Photographs like those of Reyes and
Castro are technically refugee photographs in the sense that they depict people who were once or
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are currently refugees. The sadness in these photographs still calls viewers to recognize
suffering, and they alert viewers to a change in their community – just a different type of change
than a large-scale refugee resettlement might create. If the photographs of LGBTI refugees
function as an exigence, it is less directed at calling on viewers to end some type of suffering and
more directed at calling on viewers to recognize the existence of and need for LGBTI asylum.
Unlike most other refugee photographs, Reyes and Castro are primarily depicted alone.
There is a portrait-like quality to the photographs – especially the one of Castro sitting in his
living room and the one of Reyes standing on her porch. In the moments of chaos, suffering, and
transition depicted in most refugee photographs, the focus of photographs of smaller groups of
people is primarily on family units. Women holding children and men passing children over
fences or onto rocky beaches feature prominently. By focusing on families, these images present
the coming community of refugees as one that is tied to the heterosexual family unit. In contrast,
Reyes and Castro are both alone and marked as queer. Alienated from their own families, LGBTI
asylees are left to find their own citizenship - highlighting one of the ways in which LGBTI
asylum itself contributes to a paradox of citizenship.
Although both the article and video discuss the challenges of needing to prove sexual
orientation for access to legal protection, the video and article photographs cannot fully depict
these challenges, so they instead resort to showing all of the ways in which Castro adheres to the
accepted behavior of a gay man in the United States. He sits in a room with large rainbow flags
on the windows and walls, the camera zooms in on his “Legalize Gay” t-shirt multiple times, and
the series of photographs of him in drag are a feature of the short film. The last lines of the video
acknowledge this effort to traffic in gay imagery, as Castro states: “It is a very very hard and is a
very intimidating process. It always come to your mind that, you know, am I gay enough? Am I
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going to show them that yes, I’m really gay?”395 The video frequently lingers on photographs of
Castro in drag, and Castro reports that his lawyers encouraged him to dress in drag.
Castro notes in the video that he did not begin performing in drag until several years after
he arrived in the United States. The repeated reference to his drag career, however, becomes a
marker of his lack of adherence to traditional gender norms. Perhaps in an effort to simplify the
complicated relationship between biology, sexual orientation, and gender identity, the argument
for how men can most effectively obtain asylum for sexual orientation persecution defaults to
arguments where a gay man is able to show that he is like a woman. The attention to Castro’s
performances in drag indicates that for people in the United States, a man in female drag is
particularly queer – it indicates a divorce from hypermasculinity that is most understandable as
something “gay.” And yet, counter to masculine ideals of citizenship, Castro’s claim to
citizenship is only accepted if he can prove himself to be less masculine. The attention to drag
and the conflict over femininity and masculinity in LGBTI asylum cases highlights the problems
with institutional reinforcement of binary notions of gender and sexuality.
The photographs of Reyes and Castro share many features. Not only are they (as
individuals) the focus of these portraits, but their surroundings also carry a permanence not seen
in other refugee photographs. Reyes and Castro are depicted in or near homes or offices. They
are not shown in transition, and there is no implied temporariness to their surroundings. Their
faces show expressions of sadness but are not contorted in pain, anxiety, or fear. In addition to
the requirement for both Castro and Reyes to appear in a way counter to some unspecified,
heterosexual norm, both of their cases featured affective displays that helped the courts to
categorize them in a certain way. The most commonly published photograph of Reyes shows her
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crying; Castro chokes up in his video and acknowledges that he cried during his asylum hearing.
This display of emotion can serve double duty – it can be read as authentic fear of persecution or
pain over past abuse and it can register both people as more feminine (which, in these cases,
translates as queer).396 Crying may allow both Reyes and Castro to appear as needing U.S.
support and possibly shows their fear of returning to their home nation, but the crying in their
photographs looks different than the expressions of pain and suffering in photographs of refugees
fleeing Syria.
Whereas the crying and sadness in the photographs helps to reinforce the idea that these
refugees struggled or faced pain, the smiling in the other photographs reinforces the narrative
that refugees struggles can be solved through migration to the United States. As Berlant explains,
migrants are desirable for the U.S. because they desire America. The smiling photographs help
show another way in which discourses of LGBTI asylum uphold a homonationalism. The
struggling, queer, asylum seeker is “saved” through their acceptance into the United States.
Reyes on the porch and Romulo in drag illustrate how U.S. citizenship becomes the source of
happiness for LGBTI asylum seekers who, once in the United States can be disciplined into
upholding homonationalism through their espousal of pro-American sentiments and embodiment
of American identities. This Americentrism is revealed through photographs of them enjoying
rural, domestic life that is what most in the U.S. have come to understand as queer: Castro, in
drag – or quotidian – Reyes on her porch.
Photographs of LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees inherently fit within the larger
distinct genre of refugee photography. But while refugee photographs tend to feature the mass
movement of migrants, family units, frenzied and chaotic scenes, and the outdoors or other
396
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temporary space, photographs of LGBTI refugees and asylees focus on individuals standing or
sitting, in a safe, calm, and permanent space. Both sets of images show affective displays of
sadness or related emotions, but LGBTI photographs lack the fear, faces contorted in pain, and
anxiety prominent in pictures of other refugees. Refugee photographs feature transition and
temporariness, where LGBTI refugee photographs most often show people who have reached
their destination – both in their physical location and their place in the asylum process. Yet, in
presenting queer, calm, individuals in living rooms, porches, and offices, photographs of LGBTI
migrants help to partially rupture understanding of what is meant by “refugee photography.”
Instead of limiting refugee status in the collective imaginary to only include masses of people
displaced because of war or conflict, the photographs of LGBTI refugees expand the idea of
what a refugee can look like or be. These photographs acknowledge that refugees are not just
helpless, anonymous masses of people moving toward the camera and our communities. In
helping to depict people not typically or easily marked as refugees, however, LGBTI migrants
may invoke reactions that see them as excludable for failing to be visibly in need of refuge.
Sexual orientation and gender identity are so far removed from most refugee photographs that
the ways in which Reyes and Castro are visually depicted as queer may also seem to mark them
as different from other refugees. This could be seen as a disadvantage to a comprehensive
understanding of refugeeness, or it could help to expand refugeeness to account for queer bodies
and alter the standing of refugees within the civic imaginary.
4.4

Queering the Genre of Refugee Photography
In its early stages, this dissertation project purported that cases of LGBTI asylum might

hold the potential to queer citizenship. While the analysis of the precedent-setting case and the
current training materials for immigration officers has indicated that a queered citizenship will
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not be an outcome of the institutional responses to LGBTI asylum cases, the analysis of images
of LGBTI asylum has suggested potential for queering in another space – the genre of refugee
photography. Photographs of LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees both exist within and rupture
the genre of refugee photography. Technically, a photograph of an LGBTI asylum seeker or
refugee is a refugee photograph, yet in depicting individuals, far from the moment of migration,
in permanent structures, and with evidence of a queer sexual orientation or gender identity, they
are not recognizable as such. These photographs serve as reminders that there is no universal
refugee experience. And although they are not immediately recognizable as “refugee
photographs,” images of LGBTI refugees alert us to the ways in which we might be engaging
with photographs of large-scale refugee migrations in a way that is less than civil, and encourage
us to think about all refugee photographs as evidence of the ways we are all governed and have
the potential to be displaced or to incorporate one another into our new and changing
communities.
Both sets of images depict people who have been so persecuted that they must leave their
homeland. But only those who are able to be an individual in the U.S. apart from a mass of other
migrants can truly be happy. It is possible that images of mass movements of refugees highlight
problems with photographs of individual LGBTI asylum seekers more than photographs of
individual LGBTI asylum seekers highlight problems with images of mass movements of
refugees. Together they alert us to a common media narrative in which migrants in the East are
suffering, they lack individual agency, and they will continue to suffer until they are settled in
permanent structures in the West. The photograph of Reyes smiling and the photographs of
Castro smiling in drag function to show the United States as a place where queer refugees can be
happy and free. This idea that migrants can only smile in the West reinforces homonationalism
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as it attempts to emphasize disparities in happiness and other resources between the East and
West.
4.5

Conclusions: Refugee Photographs and Creating the Queer Citizen
In the rare instance that a specific LGBTI asylum case receives media attention, the

stories are often accompanied by images of the asylees themselves and real or simulated
evidence from the case. Comparing images of LGBTI migrant citizenship reveals the ways shifts
in legal understanding of citizenship alter our cultural understandings of citizenship in ways
different than traditional refugee photographs. They alert us to the possibility that our collective
definitions of “refugee” may need expansion from the categories of people who are fleeing
widespread, institutional violence, and it reminds us that sexual orientation and gender identity
continue to be targeted in a way that might require asylum as an alternative to living in one’s
home. These images and their surrounding discourse help build the political imagining of LGBTI
refugees and asylees in the U.S., and in so doing, shift or construct anew our understanding of
citizenship.
Photographs function as part of a civic imaginary. Through photojournalistic images of
others, we can better understand others’ and our own citizenship. Efforts to depict global
atrocities and widespread migration bring about a set of questions concerning how to best
represent widespread, disparate tragedies and how, as spectators, we should (or should not) look
at those tragedies. The images of LGBTI asylees accompanying news stories about sexual
orientation persecution/asylum are important because they contribute to the collective imagining
of this population. Seeing others is important for social and political action; the images we have
of others are carried with us and impact our understanding of citizenship (discursively and
visually), which in turn informs policy. Imagining is not merely a transmission of information. It
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emerges through intersubjective relations and creates a new public – it is both constitutive and
collective.397 For Asen, times of public controversy unsettle collective imaginaries – they call
imaginaries into question and lead members of a group to reconsider the foundation of their
beliefs.
By looking at photographs of others, we define and contextualize our own place in the
world. Photography is crucial to the larger process by which we imagine what it means to
become, and to be, a citizen. Widely circulated photographs can constitute new or altered
understandings of one’s own citizenship. In Danielle Alan’s book Talking With Strangers:
Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown vs. Board of Education, she argues that photographs
depicting the mobs that confronted young students entering white schools inspired a “psychic
transformation of the citizenry” in which Americans had to confront the meaning of their
citizenship in that time and place.398 For Robert Hariman and John Lucaites, this process of
contextualization reaffirms a collective American citizen identity; our citizenship is defined
through common spectatorship. As we encounter images of violence, we see ourselves in relation
to but abstracted from the perpetrators of that violence.399 Hariman and Lucaites are particularly
interested in how iconic images reveal the cultural rules that proscribe citizenship in different
contexts. Their insights help show how the process of imagining oneself as part of a public or
citizenry can be structured through shared images. In sharing photographs we come to see what
types of citizenship are valued. Cara Finnegan, for example, has demonstrated this relationship
over the course of U.S. history. She addresses how portraits of prominent individuals “served as
397
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a way of educating the masses about what it meant to be a virtuous citizen,” in the nineteenth
century400 how visual arts became “the form of communication closest to a model of ideal
citizenship” in the New Deal era,401 and has traced the iconoclasm in our public sphere theory
that privileges certain modes of vision over others.402 Through visual images – particularly
through photographs – we calibrate our own understanding about good citizenship.403 Broadly
speaking, photography tells us who we are.
In creating identification, however, photographs also alert us to differences; they make us
aware of “others” and divisions.404 John Lucaites addresses the power dynamic inherent in
photography, noting, “As civic performance, citizenship relies upon one’s capacity as both agent
and spectator, enacting the demands of civic life for the benefit of others to witness or observe—
if not judge, while also viewing the world through the eyes of the citizen.”405 Refugee
photographs are especially susceptible to judgment of power differences and to concerns over
objectification. It cannot be guaranteed that only viewers who will keep these ideas about
privilege and power in mind will encounter photographs of suffering. Making sense of how
photographs of LGBTI refugees belong in and trouble the genre of refugee photography more
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broadly allows us to think about the relationship between citizen and refugee, individually
targeted and institutional persecution, and the role of the “coming community” in the effort to
expand their perspective of which type of migrant belongs in the United States. Just as there is no
universally accepted picture of a refugee, there is not a universally accepted image of an LGBTI
asylum seeker. The comparison of the tropes prevalent in both sets of images establishes a need
for more humanizing photographs of all migrants and sets forth a reminder to those of us viewing
these images to avoid generalizations in spite of what we repeatedly see.
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5

CONCLUSIONS

The history of LGBTI asylum in the United States is one that reflects a persistent struggle
between inclusivity and sovereignty. And while progress is encumbered by institutional
restrictions and a series of ever more specific normativities, there exists within this system
potential for positive change. In this conclusion I consider these tensions between equality and
exclusion as well as the potential future directions of this project. I proceed by first addressing
the main claims from the three chapters and articulating the contributions this project makes in
the field of rhetoric. Next I consider the insights this project makes to the concept of
“homonationalism.” Finally, I return to the concept of “queer citizenship” to consider a future in
which queer citizenship could exist.
5.1

Reflecting on Rhetorical Precedent and Homonationalism
In this dissertation I traced the adjudication of LGBTI asylum cases in the United States

beginning with the Matter of Toboso-Alfonso. This chapter dealt with the ways this case was
argued and eventually named as precedent. From the decision in 1990 to grant asylum to
Toboso-Alfonso and the establishment of his case as legal precedent in 1994, the U.S. presented
itself as a refuge for LGBTI people who could not live in their home nation for fear of
persecution. The case set in place a rhetorical precedent that established displays of certain
legible identities as necessary for proof of sexual orientation persecution. By referring to this
standard as a “rhetorical precedent” we are better equipped to consider the ways rhetoric gets
bound to and rooted in institutional discourses and circulated in a social imaginary. Those who
do not or cannot adhere to the established standard through their appearance, speech, and
argument will not receive asylum unless immigration officers are able to expand their
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understanding of the ways in which gender identity and sexual orientation are not always clearly
categorized. This rhetorical precedent evolved and developed further in the institutional efforts to
regulate and systematize the process of adjudication in LGBTI asylum cases.
The insight this project offers on the development of a rhetorical precedent provides
several jumping off points for future research. I plan to more thoroughly place this concept in
conversation with other theories of citizenship (in and outside of rhetoric). For example, Rogers
Smith discusses the ways citizenship is frequently “ascribed” based on a hierarchical
interpretation of different involuntary traits like gender or race, and Robert Hariman and John
Lucaites orient their perspective of citizenship toward the ways in which “public identity is
created as a potentially vital form of political affiliation.”406 Both of these perspectives are
helpful for thinking about the relationship between social interactions and the value of
individuals’ citizenship. However, my concept of “rhetorical precedent” offers a way to better
understand the relationship between institutional discourses, rhetorical performances, and the
social imaginary. All three function in relation to one another as, for example, social imaginaries
influence the writing of legislation and decisions rendered in court cases. These institutional
discourses in turn impact the identity performances of those whose lives are most directly
impacted by these discourses. The cycle of influence continues here, as these performances
shape understandings in the social imaginary, and again shape institutional discourses. Tracing
the decision in Toboso-Alfonso and its establishment as legal precedent allows us to see the
performances that are then expected of this population and the call to develop new institutional
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discourses (like the RAIO training module) as the collective understanding of LGBTI people
evolves.
In the third chapter I looked to the RAIO training module released twenty-two years after
Toboso-Alfonso, which reflects efforts by the USCIS to negotiate competing demands for
progress toward sexual equality and the maintenance of a safe, sovereign United States. This
analysis uncovered the system through which national heteronormativity and homonationalism is
upheld by efforts to incorporate certain people (particularly transgender people) and the ways the
efforts were burdened by a limited understanding of sexual orientation and gender identity. In the
final chapter I looked to the ways the rhetorical precedent facing LGBTI asylum seekers resulted
in a pattern of circulated images that upheld certain normative understandings of LGBTI identity.
By placing these images in the genre of refugee photography to which they technically belong, I
uncovered the difficulty facing representations of transitional populations, and the struggle to
allow refugees to be humanized individuals who are also in need. By considering the place of
LGBTI refugees within the social imaginary, I uncover the ways rhetorical precedent shaped the
demands placed on this population both in the courtroom and in their visual depictions outside of
the courtroom.
Through this analysis I offer a way to think about citizenship and civic identity as
concomitantly identified, exclusionary, and imagined through attention to the material
consequences of these processes. This project makes an ethical/political contribution to the field
of rhetorical studies because it reminds us that to deny or ignore sexual identity in our
discussions about civic identity is to reinforce national heteronormativity. Our sexual and civic
identities are inextricably linked, but for LGBTI asylum seekers, the institution that has the
power to grant citizenship mandates the persistence of that linkage in more obvious ways. My
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analysis of LGBTI asylum seekers in the United States immigration system provides a means for
reflection of the ways in which the institution of citizenship cannot be fully rejected merely
because it is exclusionary or because it remains an institution tied up with a series of privileges.
There is potential within the system of U.S. citizenship for progress that does incorporate
different bodies, and this case study of LGBTI asylum helps show the ways in which this
progress could occur. This reflection also requires us to consider the ways in which the privileges
of citizenship are always bound to civic and sexual identity, and that in denying or ignoring that
fact, we serve to perpetuate the system of exclusions – one that is most often combined in this
project with the terms homonationalism and heteronormativity.
The process through which LGBTI asylum seekers are adjudicated helps to uphold a
system of national heteronormativity and homonationalism in which room is made for certain
bodies and identities within the citizenry under the guise of progress while other bodies and
identities are foreclosed. However, the system through which homonationalism and
heteronormativity operate is not monolithic or universally oppressive. There exists the possibility
that homonationalism in particular could even be desirable to some – it offers a way to thrive in
the United States while embracing the benefits of citizenship while maintaining a minoritized
sexual orientation. Further, as the efforts to incorporate different bodies and identities are
articulated in the RAIO training module and beyond, there does appear to be a concerted effort to
include all LGBTI people who are suffering. The United States may ultimately seek these
inclusions while at the same time engaging in a project of orientalism that demonizes other
cultures. However, there does exist an effort to work against this perspective through documents
and regulations that account for the different permutations of sexual orientation and gender
identity as it is articulated around the world. Thus, the very system that created and upheld
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national heteronormativity and homonationalism may be slowly, unwittingly eroding it. Future
versions of this project will seek to understand how this erosion might happen and/or consider
the ways LGBTI asylum seekers in the social imaginary may both exist within these systems of
oppression while concomitantly working aslant them.
5.2

Queering citizenship?
To queer is to destabilize, to upheave, overthrow, or rupture. Queering something does

not necessarily eliminate it. Queering is a beginning, not an end. It is an embodied, multiply
transitive, both/and. In this dissertation, I began with a broadly optimistic premise that the
paradox of LGBTI asylum in which access to legal citizenship predicated on the embodiment of
an impaired or denounced cultural citizenship might hold the potential to queer the institution of
citizenship in the United States. The granting of LGBTI asylum seemed, at least, to rupture the
inherent and embedded heteronormativity of U.S. citizenship. After considering the ways in
which LGBTI asylum emerged, was regulated, and was represented, one conclusion is that both
institutional and cultural discourses of LGBTI asylum cannot queer citizenship. Yes, these
discourses can make known heteronormativity and can erode it, but ultimately, they serve only to
extend and codify normative identity practices in a way that regulates bodies and ensures both
national heteronormativity and homonationalism persist.
Throughout the history of LGBTI asylum, the construction of LGBTI refugees and
asylum seekers in the social imaginary has more often drawn boundaries around acceptable
identities than it has penetrated or eliminated those boundaries. Institutional discourses have an
interest in structure, labels, known quantities, and categorization. Thus, institutional discourse
will inevitably resist rupture. In setting Toboso-Alfonso as precedent, the U.S. government
sought to give structure to a new form of asylum that was not receiving consistent adjudication
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across the United States. One of the outcomes of structuring that type of asylum around a case
like Toboso-Alfonso is a system that is most effective in dealing with LGBTI asylum claims in
which the applicant embodies immigration officers’ assumptions about what a (gay) migrant
looks or sounds like, and for whom persecution is well-documented and easy to understand as
persecution. The RAIO training module created to ensure consistent, fair adjudication of LGBTI
asylum claims ultimately defined LGBTI people in a way that ensured only the most legible gay
bodies could be incorporated into the citizenry. The full elimination of “queer” identities and the
enforcement of the immutability standard enforced a straight, American perspective of LGBTI
identity and self-identification in a way that ignores the variety of ways in which sexual
orientation and gender identity might be expressed. Both Toboso-Alfonso and the RAIO training
module create as much exclusion as they do inclusion.
Through the visual representations of LGBTI asylum in photojournalism, the norms that
contribute to homonationalism are further codified despite originating from media institutions.
Just as norms emerging from legislation and government documents enforce certain exclusions
and ultimately reinforce our understanding of our own citizenship, photojournalism allows us to
look at individual LGBTI asylum seekers and decide for ourselves whether they can and do fit in
our own social imaginaries of the United States. Ultimately, photographs of LGBTI asylum
seekers come closest to rupturing heteronormativity and homonationalism, but in isolating
LGBTI asylum seekers into portraits, they lack the clear standing as members of our collective.
They are distanced and strange in the same ways the subjects of large-scale refugee crisis
photographs keep us from making sense of their place in our world.
This dissertation serves as a reminder that our efforts toward progressive queer politics in
U.S. global human rights policy will always exist in tension with the structured, institutionalized
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heteronormative and homonationalist politics that continue to find ways to impose legal
regulations on LGBTI people. Our efforts as a nation to improve the lives of LGBTI people
abroad can sometimes distract from the ways in which we continue to deny LGBTI people in the
United States both legal and cultural citizenship.
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